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Essays On Economic Behavior Under Uncertainty 
Abstract 
I study individuals' behavior under uncertainty and its implications for economies. In Chapter 1, I study a 
decision problem under uncertainty about multiple issues. In this environment, a decision maker may 
avoid uncertain acts that depend on many issues since it can be harder to form a belief about multiple 
issues jointly than about individual issues separately. I provide a novel behavioral property, Multi-issue 
Uncertainty Aversion, which captures this idea. I show that, for invariant biseparable preferences, 
exhibiting Multi-issue Uncertainty Aversion is equivalent to having a belief satisfying two conditions: 
richness of the core of the joint belief and superadditivity of the marginal beliefs. The richness condition 
provides a novel way of comparing a decision maker's degrees of uncertainty aversion about different 
sets of issues. In Chapter 2, I develop a signaling model to examine the idea that when there is more than 
one sender, a receiver may evaluate their signaling choices relatively. This idea is related to whether 
students will choose their education levels competitively based on what others choose even if there is no 
direct competition between them. My model extends the job market signaling game of Spence (1973) so 
that there are two workers, and each worker has a two-dimensional type, one dimension of which is 
positively correlated across workers. It is shown that, in this game, there exists an equilibrium in which a 
worker's wage is decreasing in the other's education level, which may result in competitive behavior in 
signaling. Chapter 3 provides novel axiomatizations of Choquet Expected Utility functions with convex 
capacities and disjointly superadditive capacities, respectively. I first show that one can characterize the 
two properties in alternative ways using the rank-dependent probabilities associated with a capacity. 
These new characterizations elucidate the tight connections between the properties and a decision 
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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR UNDER UNCERTAINTY
Youngsoo Heo
David Dillenberger and Andrew Postlewaite
I study individuals’ behavior under uncertainty and its implications for economies.
In Chapter 1, I study a decision problem under uncertainty about multiple issues. In
this environment, a decision maker may avoid uncertain acts that depend on many
issues since it can be harder to form a belief about multiple issues jointly than about
individual issues separately. I provide a novel behavioral property, Multi-issue Un-
certainty Aversion, which captures this idea. I show that, for invariant biseparable
preferences, exhibiting Multi-issue Uncertainty Aversion is equivalent to having a be-
lief satisfying two conditions: richness of the core of the joint belief and superadditivity
of the marginal beliefs. The richness condition provides a novel way of comparing
a decision maker’s degrees of uncertainty aversion about different sets of issues. In
Chapter 2, I develop a signaling model to examine the idea that when there is more
than one sender, a receiver may evaluate their signaling choices relatively. This idea
is related to whether students will choose their education levels competitively based
on what others choose even if there is no direct competition between them. My model
extends the job market signaling game of Spence (1973) so that there are two workers,
and each worker has a two-dimensional type, one dimension of which is positively cor-
related across workers. It is shown that, in this game, there exists an equilibrium in
which a worker’s wage is decreasing in the other’s education level, which may result in
competitive behavior in signaling. Chapter 3 provides novel axiomatizations of Cho-
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quet Expected Utility functions with convex capacities and disjointly superadditive
capacities, respectively. I first show that one can characterize the two properties in
alternative ways using the rank-dependent probabilities associated with a capacity.
These new characterizations elucidate the tight connections between the properties
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Chapter 1
Uncertainty Aversion With Multiple Issues
1.1 Introduction
Motivation. Many decision problems involve uncertainty about multiple issues. An
investor selecting a portfolio faces uncertainty about the returns of different securities,
and an analyst making a forecast must consider many aspects of a firm that will evolve
over time. It is both natural and common that people divide future uncertainty
into several issues either because a future event is just a combination of outcomes
regarding each issue or because the division provides a more convenient way to think
about future events. Regardless of the reason, once they do separate the issues, people
are likely to form a belief about future events based on the relevant issues. In other
words, they first think about the likelihoods of outcomes regarding individual issues
separately and then go on to consider the relationship between issues—for example,
whether the returns of securities are positively or negatively correlated.
The process of uncovering the relationship or correlation across issues adds signi-
ficant challenges to the entire belief-formation process. One reason is the possibility
of insufficient information. For example, an investor trying to learn the correla-
tion between the returns of various securities from past data would need frequent
simultaneous observations of the returns, which may not exist.1 Another reason is
computational complexity. Even if a sizable amount of data is gleaned, deriving a
sophisticated estimation from them may not be easy, especially when a large number















Figure 1.1: Options considered in the thought experiment: The numbers in each cell
represent the probabilities of a subject receiving a good prize, $100.
of issues are involved.2
In light of this difficulty, more issues being involved may mean a larger amount of
uncertainty, which an uncertainty averse decision maker would try to avoid. In other
words, when there are two options and one of them depends on a smaller set of issues
than the other, the decision maker may select the former to reduce the amount of
uncertainty she faces. This paper formalizes a concept of uncertainty aversion in this
sense.
The following thought experiment makes our idea concrete. Suppose there is an
urn which contains 100 balls in it. Each ball is colored, either yellow (Y ) or blue
(B), and marked with a letter, either L or R, but the exact composition of the urn is
unknown. A ball is to be randomly drawn from the urn. There are three options a
subject is asked to rank before a ball is drawn. The options are depicted in Figure 1.1.
The two rows, Y and B, represent the color of the ball, and the two columns, L and
R, the letter marked on the ball. The numbers in each cell are the probabilities of
the subject receiving a good prize, $100. For example, if the subject chooses option
Y , then she receives $100 for sure if the ball is yellow and $0 for sure if it is blue
(regardless of its letter).
2Various challenges in estimating high-dimensional models including correlations are documented
in the literature, for example, by Chan et al. (1999) and Chib et al. (2006). See also surveys by
Andersen et al. (2006) and Bauwens et al. (2006).
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A plausible ranking over these options is
Y ∼ L M . (1.1)
A subject may explain these preferences by the following argument. First, due to the
principle of insufficient reason, the subject may deem the events equally likely and
thus be indifferent between betting on colors and betting on letters, which leads to
Y ∼ L. Second, our argument for the strict parts (Y M and L M) is as follows.
Both options Y and L depend only on one issue, either colors (option Y ) or letters
(option L). However, if the subject chooses option M , she will be exposed to the
uncertainty about colors, letters, and the correlation between them. To avoid this
additional uncertainty, the subject may rank options Y and L over M , resulting in
the order in (1.1).
There are two interesting aspects about the illustrated ranking. First, it is incon-
sistent with Subjective Expected Utility (Anscombe and Aumann, 1963). In other
words, whatever probability distribution over Y L, Y R, BL, and BR an expected
utility maximizer holds, she will not exhibit the ranking in (1.1). Since option M is a
mixture of options Y and L (with weights 0.3 on Y and 0.7 on L), an expected utility
maximizer would rank option M between Y and L, which is not the case in (1.1).
Second, even though we motivated the ranking as a behavior that captures a desire to
avoid uncertainty, it is also inconsistent with the Uncertainty Aversion axiom of Gil-
boa and Schmeidler (1989; GS henceforth). Under their assumption, option M must
be weakly preferred to options Y and L because it is a mixture of those two indifferent
options.3 GS asserts that a mixture of alternatives gives a hedging opportunity, and
uncertainty averse behavior is characterized by preferring the hedging effect faced by
3We provide the formal definition of the Uncertainty Aversion axiom in Section 1.4.
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an uncertain situation. However, if the alternatives to be mixed depend on distinct
issues and a decision maker poorly understands the relationship between the issues,
then such a hedging effect is likely to be marginal at best. Rather, some mixtures,
such as option M , may increase the number of uncertain dimensions, thus becoming a
more uncertain alternative. Our thought experiment illustrates that when a decision
maker is concerned about the number of issues relevant to each alternative, the choi-
ces she makes to avoid uncertainty may directly conflict with the prominent concept
of Uncertainty Aversion that GS provides. As the multi-issue structure is common,
natural, and widely used in the economics literature, this behavior pattern merits a
thorough exploration.
Preview of main results. Our primary goal in this paper is to formalize the novel
behavioral concept of uncertainty aversion illustrated in our thought experiment and
then to examine what condition on utility functions is consistent with such behavior.
We answer these questions using the framework of Anscombe and Aumann (1963),
in which a decision maker chooses among acts—mappings from states to lotteries.
Crucially, on top of the standard model, we additionally assume that the set of states
is a product set, reflecting the multi-issue environment. Then, in Section 1.4, we
define a behavioral property called Multi-issue Uncertainty Aversion (MIUA). It can
be decomposed into two parts. One requires that when there are pairwise indifferent
acts that depend on distinct issues, a mixture of them, which demands multi-issue
considerations, must be less preferred to each individual act. This part captures
the behavior manifested by the ranking (1.1) in our thought experiment. The other
part imposes the Uncertainty Aversion axiom of GS among acts that depend on a
single issue. Even though mixtures are not globally preferred under MIUA, it is still
desirable when only one issue matters and hence a decision maker is not concerned
4
about an increase in the number of relevant issues. Thus, MIUA is viewed as an
extension of the Uncertainty Aversion axiom of GS to a multi-issue environment.
To characterize the set of utility functions consistent with MIUA, we focus on
the class of invariant biseparable preferences proposed by Ghirardato, Maccheroni,
and Marinacci (2004) and studied by Gilboa, Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Schmeid-
ler (2010) and Chandrasekher, Frick, Iijima, and Le Yaouanq (2020) among others.
This broad class includes Subjective Expected Utility, Choquet Expected Utility
(Schmeidler, 1989), and Maxmin Expected Utility preferences (GS). The latter is
achieved by imposing the Uncertainty Aversion axiom on the invariant biseparable
preference.4 A nice property this class provides is that we can separate a decision
maker’s preference over lotteries (represented by a utility index) and her belief about
states (represented by a belief functional). In particular, her risk attitude is fully cap-
tured by the former, while her uncertainty attitude—which is our main focus here—is
captured by the latter.
In our characterization, we use the concept of a core that is widely used in the
literature about uncertainty aversion (Ghirardato and Marinacci, 2002; Chateauneuf
and Tallon, 2002; Grant and Polak, 2013). Our main result shows that MIUA is
equivalent to the combination of two conditions: richness of the core of a joint belief
and superadditivity of marginal beliefs (Theorem 1.1). While the latter directly comes
from GS’s Uncertainty Aversion imposed on each single issue, the richness is a novel
condition we provide in this paper. This condition compares the core of a decision
maker’s joint belief to the cores of her marginal beliefs about individual issues. The
richness condition is satisfied when the former is sufficiently large relative to the
4On the other hand, the variational preference (Maccheroni et al., 2006) is derived by adding
the Uncertainty Aversion axiom to a set of axioms weaker than those of the invariant biseparable
preference. Ghirardato and Siniscalchi (2012) also analyze a class of preferences that subsumes
invariant biseparable preferences.
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latter. It can be interpreted as the decision maker being more averse to uncertainty
about the entire set of issues collectively than to uncertainty about individual issues
separately. This interpretation is exactly how we motivate the ranking (1.1) in our
thought experiment.
Related literature. Starting with the seminal work of Ellsberg (1961), the notion
of uncertainty (or ambiguity) aversion has been widely studied. Schmeidler (1989)
introduces non-additive probability (or capacity) and provides the foundation of the
Choquet Expected Utility. This generalization of Subjective Expected Utility can
accommodate the behavior in Ellsberg (1961) along with the Uncertainty Aversion
axiom (See also Wakker (1990) for an alternative formulation). This axiom is also
used to establish the axiomatic foundations of the Maxmin Expected Utility (Gilboa
and Schmeidler, 1989) and the variational preference (Maccheroni, Marinacci, and
Rustichini, 2006; Strzalecki, 2011). As we already noted, we will extend this axiom
to a multi-issue environment in a way that preference for a mixture is not global.
Other notions of uncertainty aversion have been discussed in the literature as well.
Epstein (1999) and Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002) provide intuitive definitions in
analogous ways to risk aversion. Chateauneuf and Tallon (2002) weaken the Un-
certainty Aversion axiom of GS to propose Preference for Sure Diversification. Our
paper is closely related to Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002) and Chateauneuf and
Tallon (2002) in that the characterization of utility functions is achieved through the
concept of a core. Moreover, the property MIUA is shown to be equivalent to their
axioms under some circumstances, which we discuss in Section 1.5 (Theorem 1.3).
However, we demonstrate a novel way of using a core to compare a decision maker’s
different degrees of aversion to uncertainty about different sets of issues. This con-
trasts with Ghirardato and Marinacci’s comparing degrees of uncertainty aversion of
6
two different decision makers.
In our comparison of degrees of aversion, a decision maker exhibiting MIUA can
be understood to be less averse to one issue than to multiple issues. In this sense, our
notion of an i-act, which depends only on one issue i, is similar to an unambiguous
act defined in Epstein (1999) and Epstein and Zhang (2001); however, there are two
differences. One is that MIUA allows a decision maker to have a Maxmin Expected
Utility preference among i-acts, whereas the preference over unambiguous acts is
probabilistically sophisticated in their model. The other is that while i-acts in our
model are exogenously given, unambiguous acts are subjective and identified from a
decision maker’s preference in their model.
Models with a product set of states have been studied in many papers. Walley
and Fine (1982), Hendon, Jacobsen, Sloth, and Tranæs (1996), and Ghirardato (1997)
study capacities on product sets with implications for the Choquet Expected Utility
preference. GS also studies the Maxmin Expected Utility with a product set of states.
Some of the preferences proposed in these papers will be discussed in Section 1.6 and
shown to be consistent with MIUA. Ergin and Gul (2009) also study a model with
two-dimensional states in the Savage (1972) framework. They call each dimension
an issue, the term we adopt in this paper. Unlike ours, however, their paper regards
different issues as different stages of a compound lottery. A decision maker in their
model has a probabilistic belief about each issue, treats two issues as independent of
each other, and evaluates an act in an iterative manner by resolving one issue after
another as if she has a second-order belief (Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji, 2005;
Seo, 2009). In other words, two issues in their model have a vertical relationship as
the risk about lotteries and the uncertainty about states do in the Anscombe and
Aumann framework. The issues in our model, however, are parallel.
In addition to these theoretical analyses, Epstein and Halevy (2019) run a labora-
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tory experiment that incorporates two-dimensional states. Their experiment is very
closely related to our thought experiment, and the underlying ideas are similar. Ho-
wever, our theoretical analysis presented in this paper does not directly address their
experimental observations. While we study the GS type mixture of acts that entang-
les multiple issues, the options in their experiment are understood to be generated
by a different type of mixture. We will elaborate more on this point in Section 1.7.
We believe that studying both types of behavior is vital in understanding uncertainty
aversion in multi-issue environments.
Our paper is related to the literature on correlation misperception and correla-
tion neglect in that we consider a situation in which correlations between multiple
issues are poorly understood. Ellis and Piccione (2017) study a model in which a
decision maker correctly understands what outcomes can be realized from each alter-
native, but has an incorrect understanding of what joint realizations of outcomes can
be obtained from multiple alternatives (correlation misperception). Kochov (2018)
focuses on the preferences that arise from misunderstanding the autocorrelations of
outcomes across periods in a dynamic model. Levy and Razin (in press) study how a
forecast about a multi-dimensional state can be made by combining multiple sources
of information when the correlations between them are unknown. They show that
under certain conditions, a forecaster may make a prediction as if there is no correla-
tion at all (correlation neglect). Recent experimental studies also suggest that people
often neglect correlations between asset returns (Eyster and Weizsäcker, 2016) and
information sources (Enke and Zimmermann, 2019). While these papers study the
implications of subjectively assuming an incorrect correlation different from the true
or objective one, we focus on the behavior that favors an alternative whose outcome
distribution is independent of the unknown correlation.
Last but not least, our analysis has implications for under-diversification obser-
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ved in financial markets (Dow and Werlang, 1992; Cao, Wang, and Zhang, 2005;
Easley and O’Hara, 2009, Boyle, Garlappi, Uppal, and Wang, 2012; Gorton and Me-
trick, 2013). In particular, the property MIUA provides a way to directly impose
anti-diversifying behavior, and the utility functions presented in Section 1.6 can be
used to represent such behavior. We will discuss more in this regard in Section 1.7.
Organization of the paper. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We
present our model in Section 1.2 and introduce the invariant biseparable preference
in Section 1.3. In Section 1.4, we define MIUA and present our main result, charac-
terizing the utility functions consistent with MIUA. Section 1.5 discusses a special
case with additive marginal beliefs and shows that MIUA can be characterized more
simply in that case. Then, we discuss examples of utility functions in Section 1.6
and our model’s implications for under-diversification in financial markets and its




Let I be a nonempty finite set. Each element in I is called an issue. For each issue
i ∈ I, Si is a nonempty finite set, whose elements are quasi-states or i-quasi-states
which encode complete descriptions of all relevant consequences regarding issue i. A
state is an element of the product set S = Xi∈ISi. A subset of S is called an event.
A nonempty set Z is the set of outcomes. The set of all simple lotteries, that
is, probability measures with finite supports, over Z is denoted by L. An act is a
function f : S → L, which prescribes which lottery will be delivered at each future
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state. We denote the set of all acts by F . A decision maker’s (DM henceforth)
preference, denoted by %, is a complete and transitive binary relation over F . As
usual,  and ∼ denote the asymmetric and symmetric parts of %, respectively.
1.2.2 Terminology and notation
In this subsection, we provide some terminology and notation that will be used throug-
hout this paper. For a nonempty subset J of I, we write SJ = Xi∈JSi. We call an
element of SJ a J-quasi-state and a subset of SJ a J-quasi-event. When J = {i} is
a singleton, we simply write i-quasi-state and i-quasi-event. When J is clear from
the context, we may drop J to call them a quasi-state and a quasi-event, respecti-
vely. Similar simplification will be applied to other notations, too, whenever it is
convenient.
Given the product structure of the set of states, some events may be independent
of a certain set of issues. When we can tell whether an event occurs or not only by
looking at issues in J ⊂ I, the event is called a J-event. Likewise, when the final
lottery delivered by an act can be completely determined by issues in J ⊂ I, the act
is called a J-act. Formally, for a nonempty subset J ⊂ I, an event E ⊂ S is called
a J-event if E = EJ × SJc for some J-quasi-event EJ ⊂ SJ . The collection of all
J-events forms an algebra AJ on S. Given this, an act is a J-act if it is measurable
with respect to AJ . We denote the set of all J-acts by FJ . We use an analogous
notation F∅ to denote the set of all constant acts. We say that an issue i is irrelevant
to an act if the act belongs to FI\{i}. Otherwise, issue i is relevant to the act.
For each nonempty subset J ⊂ I, ∆(SJ) denotes the set of all probabilities on
SJ . We identify ∆(SJ) as a subset of RSJ with the natural embedding. Given a
probability P ∈ ∆(S), margJ(P ) ∈ ∆(SJ) denotes the marginal probability of P on
SJ . The marginal preference relation of % on FJ is the restriction of the preference
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relation on FJ . We denote it by % |J .5
We use the usual notation for mixed acts. For acts f1, · · · , fn ∈ F and weights
α1, · · · , αn ∈ [0, 1] with
∑n
k=1 αk = 1, the mixed act α1f1 + · · ·+αnfn =
∑n
k=1 αkfk ∈







each s ∈ S.
For our analysis, it will be convenient to introduce the concept of a utility act.
A utility act is a vector v ∈ RS, where v(s) ∈ R is interpreted as the utility level
achieved at state s. For example, given a real-valued (utility) function u : L → R
and an act f : S → L, the composition of u and f , denoted by u(f), is a utility act.
In this case, u(f) represents the utility level attained at each state by choosing the
act f .
Lastly, we define two mappings that change dimensions of certain objects. First,
for a lottery x ∈ L, x̄ ∈ F∅ denotes the constant act that delivers x at all states.
Similarly, for a number c ∈ R, c̄ ∈ RS denotes the constant utility act with c̄(s) = c
for all s ∈ S. Second, for a J-act f ∈ FJ , ϕJ(f) is the natural transformation of
f into a mapping from SJ to L. That is, ϕJ(f) satisfies ϕJ(f)(sJ) = f(sJ , s−J) for
each J-quasi-state sJ ∈ SJ and J c-quasi-state s−J ∈ SJc . In addition, for a utility
act v ∈ RS measurable with respect to AJ , ϕJ(v) denotes the similar transformation
of v into a vector in RSJ .6
5Formally, % |J =% ∩(FJ ×FJ).
6Let RJ denote the set of utility acts measurable with respect to AJ :
RJ =
{
v ∈ RS : v(sJ , s−J) = v(sJ , s′−J) , ∀sJ ∈ SJ ,∀s−J , s′−J ∈ SJc
}
.
Then, for each v ∈ RJ , ϕJ(v)(sJ) = v(sJ , s−J) for all sJ ∈ SJ and s−J ∈ SJc . The function ϕJ
maps FJ ∪RJ to LSJ ∪ RSJ . Note that ϕJ is a bijection and the inverse is well-defined.
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1.3 Invariant Biseparable Preferences
This section introduces the class of invariant biseparable preferences, which will
be discussed throughout this paper. They are widely studied in the literature,
for example, by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), Ghirardato, Maccheroni, and Ma-
rinacci (2004; GMM henceforth), Gilboa et al. (2010), Chandrasekher et al. (2020)
among others.7
1.3.1 Invariant biseparable representation
We define an invariant biseparable preference as a preference that admits what we
call invariant biseparable representation. The representation is a generalization of
Subjective Expected Utility (SEU). An SEU preference allows a representation P ·
u(f), where u : L → R is an affine utility index and P is a probability on S. An
SEU maximizer behaves as if she converts an act f ∈ F into a utility act u(f) ∈ RS
using the utility index u, and then computes the expectation of u(f) with respect to
P . The latter part maps the utility act u(f) ∈ RS to a final utility level P ·u(f) ∈ R,
and this involves the decision maker’s belief over states. In light of this, we call the
mapping u(f) 7→ P · u(f) the belief functional of the SEU representation.
The invariant biseparable representation allows a more general form of belief
functionals. Let B : RS → R be a functional. We say B is monotonic if v(s) ≥ w(s)
for all s ∈ S implies B(v) ≥ B(w). It is constant linear if B(v + c̄) = B(v) + c and
B(αv) = αB(v) for all v ∈ RS, c ∈ R, and α ∈ R+. It can be easily seen that an
SEU belief functional is both monotonic and constant linear. From now on, we only
discuss belief functionals that are monotonic and constant linear. The following is
the formal definition of the invariant biseparable representation and preference.
7The name ‘invariant biseparable preferences’ is given by GMM.
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Definition 1.1. A pair (u, B) consisting of a nonconstant affine utility index u :
L → R, and a monotonic and constant linear belief functional B : RS → R is an
invariant biseparable representation of the preference relation % if the utility function
f 7→ B(u(f)) represents %. The preference relation % is an invariant biseparable
preference if it has an invariant biseparable representation.
An axiomatic foundation for the invariant biseparable representation is provided
by GMM, which we introduce in Appendix A.1. For the most part of this paper,
we will assume that the preference relation % is an invariant biseparable preference.
By doing so, we can separate the DM’s preference over lotteries represented by a
utility index u and her belief over states represented by a belief functional B which
is uniquely identified (Proposition A.1). While the former captures the DM’s risk at-
titude, the latter captures her uncertainty attitude. As is often the case with papers
about uncertainty aversion, our analysis will be primarily focused on the characteri-
zation of the set of belief functionals consistent with the behavioral property we will
provide in later sections. As is shown in Example 1.1 below, SEU (Anscombe and
Aumann, 1963), Choquet Expected Utility (CEU) (Schmeidler, 1989), and Maxmin
Expected Utility (MEU) of GS are well known examples of the invariant biseparable
representation with different specifications of monotonic and constant linear belief
functionals.
Example 1.1. Let u : L → R be a nonconstant affine utility index.
(1) The SEU representation is given by P · u(f), where P ∈ ∆(S). The belief
functional is B(v) = P · v for each v ∈ RS.
(2) The CEU representation is given by
∫
S
u(f) dν, where ν is a capacity on S and




8See Appendix A.2 for more details about the Choquet Expected Utility.
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(3) The MEU representation is given by minP∈C P · u(f), where C ⊂ ∆(S) is
nonempty, closed, and convex. The belief functional is B(v) = minP∈C P · v.
We conclude this subsection by briefly discussing the two properties, invariance
and biseparability, from which the name of the preference originates. Suppose (u,B)
is an invariant biseparable representation of %. First, biseparability means that there
exists a monotonic set function, or a capacity, ν : 2S → [0, 1] such that for any






= ν(E)u(x) + (1− ν(E))u(y) . (1.2)
Such a set function can be found by taking ν(E) = B(eE), where eE ∈ RS is an
indicator function such that eE(s) = 1 for all s ∈ E and eE(s) = 0 for all s 6∈ E.9
Given the equation (1.2), the value B(eE) can be interpreted as the likelihood the DM
assigns to the event E. Second, invariance means that even if we choose a different
normalization of the utility index, say u′, the same belief functional B still represents
% along with u′. That is, for any a > 0, b ∈ R, and for any acts f, g ∈ F ,
B(u(f)) ≥ B(u(g)) ⇐⇒ B(au(f) + b̄) ≥ B(au(g) + b̄) . (1.3)
This invariance is an immediate consequence of imposing constant linearity on the
belief functional B. We refer the interested readers to Ghirardato and Marinacci







(u(x)− u(y))eE + u(y)
)




= B(eE)u(x) + (1− B(eE))u(y) .
Rewriting B(eE) = ν(E), we obtain (1.2). The set function ν inherits monotonicity from B.
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(2001, 2002) and GMM for more details.
1.3.2 Marginal belief
In this subsection, we define a marginal belief functional which will play an important
role in our analysis. Suppose (u,B) is an invariant biseparable representation of the
preference relation %, and let J ⊂ I be a nonempty subset. Roughly speaking, a
marginal belief functional with respect to J is a belief functional defined on RSJ ,
which, jointly with the utility index u, represents the marginal preference relation
% |J . To formalize, letRJ be a subspace of RS that includes all utility acts measurable
with respect to the algebra AJ :
RJ =
{
v ∈ RS : v(sJ , s−J) = v(sJ , s′−J) , ∀sJ ∈ SJ ,∀s−J , s′−J ∈ SJc
}
. (1.4)
It is noteworthy that for any J-act f ∈ FJ , the corresponding utility act u(f) belongs
to RJ . A marginal belief functional is defined as follows.
Definition 1.2. Let (u,B) be an invariant biseparable representation of the prefe-
rence relation %, and let a nonempty subset J ⊂ I be given. The marginal belief





, ∀v ∈ RSJ .
In other words, a marginal belief functional BJ is the restriction of B to RJ
identified as a functional on RSJ . Hence, it is straightforward that BJ , as well, is
monotonic and constant linear. We can view (u,BJ) as an invariant biseparable












which is, of course, equal to B(u(f)).
Example 1.2. Consider an SEU representation with a utility index u and a proba-
bility P . For any J-act f ∈ FJ , we have
P · u(f) = margJ(P ) · u(ϕJ(f))
and we can see that v 7→ margJ(P ) · v is the marginal belief functional with respect to
J . Thus, as is expected, the marginal belief functional is the expectation with respect
to the marginal probability margJ(P ).
1.4 Main Result
In this section, we present our main characterization result. We first define the beha-
vioral property Multi-issue Uncertainty Aversion (MIUA) in Subsection 1.4.1. Then,
using the concept of a core that we introduce in Subsection 1.4.2, we characterize the
set of belief functionals consistent with MIUA (Theorem 1.1). We also discuss a rela-
ted behavioral property, Local Preference for Hedging (LPH), and its characterization
(Theorem 1.2).
1.4.1 Multi-issue Uncertainty Aversion
We begin this subsection by stating the Uncertainty Aversion axiom of GS.10
Definition 1.3 (Uncertainty Aversion). The preference relation % is uncertainty
averse if for any acts f, g ∈ F and α ∈ [0, 1], f ∼ g implies αf + (1− α)g % f .
10This axiom is introduced by Schmeidler (1989).
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Uncertainty Aversion requires that a mixture of two indifferent acts be weakly
preferred to each of the two acts.11 This property is motivated by the hedging effect
of the mixture. The effect can be clearly seen when we consider two acts f and g
such that act f delivers preferable lotteries on some event, say E, and the other act g
does so on the complement of E. In this case, a mixture of f and g smooths out the
variations involved in the acts, which helps the DM avoid uncertainty about future
events.
In our multi-issue environment, however, a mixture of acts may also change the
set of relevant issues. Formally, if Jf , Jg, and Jαf+(1−α)g are the sets of issues relevant
to f , g, and their mixture αf + (1− α)g, respectively, then
Jf4Jg ⊂ Jαf+(1−α)g ⊂ Jf ∪ Jg .12 (1.5)
When f is mixed with g to make the mixture αf + (1− α)g, some issues in Jf ∩ Jg
may become irrelevant if the variations in g regarding those issues exactly offset the
variations in f . On the other hand, the issues in Jf\Jg remain relevant and, moreover,
those in Jg\Jf are newly added to the set of issues that determine the final lottery
obtained. Thus, the mixture weakly enlarges the set of relevant issues if Jf ∩ Jg is
empty and weakly shrinks it if Jg\Jf is empty. The change is indecisive otherwise.
These changes being considered, Uncertainty Aversion loses its appeal in this multi-
issue environment.
The property MIUA mainly describes the DM’s behavior when a mixture expands
the set of relevant issues. In light of the observation above, a mixture unambiguously
increases the number of relevant issues when acts depend on separate issues with no
11If % is an invariant biseparable preference, which is the case in GS, Uncertainty Aversion implies
that a mixture of finitely many (possibly more than two) pairwise indifferent acts is weakly preferred
to each of them.
12Jf4Jg denotes the symmetric difference of them.
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intersection. MIUA requires that a negative effect is generated in this case.
Definition 1.4 (Multi-issue Uncertainty Aversion). The preference relation % exhi-
bits Multi-issue Uncertainty Aversion (MIUA) if the following holds: For any distinct
issues i1, · · · , im ∈ I, any acts f1 ∈ Fi1 , · · · , fm ∈ Fim , g1, · · · , gn ∈ F , and any weig-




l=1 βl = 1, if fk ∼ fk′ and
gl ∼ gl′ for all k, k′, l, l′, then
α1f1 + · · ·+ αmfm = β1g1 + · · ·+ βngn implies f1 % g1 .
We provide two interpretations of MIUA. For convenience, let
h = α1f1 + · · ·+ αmfm = β1g1 + · · ·+ βngn . (1.6)
The first interpretation is given by comparing the utility difference between f1 and h
with that between g1 and h (See Figure 1.2).
13 MIUA requires that f1 be preferred
to g1, which means that before the mixtures of fk’s and gl’s are taken, fk has a
higher utility level than gl for all k and l. Through mixtures, however, both groups
of acts reach the same act h and, in particular, the same utility level. This means
that the change in the utility level from the mixture of fk’s is more negative than
that from the mixture of gl’s. Since fk’s do not share any relevant issues, the former
mixture only expands the set of relevant issues with no variation regarding any issue
smoothed out, i.e., no hedging. On the other hand, hedging is not ruled out in the
latter mixture. Under MIUA, the former type of mixture is always less preferred
than the other. This can be interpreted as the DM’s aversion to an increase in
uncertain dimensions. The statement of MIUA does not rule out the possibility that
13In Figure 1.2, the utility level of f1 is above and that of g1 is below the utility level of the
mixtures. While the utility level of f1 is required to be higher by MIUA, that of g1 is not necessarily











Figure 1.2: The first interpretation of Multi-issue Uncertainty Aversion
each mixture in (1.6) is actually a single act (when α1 = 1 or β1 = 1). Such cases
warrant specific interpretations. If α1 = 1, MIUA implies that the mixture of gl’s is
preferred to each gl. This is because of a potential hedging effect between the acts
gl’s. In particular, when gl’s depend on the same issue, MIUA requires exactly what
Uncertainty Aversion of GS assumes. In contrast, if β1 = 1, MIUA implies that the
mixture of the acts fk’s is less preferred to each fk. This means that the multi-issue
consideration resulting from the mixture of fk’s indeed generates a negative effect.
The alternative interpretation comes from the opposite of mixture, or division
of a mixed act (See Figure 1.3). Suppose that there is a group of N agents who
share the same preference %, and that they want to equitably divide the act h (the
mixture). By equitable division, we mean that each agent is indifferent between her
own and any other agent’s portion resulting from the division. For heuristic purposes,
we assume here that an act can be divided into fractions. Then, one obvious way of
fairly dividing h is to give each agent 1/N ‘unit’ of h since h = 1/N ·h+ · · ·+1/N ·h.14
Alternatively, given that h =
∑m
k=1 αkfk, another way is to split the agents into m
groups of α1 ·N , · · · , αm ·N agents and give 1/N unit of f1 to each agent in the first
group, 1/N unit of f2 to each agent in the second group, and so on. Still another way
14This division of an act must be done probabilistically. For example, one can draw a random
number among 1 through N and then give (undivided) act h to the corresponding agent. One can
think of similar probabilistic ways for other divisions, too. We believe that the interpretation we















Figure 1.3: The second interpretation of Multi-issue Uncertainty Aversion: The squares
represent agents. So, there are N = 10 agents in this figure. On the left-hand side of this
figure, each of the first α1 · N = 5 agents receive 1/10 unit of f1, and the rest α2 · N = 5
agents receive 1/10 unit of f2. The other side of the figure should be similarly read. The
agents prefer the left-hand-side division under MIUA.
is to divide h similarly using the equation h =
∑n
l=1 βngn. MIUA says that among all
these ways of division, the agents prefer the division into f1, · · · , fm the most. Since
fk’s depend only on a single issue while gl’s do not necessarily, this preference means
that those agents want to avoid multi-issue uncertainty.
MIUA has threefold implications. First, it imposes Uncertainty Aversion of GS
among i-acts for each i ∈ I. Given any i-acts g1, g2 ∈ Fi, if we take i1 = i, f1 =
β1g1 + β2g2, and α1 = 1, then MIUA implies that the mixture of g1 and g2 is weakly
preferred to each of them. Second, MIUA requires that the DM prefers a mixture if
it reduces the number of relevant issues to one or zero (in which case the mixture is a
constant act). This can be seen by taking α1 = 1 in Definition 1.4. It means that the
DM is less uncertainty averse about each individual issue than about a set of multiple
issues. Third, MIUA implies that a mixture of indifferent acts that depend on distinct
issues is weakly less preferred to each of those individual acts, as we have discussed.
This is consistent with the ranking (1.1) we suggested in our thought experiment in
Section 1.1.15
15We point out here that MIUA can be written in a more general way: We can have each act fk
depend on a set of issues, say Jk, instead of a single issue ik. In that case, the sets Jk’s must be
pairwise disjoint so that the mixture of fk’s certainly increases the uncertain dimensions. In terms
of interpretation, this alternative definition has no difference with Definition 1.4 except that the DM
regards each group of issues in Jk as a single issue. Moreover, our characterization in Subsection 1.4.3
can be easily generalized, too. Since there is no conceptual difference, we keep our simpler version
of MIUA throughout this paper.
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1.4.2 Core
We proceed to discuss the implication of MIUA for utility functions. We begin by
defining the core and marginal core of a belief functional.
Definition 1.5. Let B : RS → R be a belief functional. The core of B is defined by
core(B) = {P ∈ ∆(S) : P · v ≥ B(v), ∀v ∈ RS}.
The marginal core of B with respect to a nonempty subset J ⊂ I is defined by
mcJ(B) = {p ∈ ∆(SJ) : p · v ≥ BJ(v), ∀v ∈ RSJ} .
The core (marginal core, resp.) of an invariant biseparable preference is the core
(marginal core, resp.) of its representing belief functional.
For any fixed utility index u, each probability on S induces an SEU preference
over F . By definition, a probability P in the core of B satisfies P · u(f) ≥ B(u(f))
for any act f ∈ F . Moreover, for each lottery x ∈ L, P · u(x̄) = u(x) = B(u(x̄)).16
Thus, for any act f ∈ F and any lottery x ∈ L, P ·u(x̄) ≥ P ·u(f) implies B(u(x̄)) ≥
P · u(f) ≥ B(u(f)). That is, whenever a constant act x̄ is preferred to another act f ,
which possibly involves uncertainty, under the preference induced by P (denoted by
%P ), the same is true under the one induced by B (denoted by %B).17 So, core(B) is
the set of all probabilities that induce an SEU preference that is more willing to take
on uncertainty than %B. In light of this, we view the core as a measure of aversion to
uncertainty. A larger core in terms of set inclusion is associated with a higher degree
16Constant linearity of B implies that it is normalized : For any c ∈ R, B(c̄) = c. It can be seen
that B(0̄) = 0 and B(c̄) = B(0̄ + c̄) = 0 + c = c from constant linearity.
17In the terminology of Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002), %P is less ambiguity averse than %B.
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of uncertainty aversion.18
The marginal core mcJ(B) is similarly defined as the core. It can be alternatively
viewed as the core of the marginal preference over FJ . Hence, we view the marginal
core as a measure of aversion to uncertainty about issues in J .
Example 1.3. As we saw in Example 1.1, the belief functionals of SEU, CEU, and
MEU are given by B(v) = P · v, B(v) =
∫
S
v dν, and B(v) = minP∈C P · u(f), re-
spectively, for some probability P ∈ ∆(S), some capacity ν on S, and some nonempty
closed convex set C ⊂ ∆(S).
(1) For SEU, core(B) = {P} and mcJ(B) = {margJ(P )}.
(2) For CEU, core(B) coincides with the core of the capacity of ν. That is,
core(B) = {P ∈ ∆(S) : P (E) ≥ ν(E), ∀E ⊂ S} .
By an abuse of notation, we will also denote this set by core(ν) whenever it is
convenient. The marginal core is the core of its marginal capacity, which can
be written as
mcJ(B) = {margJ(P ) ∈ ∆(SJ) : P (E) ≥ ν(E), ∀E ∈ AJ}.
(3) For MEU, core(B) = C and mcJ(B) = {margJ(P ) ∈ ∆(SJ) : P ∈ C}.19
18Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002) show that a biseparable preference is more ambiguity averse
than another biseparable preference only if the core of the former includes that of the latter (Pro-
position 16). If they are MEU preferences, then the two conditions are equivalent (Theorem 17).
19For SEU and MEU, mcJ(B) = {margJ(P ) ∈ ∆(SJ) : P ∈ core(B)}. However, this is not true
for CEU. For example, suppose S1 = {s1, t1}, S2 = {s2, t2}, and the capacity satisfies ν(E) = 0.5
for every nonempty proper subset E of S1 × S2. Then, core(B) is empty. However, mc1(B) is not
empty. In fact, it is a singleton that contains the uniform probability on s1 and t1.
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Our characterization of MIUA in the following subsection is achieved by comparing
the core and marginal cores of the DM’s preference. Even though the elements in
them have different dimensions, we can compare the sets by considering appropriate
marginals of probabilities in the core. The following lemma shows that there is a set
inclusion relationship between those sets.
Lemma 1.1. Let B : RS → R be a belief functional. Then, for each nonempty subset
J ⊂ I, {
margJ(P ) ∈ ∆(SJ) : P ∈ core(B)
}
⊂ mcJ(B) .
Now we turn to define the condition called richness of a core. The condition is
meant to capture the DM’s high degree of aversion to uncertainty about the entire
set of issues collectively relative to uncertainty about individual issues separately.
As we argued above, we interpret a larger core as a higher degree of aversion to
uncertainty. Richness then requires that the core of a preference be sufficiently large.
From Lemma 1.1, we know that the set of marginals of core probabilities is bounded
above by mcJ(B) in terms of set inclusion. Richness holds if the upper bound is well
achieved for each issue i.
Definition 1.6. Let B : RS → R be a belief functional. Then, the core of B is rich if
{
(margi(P ))i∈I ∈ Xi∈I∆(Si) : P ∈ core(B)
}
= Xi∈Imci(B) . (1.7)
Since Lemma 1.1 implies that the set on the right-hand side of (1.7) includes that
on the left-hand side, only the opposite direction of inclusion matters. So, we can
restate Definition 1.6 as follows: The core is rich if for any tuple (pi)i∈I ∈ Xi∈Imci(B),
there exists a core probability whose marginal on Si is equal to pi for all i ∈ I. This
condition is tightly connected to our behavioral property MIUA as we show in the
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following subsection.
1.4.3 Characterization of MIUA
We now present the characterization of MIUA, which is our main result of this paper.
A marginal belief functional BJ is superadditive if BJ(v+w) ≥ BJ(v) +BJ(w) for all
v, w ∈ RSJ .
Theorem 1.1. Suppose (u,B) is an invariant biseparable representation of the pre-
ference relation %. Then, the following are equivalent:
(1) The preference relation % exhibits Multi-issue Uncertainty Aversion.
(2) The core of B is rich, and the marginal belief functional Bi is superadditive for
each i ∈ I.
In Subsection 1.4.1, we discussed the threefold implications of MIUA. The first
was that it imposes Uncertainty Aversion of GS on each Fi. This is equivalent to the
superadditivity of Bi, or the DM being an MEU maximizer when considering i-acts
only.20 The second was that the DM prefers a mixture of pairwise indifferent acts if
the set of relevant issues collapses to a singleton or the empty set. This can be shown
to imply {
margi(P ) ∈ ∆(Si) : P ∈ core(B)
}
= mci(B) , ∀i ∈ I. (1.8)
In view of Lemma 1.1, equation (1.8) means that the core of B is sufficiently large
relative to each marginal core mci(B). This already suggests that the DM is highly
averse to uncertainty about the entire set of issues relative to individual issues, yet
equation (1.8) is weaker than what richness requires. The richness requires core(B)
to be even larger, so that the marginal cores are ‘jointly’ covered by core(B). This
20See Lemma A.8 in Appendix A.3 for details.
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additional property comes from the third implication of MIUA, which says that a
mixture of acts depending on distinct issues becomes less desirable.
Theorem 1.1 achieves the characterization of utility functions through comparing a
core and marginal cores. The concept of a core has been used to compare two different
decision makers’ aversion to uncertainty, for example, in Ghirardato and Marinacci
(2002). Our result shows that it can also be used to compare a single decision maker’s
different degrees of aversion to uncertainty regarding different sets of acts. Or, at least
we can say that MIUA behaviorally describes the kind of uncertainty aversion that
is captured by the relative sizes of cores and marginal cores.
1.4.4 Local Preference for Hedging
In this subsection, we introduce another behavioral property that can be under-
stood as a weakening of MIUA and its characterization in terms of belief functionals.
Roughly speaking, under MIUA, the DM prefers a mixture if the set of relevant acts
shrinks and dislikes it if the set expands. In some environments or economic models,
however, it might be too restrictive to assume both patterns of behavior. The follo-
wing behavioral property relaxes the second requirement and only demands that the
DM prefers a mixture when the set of relevant issues diminishes into a particular set.
Definition 1.7 (Local Preference for Hedging). Let J ⊂ I be a nonempty subset
of issues. Preference relation % exhibits Local Preference for Hedging (LPH) with
respect to J if the following holds: For any pairwise indifferent acts f1, · · · , fn ∈ F
and any α1, · · · , αn ∈ [0, 1] with
∑n
k=1 αk = 1, if the mixed act α1f1 + · · · + αnfn
belongs to FJ , then
α1f1 + · · ·+ αnfn % f1 .
Suppose J is a singleton set, say {i}. Then, LPH with respect to J is implied
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by MIUA. In fact, LPH with respect to J has only the first two of the threefold
implications of MIUA we discussed. Namely, it imposes Uncertainty Aversion of GS
on Fi, and the DM prefers a mixture if it results in an act that depends only on issue
i. Even when J includes multiple issues, we can interpret LPH in a similar way. The
only difference is that the DM treats all issues in J as a ‘big’ single issue. In any
case, unless J is equal to the whole set I, LPH is strictly weaker than Uncertainty
Aversion of GS in that the preference for mixtures is exhibited only locally within
FJ .21
LPH is also characterized by a sufficiently large core of the preference. However,
the notion of largeness should be slightly different from the richness.
Definition 1.8. Let B : RS → R be a belief functional and J be a nonempty subset
of I. Then, the core of B is J-compatible if
{
margJ(P ) ∈ ∆(SJ) : P ∈ core(B)
}
= mcJ(B) . (1.9)
Again by Lemma 1.1, an alternative definition of J-compatibility is allowed: For
any probability pJ ∈ mcJ(B), there exists a probability P ∈ ∆(S) consistent with
pJ in the sense that margJ(P ) = pJ . Thus, J-compatibility means that the core of
B is sufficiently large to cover the marginal core mcJ(B). Similarly as before, the
condition can be interpreted as the DM being greatly averse to uncertainty about the
entire set of issues relative to uncertainty about the issues in set J , which we view as
an underlying cause of the behavior captured by LPH. We conclude this section by
stating the utility function characterization of LPH.
Theorem 1.2. Suppose (u,B) is an invariant biseparable representation of the pre-
21A plausible preference is the one that exhibits LPH with respect to J for any J with |J | ≤ k
for some threshold k.
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ference relation % and let J be a nonempty subset of I. Then, the following are
equivalent:
(1) The preference relation % exhibits Local Preference for Hedging with respect to
J .
(2) The core of B is J-compatible and the marginal belief functional BJ is superad-
ditive.
1.5 A Special Case: Additive Marginal Beliefs
In this section, we consider a special case in which the DM has additive marginal
beliefs on each single issue, but her belief over the entire set of states is not necessarily
additive. Such a belief may naturally arise when the DM has a lot of information
about the marginal distributions of quasi-states, but is poorly informed about the
correlation across issues. The ignorance can be caused by scarcity of simultaneous
observations of multiple issues or intractability of data with too many dimensions. In
this special case, we can obtain a simpler characterization of MIUA and establish an
equivalence between MIUA and other behavioral properties in the literature.
Suppose that (u,B) is an invariant biseparable representation of the preference
relation %, and that the marginal belief functional Bi is additive for each i ∈ I. It can
be readily seen that Bi is additive if and only if % satisfies the Independence axiom on
Fi: For all f, g, h ∈ Fi and α ∈ (0, 1], f % g if and only if αf+(1−α)h % αg+(1−α)h.
This condition can be interpreted as the DM exhibiting no uncertainty aversion about
issue i. Then, the DM’s uncertainty aversion, if any, only comes from simultaneous




· dpi, for each i ∈ I. Then, the marginal core mci(B) is the singleton {pi}
for all i ∈ I. So, the richness condition of the core becomes simpler as the following
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lemma states.
Lemma 1.2. Suppose that (u,B) is an invariant biseparable representation of the
preference relation %, and that the marginal belief functional Bi is additive for all
i ∈ I. Then, the core of B is rich if and only if it is nonempty.
If the marginal core mci(B) is nonempty for all i ∈ I, nonemptiness of the core
is necessary for richness. Lemma 1.2 says that it is also sufficient if marginal beliefs
are additive. This is because if there exists any core probability, by Lemma 1.1, its
marginals will be equal to the unique marginal probabilities in the marginal cores,
that is, pi’s.
From this equivalence we can see that MIUA is closely connected to other noti-
ons of uncertainty aversion in the literature—Ambiguity Aversion of Ghirardato and
Marinacci (2002) and Preference for Sure-Diversification of Chateauneuf and Tallon
(2002). We state slightly modified definitions of them below.22 23
Definition 1.9. The preference relation % exhibits Ambiguity Aversion if there exists
an SEU preference relation %′ such that for all x ∈ L and f ∈ F ,
x̄ %′ f =⇒ x̄ % f and x̄ ′ f =⇒ x̄  f .
It exhibits Preference for Sure-Diversification (PSD) if for any pairwise indifferent
22Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002) define Uncertainty Aversion and Ambiguity Aversion diffe-
rently. In fact, the definition we provide in Definition 1.9 is what they call Uncertainty Aversion.
However, two notions coincide for invariant biseparable preferences. We use the name Ambiguity
Aversion to distinguish it from Uncertainty Aversion of GS.
23In the main model of Chateauneuf and Tallon (2002), a choice object is a mapping from states to
real numbers, not lotteries. The definition we provide in Definition 1.9 is a version for the Anscombe-
Aumann framework that we use. In fact, they also study Anscombe-Aumann acts and consider a
stronger property ‘Preference for Sure Expected Utility Diversification’ in that case. For invariant
biseparable preferences, their stronger property is equivalent to the one we stated in Definition 1.9.
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acts f1, · · · , fn ∈ F and any α1, · · · , αn ∈ [0, 1] with
∑n
k=1 αk = 1,
α1f1 + · · ·+ αnfn ∈ F∅ implies α1f1 + · · ·+ αnfn % f1 .
Ambiguity Aversion is an intuitive notion of aversion to uncertainty. In the defini-
tion, since x̄ is constant, no uncertainty is involved in the act. On the other hand, the
act f is potentially an uncertain act whose resulting lotteries depend on the realiza-
tion of a state. Taking SEU preference relations as the benchmarks with no aversion
to uncertainty, Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002) defines Ambiguity Aversion as ha-
ving a stronger taste for constant acts over uncertain nonconstant acts than some
SEU preference.
Preference for Sure-Diversification is a weakening of the Uncertainty Aversion
axiom of GS. While the latter requires that a hedging effect be positive in any mixture
of pairwise indifferent acts, PSD requires such a mixture to be preferred only when
the mixture is a constant act. So, the DM may not prefer a mixture unless it is a
complete hedge. Informally, we can regard PSD as LPH with respect to the empty
set, so PSD is weaker than our notion of LPH (with respect to any nonempty J), too.
It is known that Ambiguity Aversion is equivalent to nonemptiness of the core
for an invariant biseparable preference (Ghirardato and Marinacci, 2002, Theorem
12), and that PSD is equivalent to nonemptiness of the core for a CEU preference
(Chateauneuf and Tallon, 2002, Theorem 5). In fact, the latter equivalence holds for
an invariant biseparable preference, too. Combining these with Lemma 1.2, we obtain
the following result.
Theorem 1.3. Suppose (u,B) is an invariant biseparable representation of the prefe-
rence relation %. Then, Multi-issue Uncertainty Aversion implies Ambiguity Aversion
and Preference for Sure-Diversification. In addition, if % satisfies Independence on
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Fi for each i ∈ I, then the following are equivalent:
(1) The preference % exhibits Multi-issue Uncertainty Aversion.
(2) The preference % exhibits Ambiguity Aversion.
(3) The preference % exhibits Preference for Sure-Diversification.
(4) The core of B is nonempty.
We emphasize three implications deduced from Theorem 1.3. First, if a decision
maker is modeled by an invariant biseparable preference having additive marginal
beliefs on each issue and exhibiting Ambiguity Aversion (or PSD), then such an
assumption has an implication that the decision maker also exhibits MIUA. Second,
MIUA boils down to Ambiguity Aversion and PSD when marginal beliefs are additive.
MIUA is meant to capture a decision maker’s higher degree of aversion to uncertainty
when multiple issues are collectively considered than when each issue is separately
considered. Since additive marginal beliefs correspond to zero aversion regarding each
issue, MIUA under additive marginal beliefs represents aversion to uncertainty purely
about the relationship between issues. The equivalence result in Theorem 1.3 shows
that the imposition of MIUA as a notion of uncertainty aversion in that case is as
reasonable as imposing Ambiguity Aversion or PSD. Lastly, MIUA can be regarded as
an extension of Ambiguity Aversion from the case in which the relationship between
issues is the only source of aversion to uncertainty to the case in which each single
issue is also a source of uncertainty aversion. We already have seen that MIUA is an




In this section, we analyze utility functions that satisfy the conditions stated in The-
orem 1.1 and hence represent preferences exhibiting MIUA. In Subsection 1.6.1, we
provide two numerical examples of CEU functions with capacities derived by taking
the lower envelope of a set of (additive) probabilities. One of them satisfies the ri-
chness condition, while the other fails. In Subsection 1.6.2, we discuss the products
of MEU preferences and specific CEU preferences (Walley and Fine, 1982; Hendon
et al., 1996) that exhibit MIUA.
1.6.1 CEU preferences with lower-envelope capacities
In this subsection, we put our model in the context of making investments in firms.
Suppose there are two firms, denoted by 1 and 2. Whether firm i will default or not is
considered as issue i (I = {1, 2}). Let Si = {di, ni} for each i. The DM is an investor,
and there are two possible investment outcomes, good (1) or bad (0). Consider the
following three acts, or investment options, N1, N2, and D2 (See also Figure 1.4):
N1(d1d2) = N1(d1n2) = 0, N1(n1d2) = N1(n1n2) = 1 ;
N2(d1d2) = N2(n1d2) = 0, N2(d1n2) = N2(n1n2) = 1 ;
D2(d1n2) = D2(n1n2) = 0, D2(d1d2) = D2(n1d2) = 1 .
Under act N1, the good outcome is realized (for sure) if and only if firm 1 does not
default. The act N2 is similar. So, they are bets on each firm’s not defaulting. On
the other hand, D2 is a bet on firm 2’s default. Clearly, N1 is a 1-act while N2 and
D2 are 2-acts. (see Figure 1.4).
Suppose that the DM has a probabilistic belief about each firm’s default likeli-






























Figure 1.4: Example in Subsection 1.6.1
different results. In particular, she regards any convex combination of the following
two probabilities P1 and P2 as plausible:
P1(d1d2) = P1(n1n2) = 0.3, P1(d1n2) = P1(n1d2) = 0.2 ;
P2(d1d2) = P2(n1n2) = 0.2, P2(d1n2) = P2(n1d2) = 0.3 .
Let C denote the set of all convex combinations of P1 and P2. Then, consider the
lower envelope of C, that is, a set function P on S such that for any event E ⊂ S,
P (E) = min
P∈C
P (E) .
By construction, P is monotone and hence a capacity. Suppose the DM has a CEU
preference represented by the capacity P and a utility index with u(1) = 1 and
u(0) = 0. In this case, the core of the DM’s belief functional, which is equal to the
core of P , is nonempty. For example, a probability that assigns 0.25 to each state is
in the core. Since the marginal belief on each issue is additive, Lemma 1.2 implies
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that the core is rich. Thus, from Theorem 1.1, we know that the DM’s preference
exhibits MIUA.24
Instead of P1 and P2, suppose the DM considers the priors that are convex com-
binations of Q1 and Q2 given by
Q1(d1d2) = 0.5, Q1(n1n2) = 0.3, Q1(d1n2) = Q1(n1d2) = 0.1 ;
Q2(d1d2) = 0.3, Q2(n1n2) = 0.5, Q2(d1n2) = Q2(n1d2) = 0.1 .
In this case, the DM does not entertain a single default probability for each firm.
Instead, she thinks the probability is between 0.4 and 0.6 for both firms. However,
she thinks that the two firms have the same default probability and that they will
end up with the same result with a 0.8 chance. Thus, unlike the previous case, there
is not as much uncertainty about the relationship between the two issues as about
each issue separately.
Similarly to the previous case, consider CEU with the lower envelope Q derived
from the convex combinations of Q1 and Q2. Then, it can be seen that the core of the
CEU belief functional is not rich. For example, even though two marginal probabilities
with 0.6 on d1 and 0.4 on d2 belong to the marginal cores with respect to issue 1
and 2, respectively, there is no core probability whose marginals are simultaneously
consistent with them. So, the DM’s preference does not exhibit MIUA.25
The examples above illustrate two facts. First, a CEU preference with a lower-
24As a test case, consider the acts N1, N2, and a mixture 1/2N1 + 1/2N2. Since P (n1d2, n1n2) =
P (d1n2, n1n2) = 0.5, the DM’s utility level from N1 and N2 is 0.5. On the other hand, since
P (d1n2, n1d2, n1n2) = 0.7 and P (n1n2) = 0.2, her utility level from the mixtures is
1
2 · 0.7 +
1
2 · 0.2 =
0.45. Therefore, the DM strictly prefers N1 and N2 over their mixture as expected.
25As a counterexample to MIUA, we consider the acts N1, D2, and the mixture 1/2N1 + 1/2D2
of them. Since Q(n1d2, n1n2) = Q(d1d2, n1d2) = 0.4, the DM’s utility levels from acts N1 and D2
are both 0.4. On the other hand, since Q(d1d2, n1d2, n1n2) = 0.9 and Q(n1d2) = 0.1, her utility
level from the mixture is 12 · 0.9 +
1
2 · 0.1 = 0.5 > 0.4. Hence, the mixture is strictly preferred as
opposed to what MIUA requires.
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envelope capacity can be used to model behaviors exhibiting MIUA, but not always.26
Second, whether such a preference exhibits MIUA is determined by how permissive
the set of priors is in terms of their marginals relative to the correlations across those
marginals. In the example above, P allows more various correlations and is consistent
with MIUA, while Q allows more various marginal probabilities and conflicts with
MIUA.
1.6.2 Products of MEU and CEU preferences
It has been discussed in the literature how a decision maker forms an extended belief
about multiple issues based on her belief about individual issues. The preference
induced by the extended belief can be regarded as a product preference of the de-
cision maker’s marginal preferences. In the literature, products of MEU preferences
(Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989) and of specific CEU preferences (Walley and Fine,
1982; Hendon et al., 1996; Ghirardato, 1997) have been studied. We demonstrate in
this subsection that some of the product preferences proposed in these papers are
consistent with MIUA.
We again assume a binary set of issues: I = {1, 2}. Gilboa and Schmeidler
(1989) provide the notion of a product preference, discussing an extension of the
MEU preference to a two-dimensional set of states. Let u be a utility index function
and Ci be a nonempty closed convex subset of ∆(Si), for each i ∈ I. Then, let %′i be
a preference relation on Fi which is represented by an MEU function
min
pi∈Ci
pi · u(ϕi(f)) .
26Nevertheless, if the capacity induces additive marginal beliefs, then such a CEU preference
does exhibit MIUA since any probability in the set of priors from which the lower envelope is taken
belongs to the core of the preference and hence the core is nonempty.
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Then, define a set of probabilities on S
CG = co
(
{p1 × p2 ∈ ∆(S) : p1 ∈ C1, p2 ∈ C2}
)
, (1.10)
where p1 × p2 is the independent product of p1 and p2. The product of the two MEU
preferences %′1 and %
′
2 is the MEU preference on F that is represented by
V G(f) = min
P∈CG
P · u(f) .
We denote it by %G. By construction of the set CG, the restrictions of %G on F1 and
F2 are %′1 and %′2, respectively. Furthermore, GS proves that the product %G is the
unique MEU extension of %′1 and %
′
2 that satisfies their (stochastic) independence
condition (GS, Proposition 4.2).
This product preference %G exhibits MIUA. To see this, recall that the core of an
MEU belief functional is the set of priors over which the minimum is taken. Hence,
CG is the core and C1 and C2 are the marginal cores of %G. The construction of
CG in (1.10) implies that for any pair of marginal probabilities p1 and p2 in the
marginal cores, a probability consistent with them, namely p1×p2, exists in the core.
Thus, MIUA is guaranteed by Theorem 1.1. MIUA and Uncertainty Aversion of GS
are conflicting properties: The former requires that a mixture of two indifferent 1-
act and 2-act be weakly less preferred to each of them, while the mixture must be
weakly preferred to both of them under the latter. The product %G is a boundary
case in which such a mixture is precisely indifferent to individual acts. In fact, any
invariant biseparable preference that coincides with %G on each Fi and evaluates
every act uniformly worse in terms of its certainty equivalent exhibits MIUA. This is
true because such a preference has a core no smaller than that of %G. The formal
statement follows.
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Proposition 1.1. Assume I = {1, 2}. Suppose (u,B) is an invariant biseparable
representation of the preference relation %, and assume that the marginal preferences
% |1 and % |2 have MEU representations. Let V G be the MEU representation of the
product %G of % |1 and % |2 with the same utility index u. If B(u(f)) ≤ V G(f) for
all f ∈ F , then the preference relation % exhibits Multi-issue Uncertainty Aversion.
Walley and Fine (1982) and Hendon et al. (1996) define products of CEU pre-
ferences in a similar way to GS. Their definitions are also suggestive of stochastic
independence between issues as GS’s.27 Suppose that %′1 and %
′
2 are CEU preference
relations on F1 and F2, respectively, and that their beliefs correspond to capacities ν1
on S1 and ν2 on S2. Assume the two capacities are convex so that the belief functio-
nals, i.e., the Choquet integrals, are superadditive.28 Then, each preference %′i is also
an MEU preference whose corresponding set of priors is core(νi) (Schmeidler, 1986).
Given these capacities, consider the following sets of probabilities on the product set
S:
CW (ν) = {p1 × p2 ∈ ∆(S) : pi ∈ core(νi) , ∀i ∈ I} ;
CH(ν) = {P ∈ ∆(S) : P (E1 × E2) ≥ ν1(E1)ν2(E2) , ∀E1 ⊂ S1, ∀E2 ⊂ S2} .
The former is studied by Walley and Fine (1982) and the latter by Hendon et al.
(1996). The set CW (ν) includes all independent products of marginal probabilities
in core(ν1) and core(ν2). It is equal to C
G in (1.10) without the closed convex hull
taken. The set CH(ν) includes all probabilities under which each rectangular event
is assigned at least as much as some independent product probability would assign
to it. We can see that every probability in CW (ν) also belongs to CH(ν), that is,
27Hendon et al. (1996) and Ghirardato (1997) study an independent product of capacities. Whe-
reas the independent product of two marginal probabilities is unique, there is a range of capacities
that can be considered as independent products of two marginal capacities. See Proposition 1 of
Hendon et al. (1996), for example.
28The capacity νi is convex if νi(E ∪ F ) + νi(E ∩ F ) ≥ νi(E) + νi(F ) for all E,F ⊂ Si.
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CW (ν) ⊂ CH(ν).
Given these sets, the capacities πW (ν) and πH(ν) are defined as the lower envelope
of CW (ν) and CH(ν), respectively:
πW (ν)(E) = min
P∈CW (ν)
P (E) , ∀E ⊂ S ;
πH(ν)(E) = min
P∈CH(ν)
P (E) , ∀E ⊂ S .
(1.11)
If the preference relation % has a CEU representation with one of these capacities,
its marginal preferences coincide with % |1 and % |2, so % is indeed an extension
of them. We now prove that CEU preferences represented by capacities in (1.11)
exhibit MIUA. First, because of the set inclusion CW (ν) ⊂ CH(ν), it is immediate
that πH(ν) ≤ πW (ν). Moreover, the closed convex hull of CW (ν) is equal to CG in
(1.10) with Ci = core(νi) and π
W (ν) remains the same even if we take the minimum
in (1.11) over CG instead of CW (ν). Thus, the CEU with πW (ν) is dominated by the






u(f)dπW (ν) ≤ min
P∈CG
P · u(f) . (1.12)
We obtain the following corollary of Proposition 1.1 from the inequalities in (1.12).
Corollary 1.1. Assume I = {1, 2}, and for each i ∈ I, let νi be a convex capacity on
Si. If the preference relation % is a CEU preference represented by a capacity πW (ν)
or πH(ν), then it exhibits Multi-issue Uncertainty Aversion.
Even though we have only considered the case with binary issues as the original
papers do, the three product preferences above can be easily extended to cases with
29Given a nonempty closed convex set C of probabilities on S, it can be seen that for any real-
valued function on S, the minimum of the integrals with respect to probabilities in C is greater than
or equal to the Choquet integral with respect to the lower envelope of C. See Appendix A.2, in
particular, Fact A.3 for details.
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more than two issues. Moreover, all of the extended versions can still be proved to
exhibit MIUA in the same way we have done in this subsection.
1.7 Discussion
1.7.1 Implication for under-diversification
Many studies in finance propose explanations for under-diversification in asset mar-
kets, connecting it to uncertainty aversion. Some of them study models with investors
who have uncertainty about parameters of asset return distributions, their mean and
variance, and show that limited-participation may occur: The investors decide not
to hold any position in some assets available in the market (Dow and Werlang, 1992;
Cao et al., 2005; Easley and O’Hara, 2009; Boyle et al., 2012). These studies assume
the MEU preference of GS and argue that a large set of parameters, which means a
large amount of uncertainty, may cause non-participation. Boyle et al. (2012) suggest
that such uncertainty comes from less familiarity with assets. For example, investors
may be more familiar with—and have more accurate estimates of—relevant parame-
ters about home-country stocks than foreign ones, leading them to invest only in the
home-country market.
Others focus on the correlation between returns of assets rather than the mo-
ments of individual asset return distributions (Jiang and Tian, 2016; Huang et al.,
2017; Liu and Zeng, 2017). These papers are related to ours in that they connect
uncertainty about the relationship between issues (or asset returns in their papers)
to anti-diversifying behavior.
However, all of these papers use the MEU preference to describe investors’ uncer-
tainty aversion. Under MEU, a mixture of indifferent acts must be weakly preferred
to each of them. It means that if an investor in their models holds only a subset
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of available assets, it is not because the investor dislikes betting on multiple assets
simultaneously, but because the assets outside the set are relatively undesirable. In
other words, for under- or anti-diversification to arise in their models, some condi-
tions regarding asset returns or prices need to be met so that some assets become
unattractive. For example, in Boyle et al. (2012), investors do not invest in a foreign
stock when they are assumed to have poor estimates about its returns.
Instead, we regard under-diversification as a matter of preference, which may arise
even when each asset is considered equally desirable. We have proposed a way to
directly model an investor who does not diversify her portfolio, avoiding uncertainty
about multiple issues. This may help address the issue Gorton and Metrick (2013)
pointed out in the following quote:
There are some features of securitization that seem important but are not
directly addressed by the theoretical literature to date. One issue is the fact
that the creation of asset-backed securities always involves pooling loans
that are homogeneous, that is, a pool consists exclusively of auto recei-
vables, or credit-card receivables. It is not the case that different asset
classes are mixed, even when the originator in fact originates many dif-
ferent asset classes. The theories suggest that diversification of the loan
pool is important, but we do not observe that in the world. Asset classes
are sold separately. (Gorton and Metrick, 2013, p.42)
In our terminology, auto loans and credit-card loans are different issues. It may
be complicated to discover how they are related in terms of default possibility. So,
investors may find any securities simultaneously involving them unattractive, which
might explain why no such securities exist. MIUA provides a way to model that kind
of preference. With the property assumed, investors do not look for well-diversified
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securities because they do not want them, not because they have a strong preference
for a particular class of loans.
We conclude this subsection by stating a proposition that has an implication for
the lack of securitization documented above. It says that in our basic framework,
MIUA implies that the average value of some acts that depend on distinct issues is
higher than the value of the ‘average act.’
Proposition 1.2. Suppose the preference relation % is an invariant biseparable pre-
ference and exhibits Multi-issue Uncertainty Aversion.30 For any distinct issues
i1, · · · , in ∈ I, any acts f1 ∈ Fi1 , · · · , fn ∈ Fin, any lotteries x1, · · · , xn ∈ L, and any
weights α1, · · · , αn ∈ [0, 1] with
∑n




k=1 αkfk . (1.13)
To better understand Proposition 1.2 in the context of securities, suppose that
each outcome in Z is a monetary value (Z = R) and that the DM’s utility index
u is linear on R. Then, each lottery xk in Proposition 1.2 can be selected to be a
degenerate lottery that gives a monetary value, say Wk. If we consider fk as a security,
fk ∼ x̄k means that Wk is the DM’s willingness to pay (WTP) for the security. Then,
(1.13) implies that the DM’s WTP for the mixed security
∑n




31 Consequently, when various securities are sold to
a group of investors exhibiting MIUA, it generates a higher revenue to sell them
individually than to mix them all and sell the same mixed security to every investor.
This is closely related to our second interpretation of MIUA in Subsection 1.4.1: A
30Assuming an invariant biseparable preference is not necessary for the statement of this proposi-
tion. It is sufficient to assume completeness, transitivity, and Certainty Independence (Axiom A.2)
in Appendix A.1.























Figure 1.5: Four bets used in the experiment of Epstein and Halevy (2019): The number
1 represents a monetary prize (for sure) and 0 no prize (for sure). For example, choosing
the act R1, a subject receives a monetary prize if the ball from the first urn is red, and no
prize if it is black.
group of decision makers sharing the same preference exhibiting MIUA can be better
off by splitting a mixed act into multiple acts that depend on a single issue.
1.7.2 Experiment of Epstein and Halevy (2019)
Epstein and Halevy (2019) conduct a laboratory experiment similar to our thought
experiment introduced in Section 1.1. In their experiment, each ball is only colored
(red or black) without a letter, but instead, there are two urns from each of which
one ball is drawn. So, we can think of a two-by-two set of states as we did in our
thought experiment, but with each issue being the ball’s color drawn from each urn.
The subjects in their experiment compare two sets of bets depicted in Figure 1.5.
Bets R1 and B1 are bets on the ball’s color from the first urn. On the other hand,
bets Same and Diff are bets on the two balls having the same and different colors,
respectively.
They find that subjects display rankings
R1 % Same and B1 % Diff (1.14)
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with at least one of them strict. They say that this preference is plausible “if there
is greater aversion to ambiguity about the relation between urns than to ambiguity
about the bias of (the first urn and hence, presumably) any single urn.” (Epstein
and Halevy, 2019, p.671) This idea is very closely related to what we have discussed
in this paper. However, our behavioral property MIUA cannot say much about the
preference in (1.14). This is because the bets Same and Diff depend on two different
issues, but they are not a mixture of two options that depend on colors from different
urns.
Instead, we propose the behavioral property below, stated for the binary-issue
case, to properly capture the preference in (1.14). As an additional notation, for acts
f1, · · · , fn+1 ∈ F and pairwise disjoint events E1, · · · , En ⊂ S, f1E1 · · · fnEnfn+1 ∈ F
denotes the composite act that coincides with fk on Ek for each k = 1, · · · , n, and
with fn+1 on S\(E1 ∪ · · · ∪ En).
Property A: For any distinct i, j in I = {1, 2}, for any i-acts f1, · · · , fn+1 ∈ Fi,
and for any pairwise disjoint j-events E1, · · · , En ∈ Aj,
f1 ∼ · · · ∼ fn+1 implies f1 % f1E1 · · · fnEnfn+1 .
In the experiment above, if we take f1 = R1, f2 = B1, and E1 = {r1r2, b1r2}, then
f1E1f2 = Same. Similarly, if we take f1 = B1 and f2 = R1, then f1E1f2 = Diff .
Thus, if bets R1 and B1 are indifferent, Property A implies (1.14) except that one of
the two relations must be strict.
The interpretation of Property A is similar to that of MIUA. If the DM is an SEU
maximizer—not concerned about the number of relevant issues—and f1, · · · , fn are
pairwise indifferent, then f1 must be indifferent to the composite act f1E1 · · · fnEnfn+1.
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However, if she additionally considers an expansion of the set of relevant issues as
undesirable, she will prefer an i-act f1 to the composite act f1E1 · · · fnEnfn+1 that
possibly depends on issues 1 and 2 simultaneously.
Whereas we have focused on a mixture of acts that depend on distinct issues as
a way to make many issues entangled, Epstein and Halevy’s experiment shows that
there is another way to do so, which is to take a composition of acts that depend on
the same issue. While we do not have a full utility characterization of Property A, we
can show that the capacity πH(ν) defined by (1.11) in Subsection 1.6.2, is consistent
with Property A in addition to MIUA.
Proposition 1.3. Assume I = {1, 2} and let νi be a convex capacity on Si for each
i ∈ I. If % is a CEU preference with capacity πH(ν), then it satisfies Property A.
The key property of πH(ν) that we use to prove Proposition 1.3 is that it has a
sufficiently large core relative to the marginal cores core(ν1) and core(ν2): For any
tuple (psj)sj∈Sj with psj ∈ core(νi), there exists P ∈ core(πH(ν)) under which the
conditional probability on Si given any sj ∈ Sj is psj (i 6= j). This is reminiscent of
the richness that characterizes MIUA. Thus, we expect that a similar characterization
using a core and marginal cores as in Theorem 1.1 will also be possible for Property A
even though MIUA and Property A are independent of each other.
1.7.3 Experiment of Ellsberg (1961)
In this subsection, we briefly discuss how our idea is related to the seminal work
of Ellsberg (1961). One of the thought experiments he proposes is as follows. An
urn contains 100 balls that are either red or black, and one ball is to be drawn. A
subject may choose to bet on the ball’s color to receive $100 if the color is matched.
Alternatively, she may engage in a lottery that dispenses $100 with a half chance.











The lottery can be regarded as a mixture of the two bets on colors. As documented
in the literature, many people tend to choose the lottery over the other bets when the
numbers of red and black balls are unknown. The lottery is attractive because the
uncertain issue about the colors is completely removed by mixing. GS’s Uncertainty
Aversion axiom is predicated on this observation.
In comparison with Ellsberg (1961), our paper is about the opposite force of
a mixture. In other words, we have studied choices when a mixture introduces a
new issue rather than removing an existing one. Although mixing always goes hand
in hand with removing an issue in a single-issue environment, such as Ellsberg’s
experiment, it may work in the opposite way in our multi-issue environment.
1.7.4 Non-product set of states
In our model, we use the product set S to represent a multi-issue environment. Even
though we believe that the product structure is natural and widely applicable, it does
not play an essential role in our analysis. More important are the algebras of i-events
based on which i-acts are defined. In fact, we can start with an arbitrary finite set of
states and some algebras on it that represent issues. To be more concrete, let S be a
finite set of states which is not necessarily a product set, and suppose that for each
issue i ∈ I, Ai is an algebra on it.32 Then, for a nonempty subset of J ⊂ I, we can
say that an event is a J-event if it belongs to the algebra, denoted by AJ , generated
32Recall that in our model, the algebra Ai is induced by the product structure of S. Here, we




i∈J Ai of individual algebras. An act is a J-act if it is measurable
with respect to AJ . A marginal belief functional BJ can be defined as a real-valued
function on the partition of S that generates AJ . Likewise, other terminology we
defined in our model can be easily modified. The results analogous to the ones we
presented in this paper will continue to hold under this new setting as we do not see
any place in our analysis where this alternative approach would fail.
We should be cautious, however, about what collection of algebras is acceptable
as a representation of issues. One of the merits of having a product structure is that
two algebras, say AJ and AJ ′ , have only the trivial intersection {∅, S} if J and J ′ are
disjoint. So, a mixture of a J-act and J ′-act obviously increases the set of relevant
issues, making a (J ∪J ′)-act. This is not necessarily true in the alternative approach.
For instance, suppose that S = {s1, s2, s3}, I = {a, b, c} and algebras Aa, Ab, and Ac
are generated by the partitions {{s1}, {s2, s3}}, {{s2}, {s3, s1}}, and {{s3}, {s1, s2}},
respectively. Then, for two distinct lotteries x, y ∈ L, an act fa = x̄{s1}ȳ is an a-act















{s1, s2} ȳ ,
which is a c-act. Thus, the mixture is not necessarily undesirable if the DM is well
informed about issue c, even if she is unsure about the relationship between issues
a and b. Our property MIUA is less appealing for this particular issue structure in
which issues turn out to overlap.
Generalizing the concept of issues as we demonstrated above may be useful in ana-
lyzing preferences that are not based on a product state space. For example, it might
be of interest to see how an investor makes a choice between options that depend on a
firm’s future profits. In this case, the natural set of states to use is the real line, which
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is not a product of multiple sets. However, the investor may well implicitly consider
several issues about the firm—competition with other firms, new technologies, and so
on—that impact the firm’s profit. Such issues can be incorporated into the model if
we take the alternative way described above.
1.8 Conclusion
We studied a decision problem under uncertainty about multiple issues. We con-
structed a multi-issue environment by explicitly imposing a product structure on the
set of states in the Anscombe-Aumann framework. In this environment, we could
observe that certain mixtures of pairwise indifferent acts may increase the number
of relevant issues, thus making a more uncertain alternative. This motivated a new
pattern of uncertainty averse behavior that conflicts with the prominent notion of
Uncertainty Aversion of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). We provided a behavioral
property, Multi-issue Uncertainty Aversion, that captures a decision maker’s aversion
to alternatives that simultaneously depend on many issues and hence are highly un-
certain. Then, we focused on the class of invariant biseparable preferences to see what
conditions on a belief functional are consistent with the new behavioral property. We
showed in our main result that richness of the core of a belief functional and supe-
radditivity of marginal belief functionals are jointly equivalent to MIUA. While the
superadditivity was a direct application of GS’s result, the richness condition provi-
ded a novel way of comparing a decision maker’s degrees of aversion to uncertainty
about different sets of issues. In particular, richness holds when the decision maker
is highly averse to uncertainty about the entire set of issues collectively relative to
individual issues separately. Then, we saw that MIUA has a simpler characterization
and is equivalent to other notions of uncertainty aversion provided by Ghirardato and
46
Marinacci (2002) and Chateauneuf and Tallon (2002) when uncertainty is only about
the relationship between issues, but not about individual issues. We also discussed
some examples of utility functions consistent with MIUA and the implications of our
analysis for under-diversification.
Our study suggests several possible future studies in this vein. For example,
it will be useful to understand how an analyst can identify the set of issues from
a decision maker’s choice behavior when only an abstract set of states without a
product structure is given. Even though we have taken the set of issues as exogenous,
it is completely plausible that different decision makers think of different issues given
the same set of states. Studies on the identification of issues could help understand
how people approach decision problems and form beliefs under uncertainty. Another
future study is to parameterize the entire set of belief functionals characterized in
this paper. If the set allows a handy utility functional form, it will become easier




Signaling With Multiple Senders
2.1 Introduction
Studies in signaling games have been very successful in explaining people’s behavior
under information asymmetry, including education (Spence, 1973), advertisements
(Nelson, 1974; Milgrom and Roberts, 1986), product warranties (Gal-Or, 1989), and
limit pricing (Milgrom and Roberts, 1982). In canonical signaling models, there is a
single sender who has a privately known characteristic, and she may participate in a
potential signaling activity that costs less for individuals with a better characteristic.
In separating equilibria in which the activity indeed plays a role as a signaling device,
a sender with a better characteristic obtains a more favorable offer from a receiver
by bearing the cost of engaging in the activity. In the aforementioned applications, a
worker with a higher level of education receives a better wage, and a firm spending
more on advertisements is perceived to have higher product quality.
One of the questions that remain less explored in the literature is how signaling
and separation work when many individuals are involved. Typical signaling models
mostly focus on information transmission between a single sender and receiver. In
many signaling environments, however, a receiver faces multiple agents who send
him signals about their characteristics. In job markets, numerous job applicants
claim their high ability by showing their levels of education to an employer, and in
goods markets, multiple companies simultaneously try to convince a consumer of the
high quality of their products through commercials or product warranties. In these
situations, it is plausible that the receiver—the employer or consumer—responds
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differently to a particular sender’s specific action based on other senders’ behavior.
For example, suppose that a firm is recruiting in two different countries. In one
country, A, 8 out of 10 job applicants are college graduates, while in the other, B,
only 1 out of 10 has a college degree. Facing the different distributions, the firm will
not necessarily give the same score to a college graduate in each country.
Our primary interest in this paper is to see whether a receiver’s response to a
sender depends on other senders’ signals when there are multiple senders in a signaling
game and, if so, when and how it depends on them. To provide an intuitive answer
to these questions, we return to the previous recruitment example with the typical
assumption that an applicant of higher ability can complete her college education at
a lower cost. We argue that the firm may expect a higher ability from the college
graduate in country B than one in country A for either of the following two plausible
reasons:
• (Uncertainty about costs) As most applicants have a college degree in country
A, it might be the case that the cost of college education in the country was
so low that even a low-ability applicant was willing to go to a college for a
wage increase. In country B, the opposite may be true, and hence the college
graduate there may have a very high ability.
• (Uncertainty about beliefs) The reason why most applicants did not go to a
college in country B might be that the applicants did not think that higher
education would lead to a higher wage. This might have happened, for example,
if they did not believe that there was a strong correlation between education and
productivity, i.e., that the firm would care much about their education levels.
On the other hand, applicants in country A might have believed that education
would help increase their wages, so they received education even if the cost was
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high. So, college graduates in country A may include those with a low ability.
Both ways of reasoning have two ingredients in common: they rely on (i) the firm’s
additional uncertainty about the education costs or about the applicants’ beliefs and
(ii) the assumption that applicants from the same country are likely to have similar
costs or beliefs. This kind of reasoning is reminiscent of the relative performance
evaluation discussed in Gibbons and Murphy (1990) among others.
To formalize this idea, we develop and analyze a signaling game with multiple
senders. We first extend the model of the job market signaling game of Spence
(1973). The major departure from the existing model is that there are two workers
(senders), they have two-dimensional types, and one component of their types is
positively correlated across workers. The uncorrelated component of a worker’s type
is interpreted as her ability as in Spence (1973), and the correlated component is
related to her signaling cost or belief. We then find a separating equilibrium of
this game. In the equilibrium, an incentive for a worker to receive costly education
(signaling activity) comes from her expectation that it will become a signal of high
ability which will lead a firm (receiver) to give a better response (a higher wage)
to her. On the other hand, workers have no incentive to signal about the other
component through costly education as that component is assumed not to affect the
firm’s utility level. However, since the component does affect a worker’s utility, her
equilibrium education choice may depend on it. Hence, one worker’s education level
conveys information not only about her own ability but also about both workers’
costs or beliefs, enabling the firm’s inference about the other worker’s ability. This
is the channel through which a sender’s signaling behavior influences the receiver’s
response to another sender.33
33Even though a correlation between types is allowed, we will keep the abilities independent
across workers in order to shut down other channels of information transmission. If abilities are
correlated, too, then a worker’s education, which is a signal about her ability, can directly reveal
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The results of this paper will be presented in two steps. First, it will be shown
that a worker’s wage necessarily depends on the other worker’s education level in any
partially separating equilibrium if their costs or beliefs are strictly positively corre-
lated (Proposition 2.2). After that, we will show that an equilibrium always exists
in which a worker’s wage is decreasing in the other’s education level (Proposition 2.3
and 2.4). This result is the formalization of the reasoning we introduced earlier.
Our results have an implication for the current increasing trend of higher educa-
tion attainment in many countries. It might be partially attributed to the widened
availability or decreased costs of education. In addition to this, our analysis suggests
that peer effects between labor market entrants, or students, may underlie the trend.
According to our results, a worker without a college degree may be treated worse if
others choose to achieve one, and this may result in a higher incentive for the worker
to obtain a degree. Therefore, once an increase in higher education attainment is
triggered for some reason, it may keep more workers achieving education because of
signaling concerns.
As a study of signaling games, this paper is related to two branches in the lite-
rature. The first one involves a signaling model with multiple senders. Bagwell and
Ramey (1991) and Matthews and Fertig (1990) study a limit pricing model and an
advertisement model, respectively, with two senders. In Bagwell and Ramey (1991),
two incumbent firms set prices as signals about their common operating costs which
are received by a potential entrant. In Matthews and Fertig (1990), an incumbent
and an entrant choose their own advertisement levels to send a signal about the en-
trant’s product quality to consumers. In these papers, the two senders signal about
a single common object, and whether separation can occur is examined. The reason
for introducing multiple senders in our paper differs from them. In our model, each
some information about the other worker’s ability, which is not of our primary interest in this paper.
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worker signals her own ability and we focus on how differently a worker’s signal is
interpreted according to the other’s signal choice. In light of this, Hertzendorf and
Overgaard (2001) are closer to our work. In their model, duopolists signal their own
product quality through prices and advertisements. However, the two firms’ product
quality is perfectly correlated, so, in fact, they behave as if they are signaling about a
common object as in Bagwell and Ramey (1991) or Matthews and Fertig (1990). In
our model, on the other hand, there is neither correlation across two workers’ ability
nor competition between workers for a job. So, each worker’s signaling choice is made
for the completely separate purpose of signaling her own ability. In spite of that,
each worker’s wage depends on both workers’ education levels due to the correlated
component of their types.
The second branch of the literature studies a signaling game with a multidimen-
sional type. In Austen-Smith and Fryer (2005), a sender has an ‘economic’ and a
‘social’ type. The economic type corresponds to ability in our model. The social type
corresponds to the correlated component in our model in that it is not the characte-
ristic about which the sender tries to send a signal, but it does affect her incentive
in choosing her signaling action. So, their type structure is similar to that in this
paper, but they consider neither multiple senders nor correlated types across senders.
Similarly, Frankel and Kartik (2019) also consider a two-dimensional type in a sig-
naling model, which consists of ‘natural ability’ and ‘gaming ability’. Their primary
interest is in when each ability can be separated. In contrast, our model has only one
component, ability, that is separated in an equilibrium. The analysis on the other
component will be focused on how it causes wage dependence between workers rather
than on the separation of it.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, the model will be presented with
an interpretation that the correlated component of a worker’s type is her cost factor.
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In Section 2.3, an equilibrium is defined, and the properties of partially separating
equilibria are explored. In Section 2.4, we construct two classes of equilibria where a
worker’s wage is decreasing in the other’s education level. In Section 2.5, we provide
an alternative model where the correlated component can be deemed as a worker’s
belief, and argue that all the results in Section 2.3 and 2.4 hold true even with the
new model. Section 2.6 concludes this paper.
2.2 The Model
There are two workers and one firm. Each worker i ∈ {1, 2} has a private type
ti = (θi, ci), where θi ∈ Θ := [θ, θ̄] ⊂ R++ is i’s ability and ci ∈ C := {L,H} is i’s cost
factor. As was discussed in Section 2.1, the second component ci has an alternative
interpretation as worker i’s belief. We will discuss in Section 2.5 how the model can
be slightly modified to accommodate that interpretation. The workers’ abilities θ1
and θ2 are independently and identically distributed with cdf F and pdf f(·) > 0 on
Θ. Abilities and cost factors are independent, that is, θi and cj are independent for
any i, j. Cost factors c1 and c2 have a symmetric joint pmf p, and pcc′ denotes the
probability of c1 = c and c2 = c
′. The pmf p has a full support, and c1 and c2 are
weakly positively correlated in the following sense.
Definition 2.1. Cost factors c1 and c2 are said to be weakly positively correlated if
Pr(cj = c | ci = c) ≥ Pr(cj = c | ci = c′) for all c 6= c′ and i 6= j. (2.1)
They are strictly positively correlated if (2.1) holds as a strict inequality.
Given the symmetry of p, cost factors c1 and c2 are weakly (strictly, respectively)
positively correlated if and only if pLLpHH ≥ p2LH (pLLpHH > p2LH , respectively).
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Note that, if the inequality (2.1) holds as an equality, c1 and c2 are independent.
34
Each worker i simultaneously chooses a publicly observable education level ei ≥ 0.
A pair e = (e1, e2) of education levels is called an education profile. After observing
an education profile, the firm offers wages to the workers. So, worker i’s strategy is
σi : Θ×C → R+ and the firm’s strategy is ρ : R2+ → R2+. A pair σ = (σ1, σ2) denotes
a strategy profile of two workers, and a pair ρ(e1, e2) = (ρ1(e1, e2), ρ2(e1, e2)) is the
firm’s wage offers to each worker given that they chose education levels e1 and e2,
respectively. When no confusion is likely to arise, we also write ρi(ei, e−i) to denote
the firm’s wage offer to worker i given her education level ei and the other’s e−i.
A worker’s payoff is the wage offered to her minus her cost of education, which is
linear in her education level. The marginal cost is affected by both her ability and
cost factor. With a worker’s cost factor fixed, the higher her ability, the lower her
marginal cost, as in Spence (1973). In addition, if a worker’s cost factor is H, her
marginal cost is k times higher than it would be if her cost factor were L with the
same ability. So, if worker i of type (θi, ci) chooses an education level ei and is offered
a wage wi, her payoff is
ui(ei, wi, θi, ci) =

wi − g(θi)ei if ci = L
wi − kg(θi)ei if ci = H
,
where k > 1 and g : Θ → R++ is continuous and strictly decreasing. We write g̃(ti)
to denote the marginal cost of type ti, that is, g̃(θi, L) = g(θi) and g̃(θi, H) = kg(θi).
The firm’s payoff is the sum of the two workers’ ability minus the sum of their
wages. Therefore, if the firm offers wages w = (w1, w2) and the workers’ abilities are
θ = (θ1, θ2), then the firm’s payoff is v(w, θ) = (θ1 + θ2) − (w1 + w2). Even though
34In this case, two workers’ types t1 and t2 are independent.
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there is only one firm in this game, we assume that the firm behaves as if it is one
of multiple identical firms which are engaged in a Bertrand competition, where each
firm offers a wage to each worker and workers take the highest offer. Hence, in an
equilibrium which will be defined later, the firm offers each worker a wage that is equal
to the expectation of her ability conditional on both workers’ education choices.
2.3 Wage Dependence
In this section, we provide the definition of an equilibrium of the game introduced in
Section 2.2. Our analysis will be focused on partially separating equilibria in which
both workers’ education choices vary according to their types. In particular, it will
be shown that in any of those equilibria, a worker’s wage nontrivially depends on the
other’s education level (Proposition 2.2).
2.3.1 Definition of equilibrium
We use a version of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium as our equilibrium notion. Some
additional regularity requirements are imposed on top of the conditions that are
standard in the literature.
Definition 2.2. A triple (σ, ρ, β) of a profile σ of workers’ strategies, the firm’s
strategy ρ, and the firm’s belief β is an equilibrium if
(1) for each i = 1, 2 and ti ∈ T ,












(3) for each e ∈ σ1(T ) × σ2(T ), if Pr
(
{t ∈ T 2 : σ(t) = e}
)
> 0, β(e) ∈ ∆(T 2) is
determined by Bayes’ rule;35 and
(4) for each e ∈ σ1(T )× σ2(T ) such that Pr
(
{t ∈ T 2 : σ(t) = e}
)
= 0,
(a) for each c1, c2 ∈ C and for each i = 1, 2, if
∫
{s:σi(s,ci)=ei} dF (s) > 0,




(b) for each c1, c2 ∈ C and for each i = 1, 2, if
∫
{s:σi(s,ci)=ei} dF (s) = 0, the
support of the distribution of θi induced by β(e) conditional on (c1, c2) is
equal to the closure of the set {s ∈ Θ : σi(s, ci) = ei}; and









{s:σi(s,c′)=ei} dF (s) if
∫
{s:σi(s,c′′)=ei} dF (s) > 0 for c
′′ 6= c′
any positive number otherwise
.36
Conditions (1), (2), and (3) are the standard requirements. Condition (1) requires
the optimality of worker i’s strategy σi given the other worker’s strategy σ−i and the
35For a type profile t = (t1, t2), σ(t) denotes an education profile (σ1(t1), σ2(t2)).
36Of course, αic′ depends on the given education profile e.
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firm’s strategy ρ. The second condition imposes the optimality of the firm’s strategy
ρ given its belief β, and condition (3) requires that the belief β follow the Bayes’ rule
when possible. The last condition, (4), puts reasonable restrictions on the firm’s belief
when it observes an education profile which is in the range of σ, but is chosen only
with zero probability. Condition (a) requires that if an education level ei is chosen
by a set of abilities whose marginal probability is positive given some cost factors
(c1, c2), then the updated marginal distribution of worker i’s ability conditional on
those cost factors follows Bayes’ rule. Condition (b) requires that even in the case
when the update specified in (a) is not available because ei is chosen by a measure-
zero set of abilities, the updated marginal distribution of worker i’s ability conditional
on the cost factors has to have a full support on the set of abilities that choose ei.
This requirement is similar to an equilibrium condition imposed in Ramey (1996).37
Lastly, condition (c) puts a restriction on the updated marginal probability of cost
factors. The number αic′ can be interpreted as worker i’s ‘likelihood’ of choosing ei
given that her cost factor is c′. If she chooses ei with positive probability conditional
on at least one cost factor, then αic′ is determined in a normal way. If ei is chosen
by a measure-zero set of abilities for both cost factors L and H, then αic′ can be any
positive number. (c) requires that, given these likelihoods, the marginal distribution
of cost factors be determined as if the Bayes’ rule is used.
For future use, we introduce another belief restriction.
Definition 2.3. An equilibrium (σ, ρ, β) is said to be invariant to conditioning if for
each S ⊂ σ1(T )× σ2(T ) with Pr({t ∈ T 2 : σ(t) ∈ S}) > 0,
E
[




θi | e ∈ S
]
for each i = 1, 2.
37See the consistency requirements in subsection 3.1. in his paper.
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Even with all restrictions in Definition 2.2 imposed, the firm’s belief β may not
be completely pinned down by the workers’ strategies when some education levels
are chosen by a measure-zero set of types. So, it is not guaranteed that the workers’
expected wage is equal to her expected ability conditional on a set of education pro-
files chosen with a positive probability in an equilibrium. Invariance to conditioning
further restricts the firm’s belief so that no such discrepancy between an expected
wage and ability arises.
2.3.2 Partially separating equilibrium
If one of the two workers chooses a certain education level regardless of her type,
no information about the other worker’s type can be drawn from her choice. Even
though such an equilibrium, or a pooling equilibrium, always exists, the interaction
between workers and firms in that case does not differ from that in a single-worker
model. From now on, we restrict our attention to the interesting equilibria where
both workers’ education choices reveal some information about their private types.
Definition 2.4. An equilibrium (σ, ρ, β) is said to be partially separating if for each
i = 1, 2, Pr({t ∈ T 2 : σi(ti) = ei}) < 1 for any ei ∈ σi(T ), and σi is not one-to-one.
The literature on signaling games has been mostly focused on fully separating
equilibria where different types choose different messages so that a sender’s type
can be completely revealed to a receiver. However, no fully separating equilibrium
exists in this game. Even if we only consider the revelation of a worker’s ability, not
her whole type, which is the dimension of interest of the firm, we cannot have an
equilibrium with ability being fully separated. This is quite immediate in light of the
fact that full separation in signaling games is driven by the single crossing property.
In this game, a higher ability worker does not necessarily prefer an education-wage
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pair with a higher education level over the other with a lower education level even if
a lower ability worker does. This is because the higher ability worker may have the
higher marginal cost due to her high cost factor.
Before stating and proving this first result, we provide a useful definition and then
two lemmata. Given a strategy profile (σ, ρ), for each worker i and each education




denote i’s expected wage from choosing ei conditional on her type.
38 Superscripts σ
and ρ will be omitted if no confusion is likely to arise.
Definition 2.5. Let (σ, ρ, β) be an equilibrium. An education level ei ∈ σi(T ) is said
to be type-independent for worker i if her expected wage from choosing ei does not




i) for all ti, t
′
i ∈ T .
Roughly speaking, a type-independent education level for worker i is one that
prevents the other worker’s education choice from affecting i’s wage. In general, from
worker i’s point of view, her expected wage from a certain education level depends
on the other worker’s education choice. Since the workers’ cost factors are correla-
ted, different types of workers have different expectations about the other worker’s
choice, and hence, different expectations about her wage. Definition 2.5 says that
this difference should not be expected with a type-independent education level.
Remark 2.1. The following are examples in which an education level that belongs
to the image of an equilibrium strategy σi is type-independent for worker i. Although
these are not necessarily exhaustive, they cover most important cases.
(1) Suppose Pr(σi(θi, L) = ei | ci = L) > 0 and Pr(σi(θi, H) = ei | ci = H) > 0.
If the conditional expectations E
[




θi |σi(θi, H) =
38We write Wσ,ρi (ei, ti) for convenience, but it may depend only on ei and ci not on θi as θi does
not affect i’s belief about t−i.
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ei, ci = H
]
coincide, then ei is type-independent for i since ρi(ei, e−i) will be
equal to the common conditional expectation for any e−i ∈ σ−i(T ).
(2) Suppose Pr(σi(θi, c
′) = ei | ci = c′) > 0 and Pr(σi(θi, c′′) = ei | ci = c′′) = 0;
that is, ei is chosen by i with positive probability only when ci = c
′. Then, ei
is type-independent for i since ρi(ei, e−i) = E
[
θi
∣∣σi(θi, c′) = ei, ci = c′] for any
e−i ∈ σ−i(T ).
(3) Suppose {θi ∈ Θ : σi(θi, ci) = ei for some ci ∈ C} = {θ′i} for some θ′i, that is, ei
is chosen only when i has ability θ′i. Then, ρi(ei, e−i) = θ
′
i for any e−i ∈ σi(T ),
and hence ei is type-independent for i.
A nice property of type-independent education levels is that they have the usual
monotone relationship with marginal costs of education and with expected wages, as
in the standard signaling models. That is, a higher type-independent education level
is chosen by a worker with a lower marginal cost and leads to a higher expected wage,
compared to another type-independent one. This is because the other worker’s edu-
cation choice no longer matters when a worker chooses between two type-independent
education levels. She only needs to consider her own marginal cost and expected wa-
ges as if she was playing a single-sender signaling game. This observation is formally
stated in the following lemma. All proofs of the results are relegated to Appendix A.4.
Lemma 2.1. Let (σ, ρ, β) be an equilibrium and fix any worker i.
(1) Suppose that type ti has a strictly lower marginal cost of education than type t
′
i,
that is, g̃(ti) < g̃(t
′
i). If σi(ti) and σi(t
′
i) are both type-independent for worker i,
then σi(ti) ≥ σi(t′i).
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(2) Suppose two education levels ei and e
′
i > ei are both type-independent for worker




i, ti) for any ti ∈ T .
We emphasize here, as a caveat, that the statements in the lemma need not be
true if at least one of the two education levels in question is not type-independent.
For instance, it is possible that we have two types ti and t
′





i), as opposed to the first statement in Lemma 2.1. This may happen
when the gap between the expected wages from the two education levels σi(ti) and
σi(t
′
i) is different from each type’s point of view, which can be caused by their different
beliefs about the other’s education choice. So, unless the gap is the same for those
types, the standard monotone relationship between marginal costs and education
choices may be violated.
The next lemma states that, for any type of worker, her equilibrium wage ne-
cessarily varies according to the other worker’s education level if her prescribed level
is not type-independent. More precisely, her wage is not an almost surely constant
function with respect to the distribution of the other worker’s equilibrium education
level conditional on her own type. This fact relies on our assumption of the full sup-
port of p, the distribution of the two workers’ cost factors. This assumption implies
that, whatever worker i’s type, the support of i’s belief about the other worker’s type,
tj, does not change. So, if the wage from a particular education level is constant for
some type ti of worker i, it must be constant for any other type ti, too. However, if
this is true, the education level is a type-independent education level. Therefore, as
Lemma 2.2 states, an equilibrium education level that is not type-independent must
lead to a nonconstant wage schedule for any type ti.
Lemma 2.2. Let (σ, ρ, β) be an equilibrium. For any worker i and her type ti, if




ρi(ei, σ−i(t−i)) = wi
∣∣ti) = 1.
Based on the previous lemmata, we can prove the following result: the full sepa-
ration of abilities is not possible, let alone the full separation of types.
Proposition 2.1. In any equilibrium (σ, ρ, β), for each i = 1, 2, there exist two




i) ∈ T that have distinct abilities θi 6= θ′i, but choose the same





Now we turn to the primary question in this section of whether a worker’s equili-
brium wage depends on the other worker’s education level. The answer is that, if cost
factors are strictly positively correlated and both workers use education as a signaling
device, then a worker is offered different wages depending on the other’s education
choice with positive probability. The intuition starts from the observation that one
worker’s education choice reveals some information about her own cost factor which,
in turn, is informative about the other’s cost factor, as well, because of the correlation
between cost factors. This enables a firm to make a further inference about the other
worker’s cost factor, changing its expectation about her ability. The very last change
can occur if the mapping between a worker’s ability and equilibrium education level
differs according to her cost factor.
The last sentence above warrants a careful discussion. That the mapping varies
according to a worker’s cost factor is not always true. The simplest example is a
pooling equilibrium in which at least one worker chooses the same education level
regardless of her type. Clearly, her mapping does not vary in the equilibrium, which
implies that her wage does not depend on the other worker’s education choice. A
remaining question is whether a pooling equilibrium is the only case with such a
property. The answer is yes, as is stated in Lemma 2.3 below. According to this
lemma, the mapping from an ability to an education level must vary with a cost factor
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in any partially separating equilibrium. Hence, the previously provided intuition
about the wage dependence between workers is valid in such an equilibrium.
Lemma 2.3. Let (σ, ρ, β) be a partially separating equilibrium. Then, for any i, there
exists ei ∈ R+ such that
Pr
(




σi(θi, H) ≤ ei | ci = H
)
.
The following proposition formalizes our answer to the question of whether a
worker’s equilibrium wage is affected by another worker’s education choice, concluding
this section.
Proposition 2.2. Assume that cost factors are strictly positively correlated. Let
(σ, ρ, β) be a partially separating equilibrium that is invariant to conditioning. For
each i = 1, 2, define
Ei :=
{
ei ∈ σi(T ) : Pr
(
ρi(ei, σ−i(t−i)) = wi
∣∣ ti) < 1 for all ti ∈ T and wi ≥ 0}
as the set of worker i’s equilibrium education levels such that ρi(ei, ·) is not almost
surely constant on σ−i(T ) with respect to i’s belief induced by σ−i conditional on ti,
for any type ti. Then, Pr
(
{t ∈ T 2 : σi(ti) ∈ Ei}
)
> 0 for each i.
2.4 Negative Effect
In the previous section, we saw that each worker’s wage nontrivially depends on
the other worker’s education choice in any partially separating equilibrium, with an
additional restriction of invariance to conditioning. The next topic in this section
is the pattern of wage dependence in an equilibrium. As discussed in Section 2.1,
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the answer is that an equilibrium exists in which one worker’s wage is decreasing in
the other’s education level whenever an on-path education profile is chosen. Putting
it differently, a worker’s costly action or achievement to signal her high ability is
devalued when the other worker sends a good signal, as well.
In Subsection 2.4.1, we provide an equilibrium with a strong property that a
worker’s wage is strictly decreasing in the other’s education level. This equilibrium
exists if the cost difference between two cost factors is not large, that is, if k is small.
In the following Subsection 2.4.2, we provide another equilibrium which has a weaker
property that a worker’s wage is (not necessarily strictly) decreasing in the other’s
education level. Instead, it satisfies a version of D1 criterion (Cho and Kreps (1987)).
It is shown that this equilibrium exists for sufficiently large k. However, the two
ranges of k values that guarantee the existence of each equilibrium overlap, so an
equilibrium featuring the negative effect always exists without additional parametric
restrictions.
2.4.1 Strictly negative effect
We first state the proposition regarding the existence of an equilibrium with the
strong property.
Proposition 2.3. Suppose cost factors are strictly positively correlated. If k <
g(θ)/g(θ̄), there exists an equilibrium (σ, ρ, β), where for each i, ρi(ei, e−i) is strictly
decreasing on σ−i(T ) for all ei ∈ σi(T ).
The proof of the proposition is by construction. In the proof, provided in Appen-
dix A.4, we construct a simple symmetric equilibrium in which each worker chooses
either a positive education level ē > 0 or zero education. Such an equilibrium can be











Figure 2.1: Example of a partially separating equilibrium: In this equilibrium, each worker
i chooses a positive education level ē if her cost factor is L and her ability is above a cutoff
xL or her cost factor is H and her ability is above xH . She chooses 0 otherwise. Since
xL < xH , this equilibrium satisfies the property stated in Proposition 2.3 that a worker’s
wage is strictly decreasing in the other worker’s equilibrium education level.
with the low cost factor (or the high cost factor) chooses ē if and only if her ability
is above the cutoff xL (or xH , respectively). As xL is lower than xH , a worker with
the low cost factor is more likely to choose the high education level ē than a worker
with the high cost factor.
The reason why a worker’s wage is strictly decreasing in the other’s education
level in this equilibrium is not complicated. To see this, assume worker i’s education
level is fixed, say the higher one ē. Then, her ability is above xL when she has the
low cost factor, whereas it is above xH when she has the high cost factor. Hence,
the firm’s wage offer to worker i will be a weighted average of the conditional ex-
pectations E
[




θi | θi ≥ xH
]
, and the weight will be determined by
the firm’s belief about her cost factor ci. The more likely the firm believes ci is to
be H, the closer its wage offer is to E
[
θi | θi ≥ xH
]
, which is higher than the other
conditional expectation. Now, suppose the other worker j chooses zero education. As
the conditional probability of j’s choosing zero education is higher when she has a
high cost factor rather than a low one, the firm puts more weight on cj = H than its
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prior does. This, in turn, leads to more weight on ci = H due to positive correlation
between the cost factors. Then, the firm’s wage offer to worker i will be close to the
higher conditional expectation E
[
θi | θi ≥ xH
]
. On the other hand, if j chooses the
higher level ē, the firm’s wage offer to worker i will be close to the lower conditional
expectation E
[
θi | θi ≥ xL
]
.
As can be seen from this argument, the firm’s inference problem in this equilibrium
revolves around the types with middle-ranged abilities that are between the two
cutoffs xL and xH . They may choose either the high education level ē or zero according
to whether their cost factor is low or high. If a worker chooses the high education,
the firm thinks that the other worker is also likely to choose the high education, even
if her ability is only in the middle, since her cost is likely to be low. On the other
hand, if a worker chooses zero education level, the other worker’s high education ē is
interpreted as a very good signal about her ability since the firm thinks that a worker
with a middle ability is not likely to choose that level. As a last remark about this
equilibrium, we point out that the same mechanism discussed in Section 2.3, through
which a worker’s education choice changes the other worker’s wage, works in this
equilibrium, too.
2.4.2 D1 equilibrium
The equilibrium constructed in the previous subsection gives a clear idea of why each
worker’s high education choice may lower the other worker’s wage. However, it is
inconsistent with equilibrium refinements widely used in signaling game literature,
which leaves the robustness of the negative effect in question. In this subsection,
we establish the robustness by providing a D1 equilibrium of this game in which the
negative effect is still present. In doing so, we adopt a simple modification of the
D1 criterion for the canonical single-sender signaling game as our refinement concept.
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We say that an equilibrium survives as a D1 equilibrium if the firm’s belief in the
equilibrium is consistent with the original D1 criterion for every worker’s off-path
education level.









be type ti worker’s equilibrium expected payoff. The equilibrium is said to violate
the D1 criterion if there exists a worker i, a set of her types T̃i ⊂ T , and an off-path
education level ẽi /∈ σi(T ) such that
(i) for each t′i /∈ T̃i, there is t′′i ∈ T such that ui(ẽi, r, t′i) ≥ Ûi(t′i) implies ui(ẽi, r, t′′i ) >
Ûi(t
′′
i ) for each r ∈ Θ and ui(ẽi, r′, t′′i ) > Ûi(t′′i ) for some r′ ∈ Θ; and
(ii) the support of the marginal distribution of ti under β(ẽi, e−i) is not a subset of
T̃i for some e−i ∈ R+.
The equilibrium is called a D1 equilibrium if it does not violate the D1 criterion.
It is easy to see that the equilibrium we found in the previous subsection violates
the D1 criterion. In the equilibrium, the highest-ability types (θ̄, L) and (θ̄, H) are
pooled together with lower ability types at the higher education level ē. If we consider
an education level ẽi slightly higher than ē, it is clear that whenever a lower ability
type (θi, ci) has an incentive to deviate to ẽi, so does the highest-ability type (θ̄, ci) for
each ci = L,H. Hence, worker i’s choice of the off-path education level ẽi has to lead
the firm to believe that worker i has type (θ̄, L) or (θ̄, H) and offer her the highest
wage θ̄. However, such an offer in response to the slightly higher education level
unravels the equilibrium since there are a continuum of abilities and the marginal
cost of education changes continuously in ability.
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This observation not only verifies the previous equilibrium’s violation of the D1
criterion, but also helps us find a D1 equilibrium, by telling us that a highest-ability
type must be completely separated in such an equilibrium. In fact, in the symmetric
D1 equilibrium we will construct below, the type (θ̄, L) will be completely separated
by choosing the highest on-path education level.
This property of a D1 equilibrium, however, cannot be compatible with the ne-
gative effect of one worker’s education on the other’s wage that we stated in Pro-
position 2.3. Since a highest-ability type fully reveals her ability through her own
education choice in such an equilibrium, no further information can be provided by
another worker’s behavior. So, the firm offers the highest wage θ̄ to the type no
matter what education level the other worker chooses. This contradicts the strictly
decreasing property of the firm’s offer asserted in Proposition 2.3.
Even though the strong negative effect fails to persist once the D1 criterion is
applied, Proposition 2.4 below tells us that we can find a D1 equilibrium with a
slightly weaker property. The property is weakened in the sense that a worker’s
wage is decreasing in the other worker’s education level, but not necessarily strictly
decreasing. So, in such an equilibrium, the types are divided into two groups. For
one group of types, their equilibrium wage is not constant in the other worker’s
education choice and it is decreasing. For the other group of types, their equilibrium
education level fully reveals their type, keeping their wage constant regardless of the
other worker’s education level. Despite the difference in their exposition, the stronger
negative effect in Proposition 2.3 and the weaker one in Proposition 2.4 are based on
the same intuition.
Proposition 2.4. Assume that the cost factors are strictly positively correlated. For
some k̄ < g(θ)/g(θ̄), if k ≥ k̄, a D1 equilibrium (σ, ρ, β) exists such that for each i =
1, 2, ρi(ei, e−i) is nonincreasing in e−i on σ−i(T ) for all ei ∈ σi(T ) and nonconstant
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in e−i on σ−i(T ) for some ei ∈ σi(T ).
The proof of this proposition, presented in Appendix A.4, is again constructive.
The D1 equilibrium we construct in the proof is characterized by a cutoff ability xL
and a differential equation. A worker chooses zero education if either her ability is
below the cutoff xL and her cost factor is low, or her cost factor is high. If her ability
is above the cutoff and her cost factor is low, she chooses a positive education level.
The nonzero education levels are determined by the differential equation so that the
types who choose them are completely separated. As discussed above, these types
will be offered wages that do not depend on the other worker’s education choice.
However, if a worker chooses zero education, her wage is affected by whether the
other worker’s education level is positive or not. If it is positive, her wage will be low
as the firm believes that she chose zero education even though education was not so
costly. Otherwise, her wage will be higher than that as her zero education may be
due to the high education cost rather than her low ability.
2.5 Alternative Model
In Section 2.1, we discussed two different arguments for how workers’ education choi-
ces can impact each other’s wages. One argument was regarding the case when a firm
has uncertainty about their education costs, and our main model has addressed this
case. The other case involved the firm not knowing the workers’ beliefs about how
effective their education choice will be as a signal of their ability. The analysis of the
second case is very similar to that of the first case, but requires a slight modification
of our main model. In this section, we discuss a potential model adjustment for the
analysis and what results from the previous sections are preserved in the new model.
In the new game, we have two workers and one firm. Each worker i has a type
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ti = (θi, ci) ∈ [θ, θ̄] × {L,H} and the distribution of a type profile (t1, t2) is the
same as before. Nothing about the types differs from the original model except the
desired interpretation of the correlated component ci. In the new game, ci is worker
i’s belief or assessment about how much proportion of her productivity in the firm
is determined by her ability. To see the clear connection with the original model, it
is helpful to keep in mind that a high assessment corresponds to a low cost factor in
the previous model. So, ci = L in this new model means that worker i believes that
her ability accounts for a high portion of her productivity. The formal meaning of ci
will be provided shortly.
As suggested in the previous paragraph, a worker’s productivity in the new model
is not just her ability. Instead, it is a weighted average πθi+(1−π)µi of her (cognitive)
ability θi and her noncognitive skill µi ∈ R+ (with π ∈ [0, 1]). The noncognitive skill
µi is assumed to be known to the firm. Furthermore, the firm, as well as the workers,
has a private type in the new game. The firm’s type represents its assessment of
the proportion π. If the firm’s type is τ ∈ [0, 1], it believes that π = τ .39 Now,
the correlated component ci of worker i’s type represents her belief about the firm’s
type τ : she believes τ = πci , where 0 < πH < πL ≤ 1.40 Worker i’s payoff function
is as in the original model, except that her marginal cost does not depend on ci:
ui(ei, wi, θi, ci) = wi − h(θi)ei with strictly decreasing and continuous h : Θ → R++.




τθi + (1− τ)µi
)
− (w1 +w2). Worker i’s strategy
is σi : T → R+ and the firm’s strategy is ρ : [0, 1] × R2+ → R2+. The firm offers each
worker’s conditional expected productivity as her wage.
Despite these changes, an equilibrium of this new game is closely related to that
39This is for simplicity. It is sufficient that the firm has a belief under which the expected value
of π is τ .
40Similarly with the firm’s belief τ , it is sufficient that worker i has a belief under which the
expected value of τ is πci .
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of the original game. Consider the original game with g(·) = πLh(·) and k = πL/πH ,
and suppose (σ, ρ, β) is an equilibrium in the original game. Then, it can be shown
that (σ, ρ̂, β) is an equilibrium of the new game for some ρ̂. To see this, let ρ̂i(τ, e) =
τρi(e) + (1− τ)µi for each worker i and each education profile e ∈ R+. As ρi(e) is the
conditional expectation of θi under β(e), ρ̂i(τ, e) is worker i’s expected productivity
under β(e) and τ , which shows the optimality of ρ̂(τ, ·) for the firm of type τ . The next
step is to argue that σi is optimal for worker i. For this, take any type ti = (θi, ci) ∈ T
and any education levels ei, e
′
i ∈ R+. Assume ci = L. The same argument can be
applied to the case when ci = H. That worker i of type ti prefers ei to e
′





































This implies that if σi(ti) is optimal in the original game, then it is optimal, too, in
the new game. Therefore, (σ, ρ̂, β) is an equilibrium in the new game. The converse
is also true: if σ is a strategy profile that is a part of an equilibrium in the new game,
then it is an equilibrium strategy profile in the original game with g(·) = πLh(·) and
k = πL/πH .
Since the sets of worker-side equilibrium strategies are equal, we would have the
same propositions even if we had started with the new game instead. So, the result
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that a worker’s wage negatively depends on the other’s education level holds true,
too, in the alternative game. The underlying intuition for the result in the new game
is similar to that in the original game. If proportion π is large, a worker’s gain from
signaling her high ability is large, or education is more rewarding in that sense. So, if
worker i chooses a high education level, it signals that she believes education is highly
rewarding, and hence, the firm puts more weight on both ci = L and cj = L. Then,
even if the other worker j receives high education, the firm thinks that worker j may
have only a middle-ranged ability but chose a high education level since she believed
she would be greatly rewarded. The firm’s wage offer to worker j, therefore, will not
be that high compared to what it would be if worker i chose a low education level.
The brief analysis in this section shows that the results of this paper can be gene-
rally applied to many signaling environments. We believe that most of the situations
that have the following three properties can be understood through our model. First,
there should be multiple senders. Second, the receiver should have uncertainty about
parameters (for example, whether the marginal cost is g(·) or kg(·) in Section 2.2) or
about the senders’ beliefs (for example, workers’ beliefs about π in this section) in
addition to the primary uncertainty (for example, about each worker’s ability). Las-
tly, those parameters or beliefs should be positively correlated across senders. When
these are satisfied, a sender’s high signal choice will worsen the receiver’s response to
the other sender in any non-pooling equilibrium.
2.6 Conclusion
We studied a signaling game with two senders and two-dimensional types. While
each sender takes a costly action to signal only one component of her type, it unin-
tentionally becomes a signal of the other component, too. Under correlation of the
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latter components across senders, this affects the receiver’s inference about the other
sender’s type, as well. In particular, we observed that one sender’s costly action or
achievement could be devalued by the other sender’s costly action if the correlation
was positive.
This analysis provides an explanation about plausible behavior in signaling envi-
ronments that cannot be yielded with the typical single-sender signaling games. If
we understand a multi-sender situation merely as multiple replications of the single-
sender game, every sender’s high action should imply every sender’s good characteris-
tic, which is not so intuitive. Instead, the analysis in this paper provides a rationale




Understanding Pessimism With Choquet Expected Utility
Models
3.1 Introduction
In the famous thought experiment of Ellsberg (1961), individuals compare pairs of
bets, each of which is on the color of a ball drawn from one of two different urns. In
the first urn, there are 50 red balls and 50 black balls. The second urn contains 100
balls either red or black, but the exact numbers of red and black ones are unknown
to the individuals. When the individuals choose from two bets, one on red from the
first urn and the other on red from the second urn, the popular choice is the former.
This choice suggests that, from the individuals’ point of view, the probability of a
red ball from the second urn is less than a half. Now when they compare two bets
on black, the popular choice is again the bet on a ball from the first urn. Unlike the
previous case, the individuals seem to assign more than a half probability to red and
less than a half to black.
This variation in their estimates of the probability of each color from the second
urn is closely related to pessimism: They assign a higher probability to an event when
it leads to a less preferable outcome. Given a bet on red from the second urn, the
event in which a red ball is drawn is favorable to the individuals, and they assign
less than a half to it. On the other hand, faced with a bet on black, the pessimistic
individuals increase their probability estimate of the same event to more than a half
because the event has become worse to them.
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The behavior described above has often been called a paradox because it is incon-
sistent with the subjective expected utility (SEU) models of Savage (1972; originally
published in 1954) and Anscombe and Aumann (1963), thereby drawing many eco-
nomists’ attention. To accommodate this behavior, Schmeidler (1986, 1989) provides
a generalization of SEU, which is called the Choquet expected utility (CEU) repre-
sentation. In this representation, a decision maker’s belief is captured by a capacity
which can be dubbed a probability without additivity, and accordingly, her utility
function has the form of a Choquet integral with respect to the capacity.
In fact, as we will explain in detail in Section 3.2, CEU can be understood as
rank-dependent expected utility under which a decision maker behaves like an SEU
maximizer except that she uses different probabilities faced with different acts. Which
probability she uses depends on the rankings of the states in terms of how good an
outcome each state delivers. This means that for each capacity, there is a collection of
rank-dependent probabilities associated with it. Consequently, the behavioral proper-
ties of a CEU maximizer will be deeply related to the properties of these probabilities.
For example, if they have a property that each state is assigned a higher probability
when it is lower-ranked, this will lead to the pessimistic behavior in the Ellsberg ex-
periment as we discussed earlier. So, the CEU model is a convenient framework for
studying pessimism. The questions that arise are how pessimism is formally defined
in the framework and which capacities economists can use to incorporate pessimistic
behavior into economic models.
To answer these questions we first clarify what it means that an event is less favo-
rable under an act than under another. The comparison is done by an improvement
preorder ≥E that we define in Section 3.2. According to it, the event is less favorable
if, for each state in the event, the set of states outside the event that result in a more
preferred outcome than the state is expanded. We can say that a collection of rank-
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dependent probabilities is pessimistic if the probability of each event is increasing as
the event becomes less favorable.
Then, we examine which kind of capacity is associated with pessimistic rank-
dependent probabilities. We show that the answer is a convex capacity (Proposi-
tion 3.1). If we instead apply a weaker notion of pessimism, disjoint superadditivity,
which is weaker than convexity, is consistent with it (Proposition 3.2). Moreover, from
these results, we provide behavioral axiomatizations of CEU representations having
convex and disjointly superadditive capacities in Theorem 3.1 and 3.3, respectively.
To do so, we develop two axioms, Axiom 3.1 and 3.3, which are direct transformations
of pessimistic rank-dependent probabilities into corresponding behavioral properties.
Those two axioms basically require that the value of a bet on an event is higher when
it is mixed to an act under which the event is less favorable.
Our axiomatization of the CEU representation having a convex capacity provides
an alternative behavioral foundation of it, which is also axiomatized by the original
paper of Schmeidler (1989). He shows that convexity is equivalent to a decision ma-
ker’s aversion to variations in final outcomes of an act, or preference for hedging. He
asserts that this aversion can be generated by the decision maker’s lack of confidence
or knowledge about the probability governing the relevant uncertainty. Another axi-
omatization of the same representation by Wakker (1990) is also based on an axiom
under which a decision maker benefits from hedging. On the other hand, our result
reveals that the same behavior can be attributed to a decision maker’s pessimistic
belief. Moreover, by showing that any convex capacity is associated with a collection
of pessimistic rank-dependent probabilities, we make clear what it means that a de-
cision maker has a convex capacity as her belief, which is not very clear from the
original definition of convexity (Definition 3.6).
Unlike convexity, disjoint superadditivity has not been much discussed in the
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literature. As far as we are aware, this paper is the first to axiomatize the CEU
representation with the property. A disjointly superadditive capacity has a clear
meaning as a decision maker’s belief that when she allocates the likelihood of an
event into its sub-events, she leaves some portion unassigned to any sub-event. In
Section 3.4, we show that this property can also be understood as pessimism once we
consider the associated rank-dependent probabilities.
Many economists have studied how to represent pessimistic behavior in economic
models. Quiggin (1982), Segal (1984, 1987), and Yaari (1987) suggest the use of a
rank-dependent expected utility function. Each of them studies choices of objective
lotteries and axiomatizes the same utility functional form using different axioms. The
utility function suggested in those papers is the same as the standard vNM expected
utility except that the probability of each outcome of a lottery is adjusted by a
probability distortion function. Due to this distortion, even if an outcome is realized
with the same probability under two lotteries, it may be assigned different weights
according to how good the outcome is compared to the others obtainable under each
lottery. In particular, when the probability distortion function is concave (or convex in
Yaari’s way of representation), a decision maker assigns a higher weight to an outcome
when it is relatively bad, which is pessimism. The main difference of the CEU model
in our paper from theirs is that it considers subjective uncertainty. So, the rank-
dependent (subjective) probabilities in the CEU model are not necessarily a distortion
of a fixed probability. Moreover, in their models, the rankings of an outcome in two
different lotteries can be compared through the objective probabilities of a better
outcome being realized under each lottery; however, without a fixed probability in
the CEU model, we must find a different way of comparison. It is made possible by
the improvement preorder ≥E we mentioned earlier.
A similar idea regarding pessimism has been considered in the setting with sub-
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jective uncertainty, too. Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) provide a behavioral founda-
tion of the maxmin expected utility representation. It pertains to pessimism in that a
decision maker with the representation evaluates each act using the worst-case proba-
bility among multiple priors in her mind. However, they do not discuss exactly how
a change in the outcome on an event affects the decision maker’s assessment of the
event’s likelihood. Dean and Ortoleva (2017) axiomatize a utility function in which
a decision maker’s risk preference has the rank-dependent expected utility represen-
tation described in the previous paragraph and her uncertainty preference allows the
maxmin expected utility representation. So, it can incorporate pessimism regarding
both risk and uncertainty. Wakker (2001) provides an interpretation of a convex ca-
pacity in terms of rank-dependent probabilities and also a behavioral implication of
having a convex capacity in the CEU model. His analysis is similar to what we do
in Section 3.3. However, we provide a more comprehensive set of characterizations
of convexity in Proposition 3.1, and our pessimism axioms (Axiom 3.1 and 3.2) are
based on different characterizations of convexity from what Wakker provides. Also,
we present results about disjoint superadditivity, which is not discussed in his paper.
Dillenberger et al. (2017) show that given an SEU function, we can find another repre-
sentation of the same preference in which the probability of each state is distorted in
a pessimistic way from the one in the original SEU function. In their representation,
the probability distortion depends not only on the ranking of an event but also on
the outcome associated with the event. This allows the distortion to be fine-tuned
so that the SEU axioms are not violated even with the distorted belief. Unlike their
model, we consider a decision maker’s belief that depends only on the rankings of the
states.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, we lay out our
model and provide definitions regarding rank-dependent probabilities. In Section 3.3,
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we characterize the convexity of a capacity through its associated rank-dependent
probabilities and axiomatize the convex-capacity CEU representation using an axiom
called pessimism. We present parallel results regarding disjointly superadditive capa-
cities in Section 3.4. We discuss our analysis in connection with other papers in the
literature in Section 3.5. Finally, Section 3.6 concludes this paper.
3.2 Model
3.2.1 Primitives
We consider the Anscombe-Aumann framework with a nonempty finite set of states,
denoted by S. A subset of S is called an event. A nonempty set Z is the set of
outcomes. A set L denotes the set of all simple lotteries over Z. An act is a function
f : S → L. It specifies which lottery will be delivered at each future state. The set
of all acts is denoted by F . A decision maker’s (DM henceforth) preference, denoted
by %, is a binary relation over F . As usual,  and ∼ denote the asymmetric and
symmetric parts of %, respectively.
Given two acts f, g ∈ F and a weight α ∈ [0, 1], a mixed act αf+(1−α)g denotes
the one that delivers a lottery αf(s) + (1− α)g(s) at each state s ∈ S. In addition,
given two acts f, g ∈ F and an event E ⊂ S, a composite act fEg is the one that
delivers f(s) if s ∈ E and g(s) otherwise. By an abuse of notation, for a lottery
x ∈ L, the constant act that delivers x at all states is also denoted by x. Lastly, the
preference % is called nontrivial if f  g for some f, g ∈ F .
3.2.2 Choquet Expected Utility
We primarily study the case in which DM’s preference % has a Choquet expected
utility (CEU) representation, which is introduced by Schmeidler (1989). In this case,
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her belief over states is not necessarily additive and is represented by a capacity rather
than a probability.
Definition 3.1. A set function ν : 2S → [0, 1] is a capacity if
(1) ν(∅) = 0 and ν(S) = 1; and
(2) ν(E) ≤ ν(F ) for all E ⊂ F ⊂ S.
Given DM’s belief ν, her utility from an act is derived by integrating her utilities
from individual lotteries at each state with respect to the capacity ν. The integral is
taken in the sense of the Choquet integral. Let ψ : S → R be a real-valued function
on S, and let the states in S be numbered so that ψ(s1) ≤ · · · ≤ ψ(s|S|). The Choquet
integral of the function ψ with respect to the capacity ν is given by
∫
S








{sk, · · · , s|S|}
)
.
A CEU preference can be represented by a utility function that has the form of a
Choquet integral.
Definition 3.2. A pair (u, ν) consisting of a nonconstant affine utility index u : L →
R and a capacity ν on S is a Choquet expected utility representation of the preference






If a CEU preference is nontrivial, its CEU representation is unique up to an affine
transformation of the utility index.
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3.2.3 Rank-dependent probabilities
A CEU maximizer can be viewed as a standard SEU maximizer who assigns different
probabilities to a state according to its ranking induced by each act. A ranking is
simply an assignment of natural numbers 1 through |S| to the states in S.
Definition 3.3. A function ρ : S → {n ∈ N : n ≤ |S|} is a ranking on S if it is
one-to-one. In this case, we call ρ(s) the ranking of s for each s ∈ S.
We denote the set of all rankings on S by R. Given an act f ∈ F , states can be
ordered so that the state with the most preferred lottery comes first and the one with
the least preferred lottery comes last while ties are broken arbitrarily if necessary.
By assigning numbers |S| through 1 to the ordered states, we obtain a ranking on S
induced by the act f . Conversely, given a ranking ρ on S, we can collect all acts in
F that induce ρ with some tie-breaking. We denote the set of these acts by Fρ. That
is,
Fρ = {f ∈ F : ρ(s) > ρ(s′) =⇒ f(s) % f(s′), ∀s, s′ ∈ S} . (3.1)
Two acts f and g are called comonotonic if for any states s, s′ ∈ S, f(s)  f(s′)
implies g(s) % g(s′). It is true that two acts f and g are comonotonic if and only if
they belong to Fρ for some ranking ρ. In particular, for any ranking ρ, every pair of
acts in Fρ are comonotonic. It is also known that if % is a CEU preference, it satisfies
comonotonic independence.
Definition 3.4. The preference % satisfies comonotonic independence if for any pai-
rwise comonotonic acts f, g, h ∈ F and any α ∈ (0, 1), f  g implies αf + (1−α)h 
αg + (1− α)h.
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Thus, if % is a CEU preference, independence holds within Fρ for any ranking ρ:
∀f, g, h ∈ Fρ, ∀α ∈ (0, 1), f  g =⇒ αf + (1− α)h  αg + (1− α)h.
This suggests that being restricted to Fρ, a CEU preference satisfies the stronger
properties of an SEU preference and is associated with a (additive) probability on S.
To find such a probability, for each state s ∈ S and ranking ρ ∈ R, let H(s; ρ) ⊂ S
be the strict upper contour set of s with respect to ρ:
H(s; ρ) = {t ∈ S : ρ(t) > ρ(s)}. (3.2)
Then, for a capacity ν on S, define a probability pνρ on S by
pνρ(s) = ν(H(s; ρ) ∪ {s})− ν(H(s; ρ)) . (3.3)
By the definition of the Choquet integral, it can be shown that for any nonconstant






u(f(s))pνρ(s), ∀f ∈ Fρ . (3.4)
Therefore, if DM’s preference % has a CEU representation (u, ν), she evaluates an
act as if she is an SEU maximizer with the same utility index u and the probability
pνρ depending on which ranking the act induces. In this regard, we call the collection
(pνρ)ρ∈R as the rank-dependent probabilities associated with the capacity ν.
Now we define a (reflexive and transitive) preorder over the set R of all rankings
on S that will play a key role in our axiomatizations in later chapters.
Definition 3.5. For an event E ⊂ S and two rankings ρ, τ ∈ R, the ranking τ is said
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to improve E relative to ρ if H(s; τ)\E ⊂ H(s; ρ)\E for all s ∈ E. In this case, we
write τ ≥E ρ.
A ranking τ improves E relative to ρ if under τ , each state in E keeps dominating
every state in Ec that it dominates under ρ. If we have f ∈ Fρ, g ∈ Fτ , and τ ≥E ρ,
then it means that the event E is more favorable under g than under f in terms of
the lotteries delivered on E.
The relation ≥E is about how likely each state in E is to be dominated by ot-
her states in Ec. Since there is no objective probability over S, the comparison of
likelihoods is possible only through examining set-inclusion relationships. This leads
to our Definition 3.5. When there is an objective probability, the concept of impro-
vement can be different. We discuss this in Subsection 3.5.3 in relation to the model
of Yaari (1987). In addition, ≥E is independent of the statewise domination between
rankings. In other words, τ ≥E ρ neither implies nor is implied by the condition that
τ ≥ ρ on E (Example 3.1).
Let R̄(E) denote the set of all maximum elements of ≥E:
R̄(E) = {ρ ∈ R : ρ ≥E τ, ∀τ ∈ R}. (3.5)
The set R̄(E) is nonempty, and the maximum rankings are those that assign top
rankings to the states in E. So, we can write
R̄(E) = {ρ ∈ R : ρ(s) > |S| − |E|, ∀s ∈ E}
= {ρ ∈ R : H(s; ρ)\E = ∅, ∀s ∈ E} .
(3.6)
For two lotteries x, y ∈ L such that x  y and for an event E, we call xEy ∈ F a
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Figure 3.1: Improvement relation: Let E = {s2, s3}. Ranking ρ′ improves E relative to
ranking ρ, but ρ′ 6≥ ρ on E. On the other hand, ρ′′ ≥ ρ on E, but ρ′′ does not improve E
relative to ρ.
binary bet on E. Let BE denote the set of all binary bets on E:
BE = {xEy ∈ F : x  y ∈ L}. (3.7)
Then, for any ρ ∈ R̄(E), Fρ contains BE. Another important property regarding
R̄(E) is that given any capacity ν, any event E, and any ranking ρ ∈ R̄(E),
ν(E) = pνρ(E). (3.8)
This equation can be proved by writing equation (3.3) for each state in E and then
adding up all the equations. Equation (3.8) means that the capacity a CEU maximizer
assigns to an event is equal to the probability she assigns to the event in evaluating
an act that delivers its most preferred lotteries on the event.
Example 3.1. The relation τ ≥E ρ neither implies nor is implied by the condition
that τ(s) ≥ ρ(s) for all s ∈ E. For example, suppose S = {s1, s2, s3, s4, s5}, E =
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{s2, s3}, and let three rankings ρ, ρ′, ρ′′ ∈ R be given by
ρ(s1) = 1, ρ(s2) = 2, ρ(s3) = 3, ρ(s4) = 4, ρ(s5) = 5;
ρ′(s1) = 1, ρ
′(s2) = 4, ρ
′(s3) = 2, ρ
′(s4) = 3, ρ
′(s5) = 5;
ρ′′(s1) = 5, ρ
′′(s2) = 3, ρ
′′(s3) = 4, ρ
′′(s4) = 1, ρ
′′(s5) = 2.
See Figure 3.1 for the illustration of these rankings. Then, ρ′ ≥E ρ since
H(s2; ρ
′)\E = {s5} ⊂ {s4, s5} = H(s2; ρ)\E
and
H(s3; ρ
′)\E = {s4, s5} = H(s3; ρ)\E.
However, it is not true that ρ′(s3) ≥ ρ(s3). Moreover, even though ρ′′ ≥ ρ on E, but
we do not have ρ′′ ≥E ρ. This is because
H(s2; ρ
′′)\E = {s1} 6⊂ {s4, s5} = H(s2; ρ)\E.
3.3 Pessimism and Convex Capacities
In this section, we formally define pessimistic behavior and prove the equivalence
between pessimism and the convexity of a capacity when DM is a CEU maximizer.
Convexity is defined as follows.
Definition 3.6. A capacity ν on S is convex or superadditive if
ν(E ∪ F ) ≥ ν(E) + ν(F )− ν(E ∩ F ) (3.9)
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for all E,F ⊂ S.
If a capacity ν is a probability, then the inequality (3.9) holds as an equality. So, a
convex capacity assigns a higher likelihood to a union of two events than a probability
would. Schmeidler (1989) argues that convexity represents DM’s lack of confidence
about her estimate of the true probability. Formally, he proves convexity to be equi-
valent to uncertainty aversion (Schmeidler, 1989, p.582).
Definition 3.7 (Uncertainty Aversion). The preference % is uncertainty averse if for
any f, g ∈ F and α ∈ [0, 1], f % g implies αf + (1− α)g % g.
The last part of the definition can be relaxed to f ∼ g =⇒ αf + (1 − α)g % g
in CEU models. Now we provide alternative characterizations of convexity. This can
be done by imposing restrictions on the associated rank-dependent probabilities that
we defined in Section 3.2.
Proposition 3.1. Let ν be a capacity on S. Then, the following are equivalent:
(1) ν is convex.
(2) For any E ⊂ S and ρ, τ ∈ R, τ ≥E ρ implies pνρ(E) ≥ pντ (E).
(3) For any s ∈ S and ρ, τ ∈ R, τ ≥{s} ρ implies pνρ({s}) ≥ pντ ({s}).
(4) For any E ⊂ S, ν(E) = minρ∈R pνρ(E).
Condition (2) requires that the probability pνρ(E) be decreasing as ρ improves
the event E. Condition (3) imposes the same requirement only on singleton events.
The last condition (4) is seemingly a weaker requirement than condition (2). In
light of equation (3.8), condition (4) requires that the probability pνρ(E) becomes the
smallest when the ranking ρ is ≥E-maximum; however, it does not require pνρ(E)
to be decreasing in ρ unlike condition (2). Proposition 3.1 states that all of these
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three conditions are, in fact, equivalent to each other and also to the convexity of the
associated capacity ν. In particular, the equivalence between conditions (1) and (2)
implies that if DM is a CEU maximizer with a convex capacity, then she behaves as if
she assigns a higher probability to an event when it delivers less preferable lotteries.
We interpret this as DM’s pessimism: A worse event is thought to be more likely.
Wakker (2001) provides a similar characterization of convexity (p.1041, equation
(2.3)). In our notation, his condition states that
for any E ⊂ S and ρ, τ ∈ R(E), τ ≥E ρ ⇒ pνρ(E) ≥ pντ (E), (3.10)
where R(E) ⊂ R is the set of all rankings that rank the states in E next to each other;
see equation (3.13) and the following sentences in Section 3.4 for the mathematical
definition and discussion of R(E). Since R(E) ⊂ R, (3.10) is implied by condition (2)
of Proposition 3.1. Moreover, sinceR(E) = R for any singleton event E, (3.10) implies
condition (3) of Proposition 3.1. Hence, (3.10) is equivalent to all four conditions of
the proposition. Wakker’s characterization shows the rank-dependent probabilities of
E are decreasing in improvement when a decision maker evaluates the acts that are
constant on E since the rankings in R(E) can be induced by such acts. On the other
hand, condition (2) tells us that, under convexity, the same is true even when any
general acts are considered. In addition, condition (4) of our proposition provides a
simpler property than monotonicity that guarantees convexity.
The following axiom formalizes pessimism in the behavioral sense. It describes
how a rank-dependent probabilistic belief satisfying condition (2) of Proposition 3.1
is manifested by DM’s behavior.
Axiom 3.1 (Pessimism). For any E ⊂ S, ρ, τ ∈ R, f ∈ Fρ, g ∈ Fτ , h ∈ BE, and
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α ∈ (0, 1) such that τ ≥E ρ, αf + (1− α)h ∈ Fρ, and αg + (1− α)h ∈ Fτ ,
f  g =⇒ αf + (1− α)h  αg + (1− α)h. (∗)
Axiom 3.1 can be understood as follows. Since acts f and g induce rankings ρ
and τ , respectively, and τ is an improvement of event E relative to ρ, the event E
is relatively better to DM under g than under f . So, if DM is pessimistic, the event
E is considered less likely when she evaluates g. Hence, the value of a binary bet h
on E augmented to act g is smaller than the value of the same bet augmented to f .
Because of this, when f is preferred to g at the beginning, the preference is preserved
even after they are mixed with h. As a caveat, Axiom 3.1 requires this preservation
only locally, which means that α must be sufficiently close to 1 that the rankings
between states induced by f and g do not change after the two mixtures. Otherwise,
the value of h is not fully determined by rankings ρ and τ , and the preference may
be reversed.
Our first axiomatization result follows which provides an alternative behavioral
foundation for CEU preferences with convex capacities. If DM is a CEU maximizer,
pessimism is equivalent to the convexity of the capacity representing DM’s belief.
Theorem 3.1. Suppose % is nontrivial and has a CEU representation (u, ν). Then,
it satisfies Axiom 3.1 if and only if ν is convex.
Given the equivalence between uncertainty aversion and convexity of Schmeid-
ler (1989), Theorem 3.1 implies that pessimism is equivalent to uncertainty aversion
under CEU models. However, the behavioral meanings of those two axioms are dis-
tinct. Uncertainty aversion means a loathing for variation in an act and is typically
attributed to DM’s lack of confidence or knowledge about the relevant uncertainty.
On the other hand, Axiom 3.1 presents DM’s pessimistic view, which is not directly
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associated with aversion to variation. For example, it may be caused by DM’s mental
process of distorting a given probability, which should be distinguished from uncer-
tainty aversion. When DM’s convex belief is generated by her pessimistic view, her
dislike for variation is not her intrinsic preference, but a consequence of her pessimism.
Example 3.2. Suppose S = {s1, s2, s3, s4} and define a capacity ν on S by
ν(E) =

0.1 if |E| = 1
0.3 if |E| = 2
0.5 if |E| = 3
.
Calculations using equation (3.3) show that for E = {s1, s2},
pνρ(E) =

0.3 if ρ(E) = {3, 4}, {2, 4}
0.4 if ρ(E) = {2, 3}
0.6 if ρ(E) = {1, 4}
0.7 if ρ(E) = {1, 2}, {1, 3}
.
Hence, it is true that ν(E) = 0.3 = minρ∈R p
ν
ρ(E). This equation can be similarly
shown to hold for any event E. Thus, by the equivalence between (1) and (4) of
Proposition 3.1, the capacity ν is convex. One can also verify that ν satisfies condition
(2) of Proposition 3.1. For example, for three rankings ρ1, ρ2, ρ3 such that
ρ1(s1) = 1, ρ1(s2) = 2, ρ1(s3) = 3, ρ1(s4) = 4,
ρ2(s1) = 2, ρ2(s2) = 3, ρ2(s3) = 1, ρ2(s4) = 4,
ρ3(s1) = 3, ρ3(s2) = 4, ρ3(s3) = 1, ρ3(s4) = 2,
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we can see that ρ3 ≥E ρ2 ≥E ρ1. Indeed, we have pνρ1(E) = 0.7, p
ν
ρ2
(E) = 0.4, and
pνρ3(E) = 0.3, which is consistent with condition (2) of Proposition 3.1.
Now suppose there are two outcomes, Z = {a, b}, and let each element of L be
identified by a number in the unit interval which represents the probability of outcome
a. Assume that the preference % has a CEU representation (u, ν), where u(x) = x.
Then, consider two acts f and g such that
f(s1) = 0.3, f(s2) = 0.4, f(s3) = 0.5, f(s4) = 0.6,
g(s1) = 0.3, g(s2) = 0.4, g(s3) = 0.2, g(s4) = 0.9,
and a binary bet h on E such that h(s) = 1 on E and h(s) = 0 on Ec. Clearly,
f ∈ Fρ1 and g ∈ Fρ2. Under the representation (u, ν), the utilities from f and g are
0.39 and 0.33, respectively, so f  g. Thus, by Theorem 3.1 and the convexity of ν,
one can expect that the mixed act 0.95f + 0.05h is strictly preferred to 0.95g + 0.05h.
Indeed, the utilities from the two mixed acts are 0.4055 and 0.3335, respectively.
Before closing this section, we present another axiomatization of CEU with a con-
vex capacity. Axiom 3.2 below allows a similar interpretation to that of Axiom 3.1.
Mathematically, while Axiom 3.1 is a behavioral manifestation of condition (2) of
Proposition 3.1, Axiom 3.2 is that of condition (4). The new axiom can be easily
compared to Axiom 3.3 that will be shown to be equivalent to the disjoint superad-
ditivity of a capacity in the next section. So, Axiom 3.2 helps us clearly understand
the behavioral difference between two CEU preferences, one with a convex and the
other with a disjointly superadditive capacity.
Axiom 3.2. For any E ⊂ S, τ ∈ R̄(E), f ∈ F , g ∈ Fτ , h ∈ BE, and α ∈ (0, 1),
implication (∗) holds.
Axiom 3.2 has an effect on a smaller set of acts than Axiom 3.1: Axiom 3.2 is
90
relevant only when a ranking τ is ≥E-maximum while Axiom 3.1 does not have such
a restriction on τ . On the other hand, α can be any number in Axiom 3.2 while
Axiom 3.1 is relevant only when α is sufficiently close to 1. The interpretation of
Axiom 3.2 is that DM assigns a lower probability to an event E when it delivers the
most preferred lotteries than when it does not. This interpretation suggests a weaker
notion of pessimism than what Axiom 3.1 provides. Nevertheless, Axiom 3.2, as well
as Axiom 3.1, is equivalent to the convexity of a capacity for a CEU preference.
Theorem 3.2. Suppose % is nontrivial and has a CEU representation (u, ν). Then,
it satisfies Axiom 3.2 if and only if ν is convex.
3.4 Weak Pessimism and Disjointly Superadditive Capacities
Although convex capacities have nice mathematical properties, the meaning of con-
vexity for DM’s belief is not very clear when we try to draw it directly from its
definition itself. In the literature, convexity is often thought to require that finely
divided events must be assigned disproportionately small likelihoods. Put differently,
a union of events must be assigned an extra amount of likelihood. This is true to
some extent because inequality (3.9) in Definition 3.6 requires ν(E ∪ F ) to be large
enough. There is an issue, however, if E and F have a nonempty intersection. In
that case, the inequality demands that not only the union but also the intersection
of them must be assigned a sufficiently large likelihood, which is trickier to interpret.
A more natural application of the principle ‘more to a union’ would rather be
ν(E ∪ F ) ≥ ν(E) + ν(F\E), (3.11)
and
ν(F ) ≥ ν(F\E) + ν(F ∩ E). (3.12)
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In the definition of convexity, inequality (3.9) requires (3.11) with ν(F\E) replaced
by ν(F )− ν(F ∩E). In light of (3.12), it is a stronger condition than (3.11), but the
strengthening is hard to interpret in terms of an individual’s belief.
We think that disjoint superadditivity defined below is the right embodiment of
the feature that a union receives an extra likelihood. It imposes (3.9) only when E
and F are disjoint, being free from the issue we raised above.
Definition 3.8. A capacity ν on S is disjointly superadditive if ν(E ∪ F ) ≥ ν(E) +
ν(F ) for all disjoint E,F ⊂ S.
Disjoint superadditivity is less explored in the literature partly because it is less
tractable than convexity. As far as we are aware, there is no axiomatization result for
disjoint superadditivity in the literature. We will provide two results in this paper,
one in this section and the other in Section 3.5. For our first axiomatization, we
interpret disjoint superadditivity in relation to pessimism. Recall equation (3.8):
ν(E) = pνρ(E) for ρ ∈ R̄(E). Given two disjoint events E and F , suppose an act
delivers its best lottery on event E and its second-best lottery on event F . Then,
there is a ranking induced by the act that belongs to both R̄(E) and R̄(E∪F ). So, by
equation (3.8), the rank-dependent probability DM uses to evaluate this act assigns
ν(E) and ν(E ∪ F ) to E and E ∪ F , respectively, which implies that she assigns
ν(E ∪ F ) − ν(E) to F . Now consider another act that is constructed by replacing
the lottery on F by one that is preferred to the lottery on E. This new act induces
a ranking in R̄(F ), and DM assigns ν(F ) to F . If ν is disjointly superadditive, ν(F )
is no greater than ν(E ∪ F ) − ν(E), and this means that the improvement of F to
the top leads DM to reduce the probability assigned to F . This is why we may view
disjoint superadditivity as a form of pessimism.
As in the previous section, we characterize disjoint superadditivity in terms of
associated rank-dependent probabilities. To do so, we define a subset R(E) ⊂ R, for
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each event E, by
R(E) = {ρ ∈ R : H(s; ρ)\E = H(s′; ρ)\E, ∀s, s′ ∈ E}. (3.13)
Under a ranking in R(E), every state in E is ranked next to each other, or no state
in Ec is ranked between two distinct states in E. Such a ranking can be induced,
for example, by an act that is constant on E. The set R(E) contains R̄(E) since
H(s; ρ)\E = ∅ for all s ∈ E if ρ ∈ R̄(E).
Proposition 3.2. Let ν be a capacity on S. Then, the following are equivalent:
(1) ν is disjointly superadditive.
(2) For any event E ⊂ S, ν(E) = minρ∈R(E) pνρ(E).
Condition (2) of Proposition 3.2 is similar to condition (4) of Proposition 3.1.
The former is weaker than the latter since the minimum on the right-hand side of
the equation is taken over R(E), not R. If DM is a CEU maximizer and her belief ν
satisfies condition (2), it means that the event E is assigned a smaller probability when
DM evaluates the acts that deliver their best lottery on E than when she evaluates
other acts that are constant on E.
Condition (2) can be converted into a behavioral axiom as we used condition (4) of
Proposition 3.1 to construct Axiom 3.2 in the previous section. We weaken Axiom 3.2
so that its statement holds only when the two acts f, g are constant on the event E,
and this makes Axiom 3.3 below.
Axiom 3.3 (Weak Pessimism). For any E ⊂ S, τ ∈ R̄(E), f ∈ F , g ∈ Fτ , h ∈ BE,
and α ∈ (0, 1), if f and g are constant on E, implication (∗) holds.
This weakening of Axiom 3.2 may be more justifiable than the axiom for the
following reason. When an act is not constant on an event, DM may evaluate the
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probability of each state in the event separately. In that case, the elicited (rank-
dependent) probability of the event is just the sum of all the separately assigned
probabilities of each state. This simple addition may not properly reflect the likeli-
hood of the event that DM actually has in her mind. So, defining DM’s pessimism
using choices regarding such acts may be too demanding. On the other hand, when
an act delivers the same lottery on an event, DM may well evaluate the event’s pro-
bability directly, so no distortion is likely to be involved in the elicited probability.
Axiom 3.3 imposes a restriction only for such cases. The axiomatization result for
disjoint superadditivity follows.
Theorem 3.3. Suppose % is nontrivial and has a CEU representation (u, ν). Then,
it satisfies Axiom 3.3 if and only if ν is disjointly superadditive.
We conclude this section with an example and remarks below.
Example 3.3. Consider the same S and Z as in Example 3.2. The capacity ν
in this example is the same as that in Example 3.2 except that the capacity of each
two-element event is 0.4 instead of 0.3:
ν(E) =

0.1 if |E| = 1
0.4 if |E| = 2
0.5 if |E| = 3
.
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The associated rank-dependent probabilities of E = {s1, s2} are
pνρ(E) =

0.4 if ρ(E) = {2, 3}, {3, 4}
0.2 if ρ(E) = {2, 4}
0.6 if ρ(E) = {1, 2}, {1, 4}
0.8 if ρ(E) = {1, 3}
.
If ρ ∈ R(E), the image ρ(E) is {1, 2}, {2, 3}, or {3, 4}. Thus, the minimum
minρ∈R(E) p
ν
ρ(E) is 0.4 which is equal to ν(E). The same is true for the other events,
too. Hence, ν is disjointly superadditive by Proposition 3.2. However, the minimum
taken over R instead of R(E) is 0.2 which is strictly less than ν(E). This implies
that ν is not convex by Proposition 3.1.
Now consider the following two acts f1 and f2 given by
f1(s1) = 0.5, f1(s2) = 0.5, f1(s3) = 0.4, f1(s4) = 0.6,
f2(s1) = 0.6, f2(s2) = 0.6, f2(s3) = 0.3, f2(s4) = 0.4,
and a binary bet h on E such that h(s) = 1 on E and h(s) = 0 on Ec. Under a CEU
representation (u, ν) with u(x) = x, the utilities from f1 and f2 are 0.46 and 0.43,










h are 0.43 and 0.415, respectively,
and hence the strict preference is preserved after mixing. This is an implication of
the disjoint superadditivity of ν since Axiom 3.3 can be applied to acts f1, f2, and h.
In Axiom 3.3, we cannot dispense with the restriction that f is constant on the
designated event. To see this, let another act f3 be given by
f3(s1) = 0.5, f3(s2) = 0.8, f3(s3) = 0.2, f3(s4) = 0.7.
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This act is not constant on E. The utility from f3 is 0.44, so f3  f2. However, the
















implication (∗) of Axiom 3.3 does not hold.
Remark 3.1. In Example 3.3, we showed by a counterexample that, in Axiom 3.3,
act f must be constant on event E for Theorem 3.3 to hold. On the other hand, the
theorem is still valid even if we strengthen the axiom by not requiring act g to be
constant on E. Nevertheless, we chose to present the current version of Axiom 3.3
because it highlights the deviation from Axiom 3.2 by requiring all acts to be constant
on E and also because our justification of Axiom 3.3 is based on the constancy of f
and g.
Remark 3.2. Condition (2) of Proposition 3.2 is a version of condition (4) of
Proposition 3.1 with R replaced by R(E). Similarly, one may consider modifying
conditions (2) and (3) of Proposition 3.1 so that ρ, τ ∈ R(E) and adding them as
equivalent characterizations of disjoint superadditivity. It turns out, however, that
such a modification does not work. To see this, consider the capacity ν in Example 3.3.
We can find two rankings ρ and τ such that ρ({s1}) = 2, τ({s1}) = 3, and τ ≥{s1} ρ.
For these rankings, we have
pνρ({s1}) = 0.1 < 0.3 = pντ ({s1})
even though both ρ and τ belong to R({s1}) = R. Thus, the modified version of
condition (3) of Proposition 3.1 is not satisfied by ν. Consequently, neither is the
version of condition (2).
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3.5 Discussion
3.5.1 Comparison to pessimism independence
Schmeidler (1989) shows that a nontrivial preference % has a CEU representation
if and only if it satisfies completeness, transitivity, continuity (for all f, g, h ∈ F , if
f  g and g  h, then there are α, β ∈ (0, 1) such that αf + (1 − α)h  g and
g  βf + (1− β)h), monotonicity (for all f, g ∈ F , if f(s) % g(s) for all s ∈ S, then
f % g), and comonotonic independence. Under these axioms, uncertainty aversion
of the preference is equivalent to the convexity of the representing capacity. Our
Theorem 3.2 shows that we can replace uncertainty aversion by Axiom 3.2.
Wakker (1990) also provides an alternative axiomatization. Instead of adding an
additional axiom to the set of basic CEU axioms of Schmeidler (1989), he strengthens
comonotonic independence to define pessimism independence.
Definition 3.9. The preference % satisfies pessimism independence if for any act
f ∈ F , any comonotonic acts g, h ∈ F , and any α ∈ (0, 1), implication (∗) holds.
The intuition behind this definition is that DM having a pessimistic view dislikes
uncertainty and seeks for hedging. While the mixture of f and h may generate a
hedging effect, that of g and h does not since they are comonotonic. So, the preference
between f and g is preserved even after they are mixed with h.
The way we define pessimism in this paper differs from what Wakker (1990) sug-
gests. Our notion of pessimism is not so much an inclination for smoothing future
outcomes as an exaggeration of the likelihoods of bad events. Nevertheless, our pes-
simism axioms (Axiom 3.1 and Axiom 3.2) and Wakker’s pessimism independence
share similar forms in that they specify the situations in which implication (∗) holds.
So, we can easily compare them. In particular, the combination of comonotonic
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independence and our Axiom 3.2 is weaker than pessimism independence, which me-
ans that the full strength of pessimism independence is not necessary to achieve the
convex-capacity CEU representation.
Proposition 3.3. If the preference % satisfies pessimism independence, it satisfies
comonotonic independence and Axiom 3.2.
Since acts g and h in Axiom 3.2 are comonotonic, Axiom 3.2 is easily implied by
pessimism independence. The converse is not true, however, since Axiom 3.2 is silent
about what happens when the binary bet h is replaced by a general act as in pessimism
independence. Theorem 3.2 tells us that to decide whether DM’s preference can be
represented by CEU with a convex capacity, it is enough to test implication (∗) for
the cases (i) when f , g, and h are comonotonic, and (ii) when f is not comonotonic
with g and h, and h is a binary bet. In other words, it is unnecessary to check every
act h that is comonotonic with g as is required by pessimism independence.
3.5.2 Weakening of uncertainty aversion
The axioms we provided in previous sections are interpreted differently from uncer-
tainty aversion. However, rewriting them in slightly different forms, one can discover
their mathematically close relationships to uncertainty aversion. This further enables
us to find out how to directly weaken the uncertainty aversion axiom to characterize
the CEU preferences with disjointly superadditive capacities.
Implication (∗) in Axioms 3.1-3.3 can be replaced by
f ∼ g, g ∼ h, h ∼ f =⇒ αf + (1− α)h % αg + (1− α)h, (∗∗)
and our axiomatization results, Theorems 3.1-3.3, are still valid with the replaced
axioms (see Lemma A.15 in the appendix). Implication (∗) says that the preference
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f  g is preserved since h has a higher value when mixed with f . Similarly, (∗∗) says
that if f and g are indifferent, αf + (1− α)h is at least as good as the other mixture
for the same reason. Moreover, it is sufficient to have the implication only when the
binary bet h is indifferent to both f and g.
In Axiom 3.3, act g and binary bet h are comonotonic. Hence, under CEU axioms,
αg+ (1−α)h is indifferent to h provided that g ∼ h. So, implication (∗∗) is satisfied
if αf + (1 − α)h % h. That is, the requirement imposed by Axiom 3.3 with (∗∗) in
addition to CEU axioms is that for any event E, any act f constant on E, and any
binary bet h on E,
f ∼ h implies αf + (1− α)h % h.
Without the restrictions on f and h, the implication above is exactly what uncer-
tainty aversion demands. Because of the restrictions, Axiom 3.3 with (∗∗) becomes
weaker than uncertainty aversion and equivalent to disjoint superadditivity instead
of convexity. This provides another axiomatization of disjoint superadditivity in line
with Schmeidler’s result regarding convexity.
Proposition 3.4. Suppose the preference % is nontrivial and has a CEU represen-
tation (u, ν). Then, the following are true:
(1) (Schmeidler, 1989) The capacity ν is convex if and only if for any f, h ∈ F and
α ∈ (0, 1), f ∼ h implies αf + (1− α)h % h.
(2) The capacity ν is disjointly superadditive if and only if for any E ⊂ S, f ∈ F
constant on E, h ∈ BE, and α ∈ (0, 1), f ∼ h implies αf + (1− α)h % h.
3.5.3 Comparison to Yaari (1987)
Yaari (1987) studies choice of objective lotteries and presents a utility representation
of pessimistic behavior. Our representations of pessimism through convexity and
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disjoint superadditivity have a similar feature with Yaari’s: The better an event,
the lower its probability. Yaari (1987) and this paper, respectively, show how this
pessimism is represented under objective risk and under subjective uncertainty.
In Yaari (1987), an alternative is a random variable v with values (or monetary




f(Pr(v > t)) dt, (3.14)
for some continuous and nondecreasing probability distortion function f : [0, 1] →






f(Pr(v ≥ t))− f(Pr(v > t))
)
. (3.15)
It is the standard expected utility function with a linear Bernoulli utility index if f
is linear.
Furthermore, Yaari (1987) shows that f is convex if and only if the preference
over the random variables is risk averse (Theorem 2, p.107). He asserts that when
f is convex, the decision maker behaves in a pessimistic way assigning a relatively
large weight to a monetary payment t for which the probability Pr(v > t) of the
‘upper contour set’ is large and a relatively small weight to t for which Pr(v > t)
is small. To see this, suppose two random variables u, v with finite supports satisfy
Pr(u = t) = Pr(v = r) and Pr(u > t) > Pr(v > r) for some payments t, r ∈ [0, 1].
Under u and v, the two payments are realized with the same probability, but t is
relatively bad outcome under u than r is under v. As is clearly seen from Figure 3.2,
when f is convex, the weight assigned to t under u according to the utility function
in (3.15) is greater than that assigned to r under v.





weight on r under v
Pr(v > r)
Pr(u = t)




Figure 3.2: Weights assigned on monetary payments under a convex probability distortion
function.
ditive capacities, especially when we view them as rank-dependent expected utility
functions. The difference is that since there is no objective probability over states in
the Anscombe-Aumann framework, we cannot use the probability of the ‘upper con-
tour sets’ of an event, such as Pr
(
{t ∈ Ec : f(t)  f(s), ∀s ∈ E}
)
, to compare how
good the event is under different acts. Instead, we can compare the upper contour
sets in the sense of set inclusion, and this is done by the improvement preorder ≥E
in our paper. Namely, an event E is a better event under act f than under act g if
{t ∈ Ec : f(t)  f(s)} is contained in {t ∈ Ec : g(t)  g(s)} for every s ∈ E.
An alternative approach of defining such a relation would be to follow Yaari’s way,
but use the subjective belief of DM instead of the objective probability. That is, we
may say that an event E is improved by τ relative to ρ if the subjective likelihood of
H(s; ρ)\E is no less than that of H(s; τ)\E for each s ∈ E. In this case, the most
important issue will be how to define the subjective likelihood since DM does not
have a fixed probability. We do not have a good answer to this question yet, and it
is left for future research.
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3.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we provided novel axiomatizations of CEU functions with convex ca-
pacities and disjointly additive capacities. The key step was to view CEU functions
as rank-dependent expected utility functions and characterize convexity and disjoint
superadditivity in terms of rank-dependent probabilities associated with a represen-
ting capacity. We showed that the two properties of a capacity are equivalent to
behavioral axioms that are interpreted as a decision maker’s pessimistic attitude. In
short, pessimism means that the worse outcome an event delivers, the higher likeli-
hood the event is assigned. Lastly, we expect that other classes of capacities that
frequently appear in the literature, such as belief functions and exact capacities, also
have alternative characterizations in terms of rank-dependent probabilities. Once
such characterizations are found, they could be exploited to establish the behavioral
foundation of CEU functions with those capacities.
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APPENDIX
A.1 Axiomatization of the Invariant Biseparable Representa-
tion
In this section, we introduce and discuss the axiomatic foundation of the invariant
biseparable representation which is provided by GMM. We list the axioms and repre-
sentation result consecutively.
Axiom A.1 (Weak Order). The preference relation % is complete and transitive.
Axiom A.2 (Certainty Independence). For any acts f, g ∈ F , any lottery x ∈ L,
and any α ∈ (0, 1],
f % g if and only if αf + (1− α)x̄ % αg + (1− α)x̄ .
Axiom A.3 (Archimedean Continuity). For any acts f, g, h ∈ F , if f  g and g  h,
then there exist α, β ∈ (0, 1) such that αf + (1− α)h  g and g  βf + (1− β)h.
Axiom A.4 (Monotonicity). For any acts f, g ∈ F , if f(s) % g(s) for all s ∈ S,
then f % g.
Axiom A.5 (Nondegeneracy). There exist acts f, g ∈ F such that f  g.
Proposition A.1 (Ghirardato, Maccheroni, and Marinacci, 2004). The preference
relation % satisfies Axioms A.1-A.5 if and only if there exists an invariant biseparable
representation (u,B) of %. Moreover, the belief functional B is unique and the utility
index u is unique up to a positive affine transformation.
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Axioms A.1, A.3, A.4, and A.5 are standard. Axiom A.2 is a weakening of the
Independence axiom. A rationale for Certainty Independence is that a mixture with
a constant act is not likely to reverse a decision maker’s preference as it generates no
effect regarding the uncertainty over states. For example, GS argues that a mixture of
two different acts may generate a hedging effect, but not if one of them is a constant
act. We emphasize that the axiom is still appealing in our multi-issue environment,
too. This is because a mixture of an act with another constant act does not change
the set of relevant issues. In other words, if f is a J-act and g is a J ′-act, then the
mixture of them with a constant act x̄ is still a J- and J ′-act, respectively. Without
any effect in terms of relevant issues, a mixture with a constant act is likely to preserve
a decision maker’s preference.
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A.2 Choquet Expected Utility
We introduce the Choquet Expected Utility, its axiomatic foundation, and some facts
regarding its core in this section. We will only cover the case with a finite set of
states. See the original papers of Schmeidler (1986, 1989) or other related papers
(e.g., Ghirardato, 1997, 2001) for more details.
A.2.1 Choquet integral
Let Ω be a nonempty finite set. We start by defining a capacity.
Definition A.1. A set function ν : 2Ω → [0, 1] is a capacity on Ω if
(1) ν(∅) = 0 and ν(Ω) = 1;
(2) ν(E) ≤ ν(F ) for all E ⊂ F ⊂ Ω.
A capacity ν is called a probability if it additionally satisfies additivity: ν(E∪F ) =
ν(E) + ν(F ) for all disjoint subsets E,F ⊂ Ω. It is called convex if ν(E ∪F ) + ν(E ∩
F ) ≥ ν(E) + ν(F ) for all E,F ⊂ Ω. Now we define the Choquet integral of a real-
valued function with respect to a capacity. Let ψ : Ω→ R be a real-valued function
on Ω, and number the elements of Ω so that
ψ(ω1) ≤ · · · ≤ ψ(ω|Ω|) .
Then, given a capacity ν on Ω, the Choquet integral of ψ with respect to ν is
∫
Ω

































where the integrals on the right-hand side are taken in Riemann sense.
A.2.2 CEU representation
We now consider our model in Chapter 1, and present the definition of the CEU
representation.
Definition A.2. A pair (u, ν) consisting of a nonconstant affine utility index u : L →
R and a capacity ν on S is a Choquet Expected Utility representation of the preference






Schmeidler (1989) provides the axiomatic foundation of the CEU representation.
We say that two acts f and g are comonotonic if for all s, s′ ∈ S, f(s)  f(s′)
implies g(s) % g(s′). The preference relation satisfies Comonotonic Independence if
for any pairwise comonotonic acts f, g, h ∈ F and any α ∈ (0, 1], f % g if and only if
αf +(1−α)h % αg+(1−α)h. Clearly, Comonotonic Independence is a weakening of
Independence. However, it is stronger than Certainty Independence (Axiom A.2). It
is shown by Schmeidler (1989) that the preference relation % satisfies Axioms A.1, A.3,
A.4, A.5, and Comonotonic Independence if and only if it has a CEU representation.
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A.2.3 Core of a capacity
The core of a capacity is defined as follows.
Definition A.3. The core of a capacity ν on S is








an invariant biseparable representation. We can show that the core of the capacity ν




Fact A.1. Let ν be a capacity on S, and let B : RS → R be the belief functional
defined by B(v) =
∫
S
v dν for all v ∈ RS. Then, core(ν) = core(B).
Proof. Suppose P ∈ core(ν). Let v ∈ RS be given. Then, using a numbering of states
in S such that v(s1) ≤ · · · ≤ v(s|S|) as in (A.1), we have























v(sk)P (sk) = P · v ,
(A.2)
where the inequality holds since P ∈ core(ν). This immediately implies that P ∈
core(B). Thus, core(ν) ⊂ core(B).
Conversely, suppose P ∈ core(B). Let E ⊂ S be given and let eE ∈ RS be the




eE dν = B(eE) ≤ P · eE = P (E) .
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Since E is arbitrarily given, P ∈ core(ν). Therefore, core(B) ⊂ core(ν).
Fact A.1 immediately implies the following.




all v ∈ RS.
When a nonempty closed convex subset C ⊂ ∆(S) is given, we can think of two






The other is to consider the lower envelope of C and the CEU utility with respect to
it as we did in Section 1.6. As we claimed in the section, the latter is dominated by
the former for all acts.




P (E) , ∀E ⊂ S .
Then, for any utility act v ∈ RS,
∫
S
v dλ ≤ min
P∈C
P · v .
Proof. By definition of λ, any probability in C belongs to core(λ). Thus, by Fact
A.2, for any v ∈ RS and P ∈ C,
∫
S
v dλ ≤ P · v .
Since this holds for any P ∈ C, we obtain the desired result.
108
Lastly, a CEU belief functional is superadditive if and only if its associated ca-
pacity is convex. Moreover, if % is a CEU preference represented by (u, ν), then
the following are equivalent: (1) % satisfies Uncertainty Aversion; (2) The capa-
city ν is convex; (3) The belief functional
∫
S







u(f) dP . Schmeidler (1989) provides additional equivalent conditions
(Proposition, p.582).
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A.3 Proofs for Chapter 1
A.3.1 Preliminary results
Lemma A.1. Assume the preference relation % satisfies Axioms A.1-A.5 and let
(u,B) be an invariant biseparable representation of %. Suppose that an act f ∈ F
satisfies u(f) ∈ int(u(F)) and that a probability P ∈ ∆(S) satisfies
P · u(g) ≥ P · u(f) for all g % f.
Then, P · u(f) = B(u(f)) and P ∈ core(B).
Proof. Fix an act f ∈ F and a probability P ∈ ∆(S) that satisfy the supposition.
Let vf = B(u(f)) and xf ∈ L be a lottery satisfying u(xf ) = vf . Then, we have
vf = u(xf ) = P · u(xf ) ≥ P · u(f) , (A.3)
where the last inequality holds since xf ∼ f . Moreover, since u(f) ∈ int(u(F)),
there exist g ∈ F and α ∈ (0, 1) such that αu(g) + (1 − α)vf = u(f). Applying the
functional B on both sides, we obtain αB(u(g)) + (1 − α)vf = B(u(f)) = vf , which
implies B(u(g)) = vf , hence g ∼ f . Thus, by the supposition,
P · u(g) ≥ P · u(f) . (A.4)
To show that vf = P · u(f), suppose to the contrary that vf 6= P · u(f). This means
vf > P · u(f) by (A.3). Then,
P · u(g) = 1
α
[













P · u(f)− (1− α)P · u(f)
]
= P · u(f) ,
which contradicts (A.4). Therefore, B(u(f)) = vf = P · u(f).
Next, we show that P ∈ core(B). Suppose to the contrary that P 6∈ core(B).
Then, there exists an act h ∈ F such that vh := B(u(h)) > P · u(h). Since u(f) ∈
int(u(F)), there exists a lottery y ∈ L and β ∈ (0, 1) such that

u(y) < vf if h  f
u(y) = vf if h ∼ f
u(y) > vf if h ≺ f
,
and h′ := βh + (1 − β)y ∼ f . Let xh ∈ L be a lottery such that xh ∼ h. Then, by
Certainty Independence (Axiom A.2), we obtain βxh + (1− β)y ∼ h′ ∼ f . Applying
B ◦ u, we have
βvh + (1− β)u(y) = vf . (A.5)
Moreover, since h′ ∼ f ,
P · u(h′) ≥ P · u(f) = vf , (A.6)
where the second equality was shown in the earlier part of this proof. Combining
(A.5) and (A.6), we obtain
vf = βvh + (1− β)u(y) > βP · u(h) + (1− β)u(y)
= P · u(βh+ (1− β)y) = P · u(h′) ≥ vf ,
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which is a contradiction. Therefore, P ∈ core(B).
The following lemma shows that the converse of Lemma A.1 is also true. That is,
if P ∈ core(B) and P · u(f) = B(u(f)), then P ‘supports’ the upper contour set of f .
Lemma A.2. Assume the preference relation % satisfies Axioms A.1-A.5 and let
(u,B) be an invariant biseparable representation of %. Suppose f ∈ F and P ∈
core(B) satisfy P · u(f) = B(u(f)). Then, for any g ∈ F such that g % f , P · u(g) ≥
P · u(f).
Proof. Suppose g % f . Then, P · u(g) ≥ B(u(g)) ≥ B(u(f)) = P · u(f), where the
first inequality holds since P ∈ core(B). This concludes the proof.
Definition A.4 (Strong Local Preference for Hedging). Let J ⊂ I be a nonempty
subset of issues. Then, the preference relation % exhibits Strong Local Preference for
Hedging (SLPH) with respect to J if the following holds: For any pairwise indifferent
acts f1, · · · , fn ∈ F and any α1, · · · , αn ∈ [0, 1] with
∑n
k=1 αk = 1, if the mixed
act g := α1f1 + · · · + αnfn satisfies g(sJ , s−J) ∼ g(sJ , s′−J) for all sJ ∈ SJ and
s−J , s
′
−J ∈ SI\J , then
α1f1 + · · ·+ αnfn % f1 .
Lemma A.3. Assume the preference relation % satisfies Axioms A.1-A.5 and let
J ⊂ I be a nonempty subset. Then, % exhibits Local Preference for Hedging with
respect to J if and only if it exhibits Strong Local Preference for Hedging with respect
to J .
Proof. It is immediate that SLPH implies LPH. To prove the converse, assume LPH
holds and let f1, · · · , fn ∈ F and α1, · · · , αn ∈ [0, 1] satisfying the supposition in
SLPH be given. Write g = α1f1 + · · · + αnfn. It is easy to see that if all lotteries
in {fk(s) ∈ L : 1 ≤ k ≤ n, s ∈ S} are indifferent, then g ∼ f1 and we are done.
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Assume they are not all indifferent. Then, we can take two lotteries x, y ∈ L such
that x̄  ȳ and x̄ % fk(s) % ȳ for all k ∈ {1, · · · , n} and s ∈ S. Then, for each
k and s, there exists unique βks ∈ [0, 1] such that βks x̄ + (1 − βks )ȳ ∼ fk(s). For
each k ∈ {1, · · · , n}, define an act hk ∈ F by hk(s) = βksx + (1 − βks )y for all
s ∈ S. Then, since fk(s) ∼ hk(s) for all s ∈ S, Monotonicity (Axiom A.4) implies
fk ∼ hk for each k, and hence f1 ∼ · · · ∼ fn ∼ h1 ∼ · · · ∼ hn. Moreover, Certainty





k=1 αkhk(s) ∀s ∈ S . (A.7)
Since g(sJ , s−J) ∼ g(sJ , s′−J) for all sJ ∈ SJ , s−J , s′−J ∈ SI\J by supposition, (A.7)
implies
∑n
k=1 αkhk(sJ , s−J) ∼
∑n
k=1 αkhk(sJ , s
′
−J) ∀sJ ∈ SJ , ∀s−J , s′−J ∈ SI\J . (A.8)
Since each lottery in (A.8) is a mixture of x and y, the indifference implies
n∑
k=1





−J) ∀sJ ∈ SJ ,∀s−J , s′−J ∈ SI\J .
Thus,
∑n




αkhk % h1 ∼ f1 ,
where the first relation follows from (A.7) and Monotonicity (Axiom A.4), and the
second relation holds by LPH. This completes the proof.
We prove the following lemma using a similar argument as is used in the proof of
Lemma 21 of Grant and Polak (2013).
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Lemma A.4. Assume the preference relation % satisfies Axioms A.1-A.5 and let
(u,B) be an invariant biseparable representation of %. If % additionally satisfies
LPH with respect to some J ⊂ I, then for any f ∈ FJ with u(f) ∈ int(u(F)), there
exists a probability P ∈ core(B) such that g % f implies P · u(g) ≥ P · u(f). In this
case, P · u(f) = B(u(f)).
Proof. Fix f ∈ FJ such that u(f) ∈ int(u(F)). Consider a set
U =
{
u(f ′) ∈ RS : f ′ % f}.
and the convex hull co(U) ⊂ RS of U . The set U is the upper contour set of u(f),
or the set of all utility profiles that are preferred to u(f). Clearly, u(f) ∈ co(U). To
see that int(co(U)) is nonempty, note that u(f) + δ̄ ∈ int(u(F)), for sufficiently small
δ > 0, since u(f) ∈ int(u(F)). By continuity of B, any point near u(f) + δ̄ has a
higher value than u(f) under B. So, u(f) + δ̄ ∈ int(U) ⊂ int(co(U)).
Now we claim that u(f) 6∈ int(co(U)). Suppose u(f) belongs to the interior of
co(U). Then, for sufficiently small ε > 0, u(f) − ε̄ ∈ co(U). Moreover, we can find
a J-act g ∈ FJ such that u(g) = u(f) − ε̄ and f  g. By Carathéodory’s Theorem
(Rockafellar, 1970, Theorem 17.1), there exist finitely many acts h1, · · · , hn ∈ F and
weights α1, · · · , αn ∈ (0, 1] with
∑n
k=1 αk = 1 such that u(hk) ∈ U , for each k, and
α1u(h1) + · · · + αnu(hn) = u(g). Note that n cannot be 1 since if it were, we would
have u(h1) = u(g) while u(h1) ∈ U and u(g) 6∈ U . Since hk % f  g for each k, there
exist β1, · · · , βn ∈ (0, 1] such that h′k := βkhk + (1 − βk)g ∼ f . Given this, define







































































k % h1 ∼ f ,
where the first indifference is implied by (A.9). This is a contradiction. Thus, u(f) 6∈
int(co(U)).
Hence, by the Separating Hyperplane Theorem (Aliprantis and Border, 2006, The-
orem 5.67), there exists nonzero P ∈ RS such that
∑
s∈S P (s) = 1 and P ·v ≥ P ·u(f)
for all v ∈ co(U). In particular, f ′ % f implies u(f ′) ∈ U and hence P ·u(f ′) ≥ P ·u(f).
Thus, the functional P is the desired one we have been seeking if it belongs to core(B).
Since Monotonicity (Axiom A.4) holds and u(f) ∈ int(u(F)), P (s) is nonnegative for
each s ∈ S, which implies P ∈ ∆(S). Therefore, by Lemma A.1, P ∈ core(B). The
last statement that P · u(f) = B(u(f)) is also implied by Lemma A.1.
Definition A.5 (Strong Multi-issue Uncertainty Aversion). The preference relation
% is said to exhibit Strong Multi-issue Uncertainty Aversion (SMIUA) if the following
holds: For any distinct issues i1, · · · , im ∈ I, any acts f1 ∈ Fi1 , · · · , fm ∈ Fim ,
115
g1, · · · , gn ∈ F , and any weights α1, · · · , αm; β1, · · · , βn ∈ [0, 1] with
∑m
k=1 αk = 1
and
∑n
l=1 βl = 1, if fk ∼ fk′ and gl ∼ gl′ for all k, k′, l, l′, then
(




β1g1 + · · ·+ βngn
)
(s) , ∀s ∈ S implies f1 % g1 .
Lemma A.5. Assume the preference relation % satisfies Axioms A.1-A.5. Then, %
exhibits Multi-issue Uncertainty Aversion if and only if it exhibits Strong Multi-issue
Uncertainty Aversion.
Proof. It is immediate that SMIUA implies MIUA. We will prove the opposite di-
rection using a similar argument with that in the proof of Lemma A.3. Let f1 ∈
Fi1 , · · · , fm ∈ Fim , h1, · · · , hn ∈ F , and α1, · · · , αm, β1, · · · , βn ∈ [0, 1] be given and
suppose they satisfy the supposition of Definition A.5 for SMIUA. We need to show
f1 % h1. Consider the set of lotteries M = {fk(s) : 1 ≤ k ≤ m, s ∈ S} ∪ {hl(s) : 1 ≤
l ≤ n, s ∈ S}. If all lotteries in M are indifferent, then by Monotonicity (Axiom A.4),
f1 ∼ h1 and we are done. Assume they are not all indifferent. Then, there exist
lotteries x, y ∈ L such that x̄  ȳ and x̄ % x′ % ȳ for every x′ ∈M . Let γks , δls ∈ [0, 1]
be the unique numbers such that γks x̄+ (1− γks )ȳ ∼ fk(s) and δlsx̄+ (1− δls)ȳ ∼ hl(s),
for all k, l and for all s ∈ S. Then, define acts f ′k, h′l, for each k and l, by
f ′k(s) = γ
k
sx+ (1− γks )y , h′l(s) = δlsx+ (1− δls)y .
By Monotonicity (Axiom A.4), the acts f ′k, h
′
l defined above satisfy f1 ∼ · · · fm ∼
f ′m ∼ · · · ∼ f ′1 and h1 ∼ · · · ∼ hn ∼ h′n ∼ · · · ∼ h′1. Moreover, Certainty Indepen-














where the second indifference relation holds by the supposition of Definition A.5.
Identified as lotteries, the leftmost and rightmost objects are mixtures of x and y.
Hence, the indifference further implies that they are equal. In addition, for each
k = 1, · · · ,m and for all sik ∈ Sik and s−ik , s′−ik ∈ SI\{ik}, we have
f ′(sik , s−ik) ∼ f(sik , s−ik) = f(sik , s′−ik) ∼ f ′(sik , s
′
−ik) .
Again, since the first and last objects are mixtures of x and y, the indifference implies
equality. Hence, f ′k ∈ Fik for all k. Thus, f ′1 ∈ Fi1 , · · · , f ′m ∈ Fim , h′1, · · · , h′n ∈ F ,
and α1, · · · , αm, β1, · · · , βn ∈ [0, 1] satisfy the supposition of Definition 1.4 for MIUA.




1 ∼ f1 and h′1 ∼ h1, we conclude that f1 % h1 and %
exhibits SMIUA.
The following property is a stronger version of Preference for Sure Diversification
of Chateauneuf and Tallon (2002), and this version is also introduced in their paper.
Definition A.6. The preference relation % exhibits Preference for Sure Expected
Utility Diversification (PSEUD) if for any pairwise indifferent acts f1, · · · , fn ∈ F
and any α1, · · · , αn ∈ [0, 1] with
∑n
k=1 αk = 1, if the mixed act g := α1f1 + · · ·+αnfn
satisfies g(s) ∼ g(s′) for all s, s′ ∈ S, then
α1f1 + · · ·+ αnfn % f1 .
As Preference for Sure Diversification can be regarded as LPH with respect to the
empty set, PSEUD can be regarded as SLPH with respect to the empty set. The
following lemma says that PSD and PSEUD are equivalent for invariant biseparable
preferences.
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Lemma A.6. Assume the preference relation % satisfies Axioms A.1-A.5. Then, %
exhibits Preference for Sure Diversification if and only if it exhibits Preference for
Sure Expected Utility Diversification.
The proof of Lemma A.6 is essentially the same as that of Lemma A.3 except
that we take J = ∅, and hence omitted. We also obtain the following lemma that is
similar to Lemma A.4.
Lemma A.7. Assume the preference relation % satisfies Axioms A.1-A.5, and let
(u,B) be an invariant biseparable representation of %. If % additionally exhibits
Preference for Sure Diversification, then for any f ∈ F∅ with u(f) ∈ int(u(F)),
there exists a probability P ∈ core(B) such that g % f implies P · u(g) ≥ P · u(f).
The proof of Lemma A.7 is also omitted since it is a slight modification of the
proof of Lemma A.4 with J = ∅ taken. The last preliminary result follows below.
The equivalence between (1), (2), and (3) in the statement is a result of GS.
Lemma A.8. Suppose that (u,B) is an invariant biseparable representation of the
preference relation %, and let J be a nonempty subset of I. If % exhibits Local
Preference for Hedging with respect to J , then the following equivalent conditions
hold:
(1) For any f, g ∈ FJ and α ∈ [0, 1], f ∼ g implies αf + (1− α)g % f ;
(2) The marginal belief functional BJ is superadditive: For any v, w ∈ RSJ ,
BJ(v + w) ≥ BJ(v) + BJ(w) ;
(3) For any f, g ∈ FJ , f % g if and only if
min
p∈mcJ (B)




A.3.2 Proofs for Section 1.4
We prove Lemma 1.1 and our characterization theorem. Reversing the order of pre-
sentation, we show Theorem 1.2 first and then Theorem 1.1.
Proof of Lemma 1.1
Proof. Let J be a nonempty subset of I. Suppose P ∈ core(B). We need to show
that
margJ(P ) · v ≥ BJ(v) , ∀v ∈ RSJ . (A.10)
Since BJ(v) = B(ϕ−1J (v)) by definition of BJ and ϕJ is a bijection from RJ to RSJ ,
(A.10) is equivalent to
P · v ≥ B(v) , ∀v ∈ RJ .41 (A.11)
Since RJ ⊂ RS and P ∈ core(B), (A.11) holds, which completes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 1.2
Proof. We first prove the necessity of LPH. Let a nonempty subset J ⊂ I be given.
Assume BJ is superadditive and core(B) is J-compatible. Fix f1, · · · , fn ∈ F and
α1, · · · , αn ∈ [0, 1], and suppose f1 ∼ · · · ∼ fn,
∑n
k=1 αk = 1, and
∑n
k=1 αkfk ∈ FJ .
Superadditivity of BJ and Lemma A.8 imply that mcJ(B) is nonempty. Fix pJ ∈








αkP · u(fk) .
By the affinity of u,
n∑
k=1












































k=1 αkfk % f1.
We turn to the proof of sufficiency of LPH. Superadditivity of BJ is immediate from
Lemma A.8. We need to show J-compatibility of core(B). Suppose to the contrary
that there exists a probability qJ ∈ mcJ(B) such that qJ 6∈ margJ(core(B)). Assume
without loss of generality that 0 ∈ int(u(L)). Then, since margJ(core(B)) is closed
and convex, by the Separating Hyperplane Theorem (Aliprantis and Border, 2006,




⊂ RSJ such that pJ · v > qJ · v for
all pJ ∈ margJ(core(B)). Let f ∈ FJ be a J-act that satisfies u(ϕJ(f)) = v. Then,
B(u(f)) = min
p̃J∈mcJ (B)
p̃J · v ≤ qJ · v < pJ · v , ∀pJ ∈ margJ(core(B)) . (A.12)
Moreover, by Lemma A.4, there exists a probability Q ∈ core(B) such that Q ·u(f) =
B(u(f)). Since margJ(Q) ∈ margJ(core(B)), we obtain
B(u(f)) = Q · u(f) = margJ(Q) · u(ϕJ(f)) = margJ(Q) · v > B(u(f)) ,
where the last inequality follows from (A.12). This is a contradiction. Therefore, we
have proved that core(B) is J-compatible.
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Proof of Theorem 1.1
Proof. (Necessity) First, we show the necessity of MIUA. Fix distinct issues i1, · · · , im ∈
I. Let f1 ∈ Fi1 , · · · , fm ∈ Fim , g1, · · · , gn ∈ F , and α1, · · · , αm, β1, · · · , βn ∈ [0, 1]





We need to show that f1 % g1. Since Bik is superadditive for each k = 1, · · · ,m,
Lemma A.8 implies that there exist p1 ∈ mci1(B), · · · , pm ∈ mcim(B) such that
B(u(fk)) = pk · u(ϕik(fk)) for all k. Since core(B) is rich, there exists P ∈ core(B)
such that margik(P ) = pk for each k. Then, for each k = 1, · · · , n,
P · u(fk) = margik(P ) · u(ϕik(fk)) = B(u(fk)) . (A.13)
In particular, P · u(f1) = B(u(f1)). Hence, by Lemma A.2, the half space H = {v ∈
RS : P · v ≥ P · u(f1)} contains U = {u(f ′) ∈ RS : f ′ % f}. Moreover, (A.13) also




k=1 αkP ·u(fk) =
P · u(f1), which implies that u(
∑m
k=1 αkfk) is a boundary point of the half space H.
Given this, suppose to the contrary that g1  f1. Then, by continuity of B,














k=1 αkfk) lies on the boundary of H. Therefore, f1 % g1.
(Sufficiency) Suppose the preference relation % exhibits MIUA and write I =
{i1, · · · , im}, where the issues i1, · · · , im are distinct. Since it implies LPH with re-
spect to i for each i ∈ I, the functional Bi is superadditive, for each i, by Lemma A.8.
To show that core(B) is rich, let
M = {(margi1(P ), · · · ,margim(P )) ∈ mci1(B)× · · · ×mcim(B) :P ∈ core(B)} .
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Since core(B) is closed and convex, so is M . Suppose to the contrary that core(B) is




\M . Using the Separating
Hyperplane Theorem (Aliprantis and Border, 2006, Corollary 5.80), we can find v =
(v1, · · · , vm) ∈ R∪
m
k=1Sik , with vk ∈ RSik for each k, such that
∑m
k=1 pk · vk >
∑m
k=1 qk ·
vk, for all (p1, · · · , pm) ∈M . This condition can be rewritten as
m∑
k=1
margik(P ) · vk >
m∑
k=1
qk · vk , ∀P ∈ core(B). (A.14)
Assume without loss of generality that 0 ∈ int(u(L)). Then, we can choose sufficiently
small ε > 0 so that











∣∣Bik(εvk)− Bik′ (εvk′)∣∣ < supu(L) . (A.15)









v′k = εvk + ϕik(ck) .
By construction of ε in (A.15), ϕ−1ik (v
′
k) ∈ int(u(Fik)) for all k. Moreover, we have
Bik(v
′
k) = Bik(εvk + ϕik(ck)) = Bik(εvk) + ck = max
1≤k′≤m
Bik′ (εvk′) . (A.16)
Now for each k, let fk ∈ Fik be an ik-act such that u(ϕik(fk)) = v′k. Then, since
B(u(fk)) = Bik(u(ϕik(fk))) = Bik(v′k), we have f1 ∼ · · · ∼ fm from (A.16). Moreover,
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we obtain that for any P ∈ core(B),
∑m
k=1margik(P ) · u(ϕik(fk)) =
∑m
k=1margik(P ) · v′k
=
∑m














k=1 qk · (εvk + ϕik(ck))
=
∑m
k=1 qk · v′k =
∑m
k=1 qk · u(ϕik(fk)) ,
(A.17)
where the inequality holds by (A.14).
Let U = {u(f ′) ∈ RS : f ′ % f1}. We claim that
co{u(fk) : 1 ≤ k ≤ m} ∩ int(co(U)) = ∅ (A.18)
Suppose not. Then, there exist some α̃1, · · · , α̃m ∈ [0, 1] with
∑m
k=1 α̃k = 1 such
that u(
∑m
k=1 α̃kfk) ∈ int(co(U)). So, there is sufficiently small η > 0 such that
u(
∑m
k=1 α̃kfk)− η̄ ∈ co(U) and u(fk)− η̄ ∈ u(Fik) for all k. For each k, let f̃k ∈ Fik





k=1 α̃kfk)− η̄ ∈ co(U). The same argument in the proof of Lemma A.4 that uses
Carathéodory’s Theorem implies that there exist finitely many pairwise indifferent
acts h1, · · · , hn ∈ F such that h1 ∼ f1 and
∑n
l=1 γlu(hl) = u(
∑m
k=1 α̃kf̃k) for some
weights γ1, · · · , γn. Thus, we obtain f̃1 % h1 from SMIUA, which is implied by MIUA
(Lemma A.5). However, this is contradictory to h1 ∼ f1  f̃1. Therefore, (A.18) is
true.
Since u(f1) ∈ int(u(Fi1)) by construction and int(u(Fi1)) ⊂ int(u(F)), there
exists sufficiently small ζ > 0 such that u(f1) + ζ̄ ∈ int(u(F)). Since B(u(f1) + ζ̄) >
B(u(f1)) and B is continuous, u(f1) + ζ̄ ∈ int(U). Hence, int(co(U)) is nonempty.
Thus, the Separating Hyperplane Theorem (Aliprantis and Border, 2006, Theorem
5.67) implies that there exists nonzero Q ∈ RS with
∑
s∈S Q(s) = 1 and c ∈ R such
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that Q · t ≥ c for all t ∈ co(U) and Q · t ≤ c for all t ∈ co{u(fk) : 1 ≤ k ≤ m}. Since
Q ·u(fk) ≤ c for each k, co(U) is contained in the half space {t ∈ RS : Q ·t ≥ Q ·u(fk)}
for each k. Moreover, by Monotonicity (Axiom A.4), Q ∈ ∆(S). Hence, Lemma A.1















where the last inequality holds since qk ∈ mcik(B) and Bik is superadditive, for all k.
This is a contradiction. Therefore, we conclude that core(B) is rich, and the proof of
sufficiency is completed.
A.3.3 Proofs for Section 1.5
Proof of Lemma 1.2
Proof. To show that richness implies nonemptiness, suppose core(B) is rich. Since
each Bi is additive for each i ∈ I, mci(B) is a singleton, in particular nonempty.
Hence, by definition of richness, core(B) is nonempty. To prove the converse, suppose
core(B) is nonempty. Note that Xi∈Imci(B) is a singleton since every Bi is additive.
Moreover, by Lemma 1.1, margi(P ) must be equal to the probability in mci(B) for
all i ∈ I and for all P ∈ core(B). Therefore, core(B) is rich.
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Proof of Theorem 1.3
Proof. Let (u,B) be an invariant biseparable representation of %. We first show that
Ambiguity Aversion and PSD, respectively, are equivalent to nonemptiness of core(B).
The equivalence between Ambiguity Aversion and nonemptiness of core(B) is shown
in Theorem 12 of Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002). Moreover, Lemma A.7 shows
that PSD implies nonemptiness of core(B). Conversely, suppose core(B) is nonempty
and let P ∈ core(B). We will show that % exhibits PSD. Let f1, · · · , fn ∈ F and
α1, · · · , αn ∈ [0, 1] with
∑n
k=1 αk = 1 be given, and assume f1 ∼ · · · ∼ fn and
g := α1f1 + · · ·+ αnfn ∈ F∅. Suppose to the contrary that
f1  g = α1f1 + · · ·+ αnfn .
Since g ∈ F∅, Lemma A.2 implies that
P · u(h) ≥ P · u(g) for all h % g. (A.19)
In particular, P · u(f1) ≥ P · u(g). Moreover, P · u(f1) > P · u(g) since if the equality
holds, then B(u(g)) = P ·u(g) = P ·u(f1) ≥ B(u(f1)) which contradicts f1  g. Since
f1 ∼ · · · ∼ fn, it can be shown in the same way that P · u(fk) > P · u(g). Then, we
obtain
P · u(g) = P · u(α1f1 + · · ·+ αnfn) =
n∑
k=1
αkP · u(fk) > P · u(g) ,
which is a contradiction. Thus, it must be true that g % f . Therefore, % exhibits
PSD.
Next, we show that MIUA implies Ambiguity Aversion and PSD. Assume MIUA.
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Then, for each i ∈ I, mci(B) is nonempty since Bi is superadditive by Theorem 1.1.
Then, core(B) is also nonempty since it is rich by Theorem 1.1. Therefore, by the
equivalence we proved in the previous paragraph, % exhibits Ambiguity Aversion and
PSD.
Lastly, we show the equivalence between (1), (2), (3), and (4) when % satisfies In-
dependence on Fi for each i ∈ I. We already saw that (2), (3), and (4) are equivalent
(even without Independence). Moreover, since each Bi is additive by Independence
imposed on Fi, Lemma 1.2 implies the equivalence between (1) and (4). So, the proof
of the theorem is completed.
A.3.4 Proof for Section 1.7
Proof of Proposition 1.2
Proof. Fix distinct issues i1, · · · , in ∈ I, acts f1 ∈ Fi1 , · · · , fn ∈ Fin ,, lotteries
x1, · · · , xn ∈ L, and weights α1, · · · , αn ∈ [0, 1]. Suppose fk ∼ x̄k for each k. Then,
by Certainty Independence (Axiom A.2), we have
αkfk +
∑
l 6=k αlx̄l ∼
∑n
l=1 αlx̄l ∀k = 1, · · · , n.
Write gk = αkfk+
∑
l 6=k αlx̄l. Since gk ∈ Fik for each k and gk’s are pairwise indifferent








By rearranging the right-hand side, we obtain
∑n


















which is the desired result.
Proof of Proposition 1.3
Proof. Assume I = {1, 2} and let νi be a convex capacity on Si for each i ∈ I. Fix i 6=
j ∈ I. Let i-acts f1, · · · , fn+1 ∈ Fi and pairwise disjoint j-events E1, · · · , En ∈ Aj be
given. Suppose % is a CEU preference with a utility index u and the capacity πH(ν).
Write g = f1E1 · · · fnEnfn+1 and suppose that f1, · · · , fn+1 are pairwise indifferent.







































for each k = 1, · · · , n + 1. Now choose a probability qj ∈ core(νj) and define a
probability Q on S by
Q(si, sj) = pk(sj)(si)qj(sj) , ∀si ∈ Si , ∀sj ∈ Sj,





. Write Ek = Si×Ẽk with Ẽk ⊂ Sj for each k = 1, · · · , n+1.
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(∵ pk ∈ core(νi))
= νi(Gi)qj(Gj) (∵ Ẽ1 ∪ · · · ∪ Ẽn+1 = Sj)
≥ νi(Gi)νj(Gj) . (∵ qj ∈ core(νj))
















































A.4 Proofs for Chapter 2
A.4.1 Proofs for Section 2.3
Proof of Lemma 2.1
Proof. (1) Because of type-independence, we can find wi and w
′
i which are worker i’s
expected wages from choosing σi(ti) and σi(t
′
i), respectively, irrelevant of her type.
By optimality of σi(ti), we have wi − g̃(ti)σi(ti) ≥ w′i − g̃(ti)σi(t′i). Suppose to the
contrary that σi(ti) < σi(t
′
i). Then,
w′i − g̃(t′i)σi(t′i) ≤ wi + g̃(ti)(σi(t′i)− σi(ti))− g̃(t′i)σi(t′i)
= wi + (g̃(ti)− g̃(t′i))(σi(t′i)− σi(ti))− g̃(t′i)σi(ti)
< wi − g̃(t′i)σi(ti) ,
which contradicts that σi(t
′
i) is optimal for t
′
i.








i is prescribed for would
strictly prefer ei to e
′
i as ei is associated with a higher expected wage and a lower
cost. Contradiction.
Proof of Lemma 2.2
Proof. Suppose not. Then, for some equilibrium (σ, ρ, β), there exists i ∈ {1, 2},
ti ∈ T , ei ∈ σi(T ) not type-independent, and wi ∈ R+ such that
Pr
(
ρi(ei, σ−i(t−i)) = wi
∣∣ti) = 1.
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Since the joint distribution p of cost factors has a full support,
Pr
(
ρi(ei, σ−i(t−i)) = wi
∣∣t′i) = 1,
for any t′i ∈ T . Hence, Wi(ei, t′i) = wi for any t′i ∈ T . Then, ei is type-independent
for worker i, which is a contradiction.
Proof of Lemma 2.3
Proof. We start by proving the following lemma.
Lemma A.9. Let (σ, ρ, β) be an equilibrium. If θi < θ
′
i, σi(θi, ci) ≤ σi(θ′i, ci) for any
ci = L,H.




i, ci) of worker i with θi < θ
′
i have the same
belief about worker j(6= i)’s type. Hence, Wi(ei, ti) = Wi(ei, t′i) for any ei ∈ σi(T ).
Suppose σi(ti) > σi(t
′




i strictly prefers it.





Take any i and suppose two probabilities are equal for any ei. Lemma A.9 implies
that for each ei ∈ σi(T ), the set {θi ∈ Θ : σi(θi, ci) = ei} is an empty set, a single-
ton set, or an (nondegenerate) interval for each ci. The supposition of an identical
distribution implies the following: For each ei ∈ σi(T ),
(i) {θi ∈ Θ : σi(θi, L) = ei} is an interval if and only if {θi ∈ Θ : σi(θi, H) = ei} is
an interval, in which case, two intervals have the same interior;
(ii) If both {θi ∈ Θ : σi(θi, L) = ei} and {θi ∈ Θ : σi(θi, H) = ei} are singletons,
they coincide.
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Note that these two conditions imply that all education levels in σi(T ) are type-
independent for i.
Now pick e′i < σi(θ̄, L) from σi(T ) and let θ
inf := inf{θi ∈ Θ : σi(θi, L) = e′i} and
θsup := sup{θi ∈ Θ : σi(θi, L) = e′i}. If θinf > θ, take θ
inf
− < θ
inf and θinf+ > θ
inf close
enough to θinf so that g(θinf− , L) < kg(θ
inf
+ , H). Then, because of the supposition
at the beginning, σi(θ
inf
− , L) < σi(θ
inf
+ , H). However, the opposite direction of the
inequality must be true by Lemma 2.1 (1), which is a contradiction. So, suppose
θinf = θ. Then, θsup < θ̄ since σi is a partially separating strategy. We reach a
contradiction similarly to the previous case by taking a pair of abilities close to θsup.
Therefore, the supposition is false, and the conditional distributions of education
levels induced by σi must be different.
Proof of Proposition 2.1
Proof. Suppose (σ̃, ρ̃, β̃) is an equilibrium that does not satisfy the condition in the
statement. Take any i and two types t′i = (θ
′









and g(θ′i) < kg(θ
′′





















i are both type-independent for i,
42
e′i ≥ e′′i by Lemma 2.1 (1). Hence, type ti may profitably deviate to e′′i , which is a
contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 2.2
Proof. We first show that for each i, σi(Θ× {L}) ∩ σi(Θ× {H}) 6= ∅, that is, some
education level can be chosen both when i has the low cost factor and when she
has the high cost factor. Suppose the intersection is empty for some i. Then, every
education level in σi(T ) is type-independent.
43
42See example (3) right after Definition 2.5.
43See example (2) right after Definition 2.5.
131
Case 1 : Assume k > g(θ)/g(θ̄). Then, g̃(θ, L) < g̃(θ̄, H). Hence, σi(θ, L) >
σi(θ̄, H) by Lemma 2.1 (1) and
Wi(σi(θ, L), θ, L) > Wi(σi(θ̄, H), θ̄, H)
by Lemma 2.1 (2). However, by Lemma A.9, the LHS of the inequality is E
[
θi | θi ≤ θ′i
]
for some θ′i > θ, or θ if only (θ, L) chooses σi(θ, L). Similarly, the RHS is E
[
θi | θi ≥ θ′′i
]
for some θ′′i < θ̄, or θ̄ if only (θ̄, H) chooses σi(θ̄, H). So, the inequality cannot hold.
Case 2 : Assume k = g(θ)/g(θ̄). Then, g̃(θ, L) = g̃(θ̄, H). If σi(θ, L) > σi(θ̄, H),
then the same argument as in Case 1 leads to a contradiction. So, assume σi(θ, L) <
σi(θ̄, H). Take any θ
L
i > θ and θ
H
i < θ̄. Lemma 2.1 (1) implies σi(θ
L
i , L) > σi(θ̄, H) >
σi(θ, L) > σi(θ
H
i , H). In particular, type (θ̄, H) is completely separated from other
types under σi, which implies Wi(σi(θ̄, H), ti) = θ̄ for any ti ∈ T . However, by
Lemma 2.1 (2), we obtain θ̄ = Wi(σi(θ̄, H), ti) < Wi(σi(θ
L
i , L), ti) ≤ θ̄, which is a
contradiction.
Case 3 : Lastly, assume 1 < k < g(θ)/g(θ̄). Let θ†i > θ be an ability such
that g(θ†i ) = kg(θ̄). Then, for each θi ∈ [θ, θ
†
i ], define s(θi) as the ability satisfying
g(θi) = kg(s(θi)). Note that s is one-to-one and strictly increasing. Now take any
distinct θ′i < θ
′′
i ∈ [θ, θ
†

















. Hence, if we take a rational number rθi between σi(θi, L)
and σi(s(θi), H) for each θi ∈ [θ, θ†i ], the collection {rθi : θi ∈ [θ, θ
†
i ]} is a set of a
continuum of distinct rational numbers, which is a contradiction.





> 0. The idea is that if we pick any education level in
σi(Θ×{L})∩σi(Θ×{H}), either itself or close by education levels belong to Ei. So,
take any i and ei ∈ σi(Θ× {L}) ∩ σi(Θ× {H}).
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Case 1 : Suppose {θi ∈ Θ : σi(θi, L) = ei} and {θi ∈ Θ : σi(θi, H) = ei} are
nondegenerate intervals, and that E
[




θi |σi(θi, H) =
ei, ci = H
]
. Let j 6= i be the index of the other worker. Note that for any set




∣∣ ej ∈ Sj] = E[θi ∣∣ ej ∈ Sj]
= Pr(ci = L |σ(t) ∈ {ei} × Sj) · E
[
θi |σi(θi, L) = ei, ci = L
]
+ Pr(ci = H |σ(t) ∈ {ei} × Sj) · E
[
θi |σi(θi, H) = ei, ci = H
]
.
By Lemma 2.3, we can find an education level e′j such that Pr
(





σj(θj, H) ≤ e′j | cj = H
)
. Assume the LHS is greater. (The opposite case



























ρi(ei, ej) | ej > e′j
]





< 1 for any wi ≥ 0. Since p has a full support, Pr
(
ρi(ei, σ−i(t−i)) = wi | ti
)
< 1









Case 2 : Suppose {θi ∈ Θ : σi(θi, L) = ei} and {θi ∈ Θ : σi(θi, H) = ei} are
nondegenerate intervals, and that E
[




θi |σi(θi, H) =
ei, ci = H
]
. Then, ei is type-independent. Assume sup{θi ∈ Θ : σi(θi, L) = ei} >
sup{θi ∈ Θ : σi(θi, H) = ei}. (The other cases allow similar arguments and will be
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omitted.) Let θsup := sup{θi ∈ Θ : σi(θi, H) = ei} and take θ′i < θsup near θsup such
that σi(θ
′
i, L) = ei. Then, there is an interval (θ
sup, θ†) such that g(θ′i, L) < g(θi, H) for
all θi ∈ (θsup, θ†). Since ei is type-independent and σi(θi, H) > ei for all θi ∈ (θsup, θ†),
σi(θi, H) is not type-independent for any θi ∈ (θsup, θ†) by Lemma 2.1 (1). Thus, by










Case 3 : Suppose {θi ∈ Θ : σi(θi, c′) = ei} is a nondegenerate interval and
{θi ∈ Θ : σi(θi, c′′) = ei} is a singleton for c′ 6= c′′. Then, a similar argument as in
Case 2 can be applied and will be omitted.
Case 4 : Suppose {θi ∈ Θ : σi(θi, ci) = ei} is a singleton for each ci = L,H. If two
sets coincide with each other, the argument in Case 2 can be applied. If two sets are
distinct, the argument in Case 1 can be applied.
A.4.2 Proofs for Section 2.4
Proof of Proposition 2.3
Proof. Let a pair of cutoffs (xL, xH) ∈ Θ2 be given. Define two subsets E+, E0 ⊂ T by
E+ := {(θ, c) ∈ T : θ ≥ xc} and E0 := {(θ, c) ∈ T : θ ≤ xc}. E+ (E0, resp.) is the set
of types whose abilities are above (below, resp.) the corresponding cutoffs xL or xH .
Let ρ++(xL, xH) = E
[
θ1 | t1 ∈ E+, t2 ∈ E+
]
, ρ+0(xL, xH) = E
[
θ1 | t1 ∈ E+, t2 ∈ E0
]
,
ρ0+(xL, xH) = E
[
θ1 | t1 ∈ E0, t2 ∈ E+
]
, and ρ00(xL, xH) = E
[
θ1 | t1 ∈ E0, t2 ∈ E0
]
.













where αL = pLL(1 − F (xL))2 + pLH(1 − F (xL))(1 − F (xH)) and αH = pHL(1 −




































(ρ+0 − ρ00) .








The functions defined above have the following interpretation. Suppose both
workers choose some education level, say e+, if their abilities are above the given
cutoff xL or xH , and another level, say e0, if their abilities are below the given cutoff.
Then, ρ++ is the expected ability of a worker when she chose e+ and the other chose
e+. Similarly, ρ+0 is her expected ability given that she chose e+ while the other chose
e0. ρ0+ and ρ00 can be similarly understood. Now suppose a worker’s wage is equal
to those expected values for each education level profile. Then, dc is the difference
between a worker’s expected wages from choosing e+ and from choosing e0 given her
cost factor c.
44αL and αH are functions of xL and xH , too.
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Since k < g(θ)/g(θ̄), there exist θL, θH ∈ Θ such that g(θL) = kg(θ̄) and g(θ) =
kg(θH). Then, ρ++ = ρ+0 and ρ0+ < ρ00 at (θL, θ̄), and ρ++ < ρ+0 and ρ0+ = ρ00
at (θ, θH). Moreover, since θL < θ̄, θ < θH , and cost factors are strictly positively
correlated, we obtain that dL > dH at (θL, θ̄) and dL < dH at (θ, θH). Since d(θL, θ̄) >
0, d(θ, θH) < 0 and d is continuous, there exists a pair of cutoffs (x̄L, x̄H) ∈ (θ, θ̄)2
such that d(x̄L, x̄H) = 0 and x̄L < x̄H by Intermediate Value Theorem.
Let ē = dL(x̄L, x̄H)/g(x̄L) and consider the following strategy profile (σ, ρ):
σi(θi, ci) =

ē if θi ≥ x̄ci
0 if θi < x̄
ci




ρ00(x̄L, x̄H) if ei, e−i < ē
ρ0+(x̄L, x̄H) if ei < ē and e−i ≥ ē
ρ+0(x̄L, x̄H) if ei ≥ ē and e−i < ē
ρ++(x̄L, x̄H) if ei, e−i ≥ ē
.
Given σ, the firm’s beliefs that follow the Bayes’ rule after education level profiles
(0, 0), (0, ē), (ē, 0), and (ē, ē) are uniquely determined. Let those distributions denoted
by β(0, 0), β(0, ē), β(ē, 0), and β(ē, ē), respectively, and then define
β(e1, e2) =

β(0, 0) if e1, e2 < ē
β(0, ē) if e1 < ē and e2 ≥ ē
β(ē, 0) if e1 ≥ ē and e2 < ē
β(ē, ē) if e1, e2 ≥ ē
.
Now we show that (σ, ρ, β) is an equilibrium. By construction, the conditions for ρ and
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β are trivially satisfied. To see why σi is optimal for worker i, consider the cutoff types
(x̄L, L) and (x̄H , H). By definition of x̄L, x̄H , and ē, we have dL(x̄L, x̄H) = g(x̄L)ē
and dH(x̄L, x̄H) = kg(x̄H)ē. Hence, those two cutoff types are indifferent between ē
and zero education. Since education cost is strictly decreasing in ability once the cost
factor is fixed, types with abilities above the cutoffs prefer ē over 0 while those with
abilities below the cutoffs prefer 0 over ē. Therefore, (σ, ρ, β) is an equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 2.4




2 + pLHF (x)
)
E[θ1 | θ1 ≤ x] +
(
pHLF (x) + pHH
)
E[θ1]
pLLF (x)2 + pLHF (x) + pHLF (x) + pHH
, and
ρ0+(x) =
pLLF (x)E[θ1 | θ1 ≤ x] + pHLE[θ1]























The functions above have the following interpretation. Suppose each worker chooses
zero education if and only if either her ability is below x and her cost factor is L, or
her cost factor is H. ρ00(x) is worker i’s expected ability given that she and the other
worker j chose zero education. ρ0+(x) is her expected ability when she chose zero
education but j did not choose zero. If we assume i’s wage is equal to her expected
ability, ρc is her expected wage from choosing zero education when her cost factor
is c = L,H. Given that the cost factors are strictly positively correlated, a simple








ds for x ≤ θ ≤ θ̄,
and define s : Θ → Θ by s(x) = max{s′, x}, where s′ = inf
{
θ ∈ Θ : g(θ) ≤ kg(θ̄)
}
.
Note that s′ is the ability such that the marginal costs of education for type (s′, L)
and type (θ̄, H) are the same. (s′ = θ if there is no such ability level.)
Given these functions, consider the following strategy profile:
σxi (θi, ci) =

ê(θi, x) if θi > x and ci = L
0 otherwise
for each i = 1, 2; and
ρxi (ei, e−i) =

ρ00(x) if ei = e−i = 0
ρ0+(x) if ei = 0 and e−i > 0
x′ if ei = ê(x
′, x) for some x′ ∈ (x, θ̄]
θ̄ if ei > ê(θ̄, x)
for each i = 1, 2.
We first show that there is x̄ ∈ (θ, θ̄) such that σx̄i is worker i’s best reply to σx̄−i and
ρx̄ for each i. Such x̄ is the value satisfying x̄−ρL(x̄) = 0. Since limx→θ(x−ρL(x)) =
θ − E[θi] < 0 and limx→θ̄(x − ρL(x)) = θ̄ − E[θi] > 0, such x̄ indeed exists on (θ, θ̄).
First, σx̄i (θi, L) is optimal for all types (θi, L) with θi > x̄. If type (θi, L) chooses zero
education, her payoff is ρL(x̄) = x̄. If she chooses ê(x′, x̄) for some x′ ∈ (x, θ̄], her


















R 0 for x′ Q θi ,
ê(θi, x̄) gives a higher payoff than any other ê(x











ds = θi − (θi − x̄) = x̄, and hence zero education is suboptimal.
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As any education level higher than ê(θ̄, x) is clearly suboptimal, σx̄i (θi, L) = ê(θi, L)
is indeed optimal for type (θi, L). Now we see if σ
x̄
i (θi, L) = 0 is optimal for type











ds = x′− g(θi)
g(x̄)
(x′−x̄) < x̄. Hence, zero education
is optimal for the type. Lastly, we need to show that σx̄i (θi, H) = 0 is optimal for
type (θi, H) for any θi. For this, it is sufficient to show that zero education is optimal
for type (θ̄, H), which has the lowest marginal cost among high-cost-factor types. By
definition of s(x), education level ê(s(x̄), x̄) will give the type the highest expected
payoff among all positive education levels. Hence, zero education is optimal for the
type if






If s′ ≤ x̄, this inequality holds for any k > 1 since s(x̄) = x̄ and ρH(x̄) > ρL(x̄) = x̄.





g(θ̄)/g(s)ds. It can be easily shown that





if k ≥ k̄, σx̄i is a best reply to σx̄−i and ρx̄. By construction of ρ00, ρ0+, and ê, it is easy
to see that ρx̄ is optimal for the firm given some belief that satisfies every condition
in the definition of equilibrium.
The strategy profile (σx̄, ρx̄) with an appropriate belief does survive D1 criterion.
Note that (i) the equilibrium wage associated with ê(θ̄, x̄) is θ̄, and (ii) the only unsent
messages in this equilibrium are e > ê(θ̄, x̄). Hence, even if the maximum wage θ̄ is
offered, no type can obtain a higher payoff than her equilibrium expected payoff by
choosing an unsent education level. So, no restriction on the firm’s belief is imposed
by D1 criterion.
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A.5 Proofs for Chapter 3
A.5.1 Preliminary results
We defined a preorder ≥E in Section 3.2. We define another binary relation DE over
R for each event E.
Definition A.7. For an event E ⊂ S and two rankings ρ, τ ∈ R, τ is said to
monotonically improve E relative to ρ if H(s; τ) ⊂ H(s; ρ) for all s ∈ E. In this case,
we write τ DE ρ.
If H(s; ρ) ⊂ H(s; τ), H(s; ρ)∩Ec ⊂ H(s; τ)∩Ec. Hence, τ DE ρ implies τ ≥E ρ. More
precisely, τ DE ρ if and only if (i) τ ≥E ρ and (ii) τ(s) > τ(s′) for all s, s′ ∈ E such
that ρ(s) > ρ(s′). The second condition means that the relative rankings between the
states in E under ρ are preserved under τ . It can be shown that the binary relation
DE is a partial order, being antisymmetric in addition to reflexive and transitive,
whereas ≥E is a preorder. We present the following useful lemma.
Lemma A.10. Suppose ν is a convex capacity on S. Then, for any event E ⊂ S
and any two rankings ρ, τ ∈ R, τ DE ρ implies pντ (E) ≤ pνρ(E).
Proof. Suppose ν is convex. It is known that ν is convex if and only if for any events
E,F,G ⊂ S such that E ⊂ F and F ∩G = ∅, ν(E ∪G)− ν(E) ≤ ν(F ∪G)− ν(F ).
Fix an event E and assume τ DE ρ. For each s ∈ E, since H(s; τ) ⊂ H(s; ρ) and
s /∈ H(s; ρ), the convexity of ν implies
pντ ({s}) = ν(H(s; τ) ∪ {s})− ν(H(s; τ)) ≤ ν(H(s; ρ) ∪ {s})− ν(H(s; ρ)) = pνρ({s}) .
Therefore, pντ (E) ≤ pνρ(E).
Next, we define still another binary relation ≈E on R.
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Definition A.8. Given an event E ⊂ S, a ranking τ ∈ R is an E-shuffle of another
ranking ρ ∈ R if H(s; ρ)\E = H(s; τ)\E for all s ∈ E and ρ(s) = τ(s) for all s ∈ S\E.
In this case, we write ρ ≈E τ .
If ρ ≈E τ , then ρ ≥E τ and τ ≥E ρ. The relation ρ ≈E τ holds if each state outside E
has the same ranking under ρ and τ and the order between a state inside E and a state
outside E is not reversed under the two rankings. The rank-dependent probability of
an event remains fixed under two rankings if they are E-shuffles of each other.




Proof. Fix ν and E, and suppose ρ ≈E τ . If E is empty, pνρ(E) = pντ (E) = 0. If
E = S, pνρ(E) = p
ν
τ (E) = 1. Suppose E is nonempty and proper. Number the states
in S\E as t1, · · · , tm so that ρ(t1) > · · · > ρ(tm), where m = |S| − |E|. Also, number
the states in E as s11, · · · , s1n(1), s21, · · · , s2n(2), · · · , s
m+1
1 , · · · , sm+1n(m+1) so that
ρ(s1i ) > ρ(t1) ∀i = 1, · · · , n(1),
ρ(tj−1) > ρ(s
j
i ) > ρ(tj) ∀i = 1, · · · , n(j), ∀j = 2, · · · ,m,
ρ(tm) > ρ(s
m+1
i ) ∀i = 1, · · · , n(m+ 1),
ρ(sji ) > ρ(s
j
i+1) ∀i = 1, · · · , n(j)− 1, ∀j = 1, · · · ,m+ 1,
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H(sj1; ρ) ∪ {s
j






H(sj1; ρ) ∪ {s
j







ν(H(sj1; ρ) ∪ {s
j






With a similar numbering s̃11, · · · , s̃1n(1), · · · , s̃
m+1




ν(H(s̃j1; τ) ∪ {s̃
j




1; τ)) . (A.23)
Since ρ ≈E τ , H(sj1; ρ) = H(s̃
j
1; τ) and {s
j




1, · · · , s̃
j
n(j)} for all j =
1, · · · ,m+ 1. Therefore, equations (A.22) and (A.23) imply pνρ(E) = pντ (E).
The next two lemmata include useful properties of the three binary relations we
have defined.
Lemma A.12. Let a capacity ν on S and an event E ⊂ S be given. Suppose τ ≥E ρ.
Then, there exists a finite sequence ρ11, ρ
1
2, · · · , ρK1 , ρK2 with K ≥ 1 such that
τ = ρK2 ≈E ρK1 DE ρK−12 ≈E ρK−11 DE · · · DE ρ12 ≈E ρ11 DE ρ.
Consequently, pντ (E) ≤ pνρ(E) if ν is convex.
Proof. If E is empty, we can take ρ11 = ρ
1
2 = ρ. If E is the entire set S, we can take
ρ11 = ρ and ρ
1
2 = τ . This completes the proof for these cases.
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Suppose E is nonempty and proper. Let t1, · · · , tm be the states in Ec such that
τ(t1) > · · · > τ(tm), where m = |Ec|. The rest of the proof is by construction of the
sequence ρ11, ρ
1
2, · · · , ρK1 , ρK2 . It can be constructed by repeating the following step.




j ∈ {1, · · · ,m} :τ(s) > τ(tj), and
ρk2(s
′) > ρk2(s)⇒ τ(s′) > τ(tj)∀s′ ∈ E
}
,
if the set on the right-hand side is nonempty and jk(s) = m+ 1 otherwise. Then, let
ρk+11 ∈ R be the unique ranking on S that satisfies
(i) ρk+11 (t1) > · · · > ρk+11 (tm);
(ii) ρk+11 (tjk(s)−1) > ρ
k+1
1 (s) > ρ
k+1
1 (tjk(s)), for all s ∈ E, where τ(t0) = |S| + 1 and
τ(tm+1) = 0; and
(iii) jk(s) = jk(s′) and ρk2(s) > ρ
k
2(s
′) imply ρk+11 (s) > ρ
k+1
1 (s
′) for all s, s′ ∈ E.
By construction, ρk+11 DE ρ
k
2. Then, let ρ
k+1
2 ∈ R be the unique E-shuffle of ρk+11 such
that
jk(s) = jk(s′) and τ(s) > τ(s′) imply ρk+12 (s) > ρ
k+1
2 (s
′) for all s, s′ ∈ E.
If ρk+12 = ρ
k
2, we stop. Otherwise, we proceed to step k + 1 to repeat the procedure
above starting from ρk+12 .
This procedure stops in finitely many steps. The ranking ρK2 generated at the last
step K − 1 is equal to τ by construction.
143
Finally, suppose ν is convex. Then, by Lemma A.10 and Lemma A.11, we obtain










≥ · · ·





which completes the proof.
Lemma A.13. Fix a state s ∈ S, an event E ⊂ S, and two rankings ρ, τ ∈ R. Then,
the following hold:
(1) ρ ≥{s} τ ⇐⇒ ρ D{s} τ ;
(2) ρ DE τ =⇒ ρ D{t} τ for all t ∈ E.
Proof. Since H(s; ρ)\{s} = H(s; ρ) and H(s; τ)\{s} = H(s; τ), the binary relation
≥{s} is equal to D{s}. Hence, (1) holds. Condition (2) trivially holds by definition.
The last preliminary lemma is related to the Choquet expected utility from a
mixture of an act and a binary bet.
Lemma A.14. Let E ⊂ S and ψ = a · 1E for some a > 0, where 1E is the indicator
function on E. Suppose that ϕ : S → R and ρ, ρ′ ∈ R satisfy ϕ(s) > ϕ(s′) ⇒
ρ(s) > ρ(s′) and ϕ(s) + ψ(s) > ϕ(s′) + ψ(s′) ⇒ ρ′(s) > ρ′(s′) for all s, s′ ∈ S. Then,
















pντ (E) ≤ π ≤ max
ρ′≥E τ≥E ρ
pντ (E) (A.24)








Proof. For each c ∈ [0, a], let ρc ∈ R be a ranking such that
ϕc(s) > ϕc(s
′) =⇒ ρc(s) > ρc(s′) ,
where ϕc = ϕ + c · 1E. Since ϕ + ψ ≥ ϕc ≥ ϕ on E and ϕ + ψ = ϕc = ϕ on Ec,




the rank-dependent probabilities associated with ν, we have
∫
S














Since ρ′ ≥E ρc ≥E ρ for all c, (A.24) holds. If ϕ is constant on E, ρc ∈ R(E) except
for at most finitely many values of c ∈ [0, a]. Therefore, (A.25) holds.
A.5.2 Proofs for Section 3.3
Proof of Proposition 3.1
Proof. We will show (1) ⇒ (2) ⇒ (4) ⇒ (1) and (2) ⇔ (3).
First, (1) implies (2) by Lemma A.12.
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To show that (2) implies (4), assume that condition (2) holds. Since ν(E) = pντ (E)
for some τ ∈ R̄(E), ν(E) ≥ minρ∈R pνρ(E). Moreover, since τ ≥E ρ for all ρ ∈ R,
ν(E) = pντ (E) ≤ pνρ(E) for all ρ ∈ R by condition (2). Hence, ν(E) ≤ minρ∈R pνρ(E).
Thus, condition (4) holds.
To show that (4) implies (1), suppose to the contrary that (4) holds but ν is not
convex. Then, there exist two events E,F ⊂ S such that ν(E) + ν(F ) > ν(E ∪ F ) +
ν(E ∩ F ). Consider a ranking ρ ∈ R such that
ρ(s1) > ρ(s2) > ρ(s3) > ρ(s4)
for all s1 ∈ E ∩ F , s2 ∈ F\E, s3 ∈ E\F , and s4 ∈ S\(E ∪ F ). Then, we obtain
pνρ(E) = p
ν
ρ(E ∩ F ) + pνρ(E\F )
= ν(E ∩ F ) + ν
(




(E ∩ F ) ∪ (F\E)
)
= ν(E ∩ F ) + ν(E ∪ F )− ν(F )
< ν(E) .
This is a contradiction since (4) is violated.
Clearly, (2) implies (3). Now it remains to show that (3) implies (2). Assume (3)
and τ ≥E ρ. We need to show pντ (E) ≤ pνρ(E). By Lemma A.12, there is a finite
sequence ρ11, ρ
1
2, · · · , ρK1 , ρK2 such that
τ = ρK2 ≈E ρK1 DE ρK−12 ≈E ρK−11 DE · · · DE ρ12 ≈E ρ11 DE ρ.
Since ρ11 DE ρ, we have ρ
1










pνρ({s}) = pνρ(E) .
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(E) since ρ12 ≈E ρ11. Repeating this, we
obtain





≤ · · · ≤ pνρ12(E) ≤ p
ν
ρ(E) ,
which is the desired result.
Proof of Theorem 3.1
Proof. Let V : F → R denote the utility function corresponding to the representation
(u, ν). We first show the sufficiency of Axiom 3.1. Assume the axiom holds. Fix any
E ⊂ S and ρ, τ ∈ R such that τ ≥E ρ. We will show
pνρ(E) ≥ pντ (E), (A.26)
which implies the convexity of ν by Proposition 3.1.
Let h = yEy′ be a binary bet on E. We normalize u(y) to 1 and u(y′) to 0. Let
B = {b1, · · · , b|S|} and W = {w1, · · · , w|S|} be subsets of L such that
(i) b|S|  · · ·  b1 and w|S|  · · ·  w1;
(ii) b1  w1;










Let sρ = ρ
−1(1) and sτ = τ
−1(1) be the states that have the lowest rankings under ρ
and τ , respectively. We consider the following two cases separately.
Case 1: Suppose pνρ(sρ) = p
ν
τ (sτ ) = 1. First, we show that sρ ∈ E or sτ /∈ E.
If not, we have sρ /∈ E and sτ ∈ E. Then, pνρ(E) = 0 and pντ (E) = 1. Let f be
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the unique act in Fρ such that f(S) = B. Similarly, let g be such that g ∈ Fτ and
g(S) = W . Since pνρ(sρ) = p
ν
τ (sτ ) = 1,
V (f) = u(f(sρ)) > u(b1) > u(w1) = u(g(sτ )) = V (g).
For α ∈ (0, 1), let fα = αf + (1 − α)h and gα = αg + (1 − α)h. If 1 − α < α · ∆u,
fα ∈ Fρ and gα ∈ Fτ . Moreover,
V (fα)− V (gα) =
(




αV (g) + (1− α)pντ (E)
)
= α(u(b1)− u(w1))− (1− α).






then Axiom 3.1 is violated. Since u(b1)− u(w1) < ∆u by construction of B and W ,
such α exists. This is a contradiction. Thus, it must be that sρ ∈ E or sτ /∈ E.
If sρ ∈ E, pνρ(E) = 1 ≥ pντ (E). If sτ /∈ E, pντ (E) = 0 ≤ pνρ(E). In any case, (A.26)
holds. This completes the proof for Case 1.
Case 2: Suppose pνρ(sρ) < 1 or p
ν
τ (sτ ) < 1. We assume p
ν
ρ(sρ) < 1 and prove
(A.26) by contradiction. A similar argument applies to the case when ρντ (sτ ) < 1.
Suppose to the contrary that pντ (E) = p
ν
ρ(E) + η for some η > 0. Let f
′ be the
unique act in Fρ with f ′(S) = W , and g′ be the unique one in Fτ with g′(S) = B.
Since pνρ(sρ) < 1, V (f
′) > u(w1). Moreover, V (g
′) ≥ u(b1) > u(w1). So, we can find
γ1, γ2 ∈ (0, 1) such that V (γ1f ′ + (1 − γ1)w1) = V (γ2g′ + (1 − γ2)w1) > u(w1). Let
f = γ1f
′ + (1 − γ1)w1, g′′ = γ2g′ + (1 − γ2)w1, and γ = min{γ1, γ2}. Finally, for
β ∈ (0, 1), let g = βg′′ + (1 − β)w1. Then, f ∈ Fρ, g ∈ Fτ , and f  g. Similarly to
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Case 1, let fα = αf + (1−α)h and gα = αg+ (1−α)h. Then, fα ∈ Fρ and gα ∈ Fτ if
(1− α) < αβγ ·∆u.
Moreover, gα  fα if
V (fα)− V (gα) =
(




αV (g) + (1− α)pντ (E)
)
= α(V (f)− V (g))− (1− α)η
= α
(
V (f)− (βV (g′′) + (1− β)u(w1))
)
− (1− α)η
= α(1− β)(V (f)− u(w1))− (1− α)η < 0
Thus, Axiom 3.1 is violated if there exist α, β ∈ (0, 1) such that






For β sufficiently close to 1, we can find α that satisfies the inequalities above. This
is a contradiction, and we conclude that (A.26) must be true.
Now we show the necessity of Axiom 3.1. Suppose ν is convex. Fix E ⊂ S,
ρ, τ ∈ R, f ∈ Fρ, g ∈ Fτ , h = yEy′ ∈ BE, and α ∈ (0, 1) such that τ ≥E ρ,
fα = αf + (1− α)h ∈ Fρ, gα = αg + (1− α)h ∈ Fτ , and f  g. Then,
V (fα) = αV (f) + (1− α)u(y′) + (1− α)(u(y)− u(y′))pνρ(E),
and
V (gα) = αV (g) + (1− α)u(y′) + (1− α)(u(y)− u(y′))pντ (E).
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Since pνρ(E) ≥ pντ (E) by Proposition 3.1,
V (fα)− V (gα) = α(V (f)− V (g)) + (1− α)(u(y)− u(y′))(pνρ(E)− pνρτ(E)) > 0.
Therefore, fα  gα, and Axiom 3.1 holds.
Proof of Theorem 3.2
Proof. The proof Let V : F → R denote the utility function associated with the
representation (u, ν). First, we show the sufficiency of Axiom 3.2. Assume the axiom
holds and fix E ⊂ S. We will show ν(E) = minρ′∈R pνρ′(E), which implies the
convexity of ν by Proposition 3.1. Since ν(E) is no smaller than the minimum, it
suffices to show
ν(E) ≤ pνρ′(E), ∀ρ′ ∈ R. (A.27)
Fix any ρ ∈ R and τ ∈ R̄(E). Then, ν(E) = pντ (E) and τ ≥E ρ. Hence, a similar
argument in the proof of sufficiency in Theorem 3.1, which proved (A.26), shows
pνρ(E) ≥ pντ (E) = ν(E). This completes the proof of sufficiency.
To show the necessity of Axiom 3.2, suppose ν is convex and fix E ⊂ S, τ ∈ R̄(E),
f ∈ F , g ∈ Fτ , h = yEy′ ∈ BE, and α ∈ (0, 1) such that f  g. Let fα = αf+(1−α)h
and gα = αg + (1− α)h. By Lemma A.14,
V (fα) = αV (f) + (1− α)u(y′) + (1− α)(u(y)− u(y′))π ,









V (gα) = αV (g) + (1− α)u(y′) + (1− α)(u(y)− u(y′))ν(E).
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V (fα)− V (gα) = α(V (f)− V (g)) + (1− α)(u(y)− u(y′))(π − ν(E)) > 0,
which implies fα  gα. Therefore, Axiom 3.2 holds.
A.5.3 Proofs for Section 3.4
Proof of Proposition 3.2
Proof. To show (1) implies (2), assume ν is disjointly superadditive. Suppose to
the contrary that ν(E) 6= minρ′∈R(E) pνρ′(E), for some E ⊂ S. Then, there exists
ρ ∈ R(E) such that pνρ(E) < ν(E). Let F = {t ∈ S : ρ(t) > ρ(s), ∀s ∈ E}. Then,
ρ ∈ R̄(F ) ∩ R̄(E ∪ F ). Hence,
ν(E ∪ F )− ν(F ) = pνρ(E ∪ F )− pνρ(F ) = pνρ(E) < ν(E) ,
which contradicts the disjoint superadditivity of ν. Thus, condition (2) must hold.
We show that (2) implies (1) using the contrapositive. Suppose ν is not disjointly
superadditive. Then, there are disjoint E,F ⊂ S such that ν(E) + ν(F ) > ν(E ∪F ).
Let τ ∈ R be a ranking such that the states in F are top ranked immediately followed
by the states in E. That is, ρ ∈ R̄(F ) ∩ R̄(E ∪ F ). Hence,
pνρ(E) = p
ν
ρ(E ∪ F )− pνρ(F ) = ν(E ∪ F )− ν(F ) < ν(E).
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Thus, (2) is violated. This completes the proof.
The proof of Theorem 3.3 is omitted since it is an easy modification of the proofs
of Theorem 3.1 and Theorem 3.2. The sufficiency proof is similar to that of The-
orem 3.2 which adopts the argument in the proof of Theorem 3.1. One modifica-
tion worth mentioning is that the sets B and W that appear in the proof of Theo-
rem 3.1 must have |S| − |E| + 1 elements in the proof of Theorem 3.3 since every
state in E must be assigned the same lottery. The necessity proof is also similar







by (A.25) of Lemma A.14.
A.5.4 Proofs for Section 3.5
Axiom 3.3**. For any E ⊂ S, τ ∈ R̄(E), f ∈ F , g ∈ Fτ , h ∈ BE, and α ∈ (0, 1),
if f and g are constant on E, implication (∗∗) holds.
Lemma A.15. Suppose the preference % is nontrivial and has a CEU representation.
Then, it satisfies Axiom 3.3 if and only if it satisfies Axiom 3.3**.
Proof. We prove that Axiom 3.3 implies Axiom 3.3**, and that Axiom 3.3** implies
the disjoint superadditivity of the representing capacity. Then, the desired equiva-
lence holds by Theorem 3.3.
Let (u, ν) be the CEU representation of % and let V : F → R denote the cor-
responding CEU function. Suppose % satisfies Axiom 3.3. Fix E ⊂ S, τ ∈ R̄(E),
f ∈ F , g ∈ Fτ , h ∈ BE, and α ∈ (0, 1) such that f ∼ g ∼ h. We need to show
αf + (1−α)h % αg+ (1−α)h. Take a sequence (fn)n∈N in F and (gn)n∈N in Fτ such
that V (fn) > V (gn) for all n ∈ N and u(fn)→ u(f), u(gn)→ u(g) as n→∞. Then,
u(αfn + (1 − α)h) → u(αf + (1 − α)h) and u(αgn + (1 − α)h) → u(αg + (1 − α)h)
as n → ∞ by affinity of u. Hence, V (αfn + (1 − α)h) → V (αf + (1 − α)h) and
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V (αgn+(1−α)h)→ V (αg+(1−α)h). Moreover, by Axiom 3.3, V (αfn+(1−α)h) >
V (αgn + (1 − α)h) for all n ∈ N. Therefore, V (αf + (1 − α)h) ≥ V (αg + (1 − α)h)
as desired.
Now suppose % satisfies Axiom 3.3**. We will show
pνρ(E) ≥ pντ (E), ∀ρ ∈ R(E), ∀τ ∈ R̄(E), ∀E ⊂ S, (A.28)
which implies the disjoint superadditivity of ν by Proposition 3.2.
Fix E ⊂ S, ρ ∈ R(E), and τ ∈ R̄(E). If E = ∅ or E = S, (A.28) trivially holds.
Assume ∅ ( E ( S. Let h̃ = yEy′ ∈ BE for some y, y′ ∈ L, and normalize u(y) = 1




u(bi+1)− u(bi) > 0.
Let f̃ and g̃ be the unique acts that satisfy f̃ ∈ Fρ, g̃ ∈ Fτ , and f̃(S) = g̃(S) = B.
Since V (h̃) = u(y′) + pντ (E), h̃ ∼ y′ implies pντ (E) = 0, in which case (A.28) holds.
Assume h̃  y′. Also, we know f̃ , g̃ % b1  y′. Hence, there are γ1, γ2, γ3 ∈ (0, 1) such
that f ∼ g ∼ h, where
f = γ1f̃ + (1− γ1)y′ ∈ Fρ, g = γ2g̃ + (1− γ2)y′ ∈ Fτ , h = γ3h̃+ (1− γ3)y′ ∈ BE.
By Axiom 3.3**,
αf + (1− α)h % αg + (1− α)h, ∀α ∈ (0, 1). (A.29)
For α close to 1 such that (1− α)γ3 < α ·∆u ·min{γ1, γ2}, αf + (1− α)h ∈ Fρ and
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αg + (1− α)h ∈ Fτ . Thus, by Lemma A.14,
V (αf + (1− α)h) = αV (f) + (1− α)γ3pνρ(E)
V (αg + (1− α)h) = αV (g) + (1− α)γ3pτρ(E).
Since V (f) = V (g), (A.29) implies pνρ(E) ≥ pντ (E). This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3.4
Proof. We will prove statement (2). By Lemma A.15, it suffices to show that %
satisfies Axiom 3.3** if and only if
for any E ⊂ S, f ∈ F constant on E, h ∈ BE, and α ∈ (0, 1),
f ∼ h implies αf + (1− α)h % h
(A.30)
Suppose Axiom 3.3** is satisfied. Fix E ⊂ S, f ∈ F , h ∈ BE, and α ∈ (0, 1) such
that f is constant on E and f ∼ h. Then, by Axiom 3.3** with h playing the roles
of both g and h, αf + (1− α)h % αh+ (1− α)h = h.
Conversely, suppose (A.30) holds. Fix any E ⊂ S, τ ∈ R̄(E), f ∈ F , g ∈ Fτ ,
h ∈ BE, and α ∈ (0, 1) such that f and g are constant on E and f ∼ g ∼ h. By (A.30),
αf + (1 − α)h % h. Moreover, since g and h are comonotonic, αg + (1 − α)h ∼ h.
Therefore, αf + (1− α)h % αg + (1− α)h as required by Axiom 3.3**.
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